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DIALECTIC, ANALYSIS, AND EMPIRICAL GENERALIZATION IN THEOLOGY

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Yale University

AT THE OUTSET I should like to raise several preliminary questions. The first of these: What may we legitimately hope to obtain from methodological enquiries in theology? An obvious motive for asking this question is the fear that theology may follow a course parallel to that of philosophy. Philosophy has fallen upon evil days because of its preoccupation with methodological questions. It seems to have got lost in the endless mazes of epistemology and logic, and to have nothing better to do than to examine with microscopic subtlety the structure of language. Believing that the traditional problems of philosophy are infertile and meaningless, the philosophical methodologist scrupulously refine the instrumentalities of thought and expression. The grand result appears to be that the philosophers take in one another's washing: each examines the semantic and linguistic respectability of the others' questions about questions and statements about statements.

Our immediate problem, however, is not the degradation and trivialization of the philosophical enterprise. At the moment our interest in that runs no farther than to derive a timely warning from it. It is not that methodological enquiry is inherently unproductive: Descartes, Kant, and Kierkegaard are an insurmountable barrier to such a thesis. No, we learn from the methodological stagnation of much of contemporary philosophic thought, that productive methodological enquiry presupposes compelling and widely persuasive convictions about the nature and value of the world—convictions so important for the right ordering and direction of life that all possible clarity in their expression and elaboration is desirable or, to put it differently, if something is really worth saying, it is worth saying rightly. And methodology examines the conditions determining the right expression and the right modes of theoretical elaboration of these basic and critical convictions and intuitions.

The methodological question in theology is: How is theological knowledge possible? The question presupposes that such knowledge exists. If there is no such knowledge, methodology cannot create it. If there is

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no such knowledge, then problems of theological methodology will inevitably prove infertile and trivial. But now if the reality of such knowledge is granted, what is to be hoped for from methodology? For one thing, it may be possible to discover how confusion on methodological questions has needlessly limited the significance—the "appropriatability"—of an item of concrete theological thought. It would be unlikely that all parties discussing that item would accept the methodological revision of its formulation; but some of them might do so, and this would open the way to the discharging of unnecessary tensions among the disputants.

In the second place, methodological study should clarify the relation of theological knowledge to other degrees or modes of knowledge. This problem is part of the broader problem of the relation of the church and its gospel to the world and its wisdom; but this larger problem must be attacked one point at a time. We are now coming up on the methodological front, not because it is the most important one but because confusions reigning there may well block progress in concrete theological thought. The clarification of the relationships between theological and other modes of thought might then materially reduce the unproductive tensions among the protagonists of the respective modes. This would seem no great gain to the burning partisans in the various camps, but their interests need not be regarded as absolutely paramount.

Another possible contribution of methodology is bound up with the longed-for occurrence of a fresh metaphysical-religious vision of the unity of and prospects for human life. A fresh, vigorous, and creative culture cannot be expected to appear upon the ruins of the present one without such a compelling vision. Now the concrete appropriation of such a vision demands a method proportioned to it. Such a method will not appear suddenly out of nowhere. Its development entails the most rigorous examination of the methodological shortcomings and successes of contemporary theological discussion. That examination will not, in all likelihood, produce the creative, synoptic vision, but it will furnish the materials for the appropriation of that vision.

There is a second preliminary question to which brief attention must be given: Does methodology itself presuppose either a particular methodology or a metaphysics?

The methodological presuppositions of any given methodological enquiry are in principle very general, although they may in fact be explicit and specific. The methodology presupposed in such an enquiry as this is simply the method actually employed, which is to say, the distinction of the several elements embodied in the statement of a theological case, and the identification and analysis of each of these elements.

As to whether a metaphysics is presupposed by any particular methodo-

logical enquiry, I refer to what was said above concerning the relation of methodology to the concrete content of theological knowledge. There can be no productive examination of *ways* of knowing, unless something is (antecedently) known. What is to be added to this dictum in this context is that that presupposed truth does not itself determine the pattern or supply the instruments of the methodological study. The depth and intensity of a man's commitment to the Christian faith does not itself supply him with supernaturally edged critical tools for the examination of the cogency and clarity of ways in which that faith has been preached and taught. And if a particular concrete doctrine of that faith exercises undue influence in determining the pattern of criticism, there is the liveliest possible danger of confusion. Hence, no particular or determinate theological perspective is necessarily presupposed by a methodology of the theological sciences. A person may devoutly believe that the indispensable presupposition of all enquiry is that the realm of truth is ultimately coincident with God himself; or that it is God who makes all discovery of truth possible. These are beliefs worthy of examination in the proper context; but methodology can proceed to its work before that examination has been completed. Accordingly if anything can be called the presupposed metaphysics of methodology in general, it is simply that the world is such as to make truth and knowledge achievable. Everyone in his senses believes this, whatever he may say. But not everyone otherwise in his senses knows that when he affirms this he is really affirming the existence of God; and so far it is useful to settle for what everybody knows.

I have already employed several times the distinction between methodological and concrete theological thought. *Methodological thought* is the examination of the principles employed in the expression and vindication of theological knowledge. It is not necessary and it may be an error to say that these are the principles which bestow verity upon human claims, but they are at least the means for obtaining cogency and clarity. *Concrete theological thought* is the statement and interpretation of the verbally communicable content of the Christian faith.

It may be useful to indicate the distinction made for present purposes between systematic and philosophical theology. *Systematic theology* is the elucidation and systematization of the central beliefs of the Christian community, the content of these beliefs being derived from the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. The truth of these beliefs has been commonly held in the Christian church to be nondemonstrable, either because this truth is essentially beyond the powers of comprehension of the finite mind, or because it is too concrete—too "existential"—to permit the ghostly fingers of reason to peel it. *Philosophical theology* is the examination of certain crucial beliefs of the Christian faith, by means of the principals of philosophical criticism, with the view to relieving those beliefs of errors in

formulation and argumentation, and to showing them to be more reasonable than any alternatives.

Dialectic has both negative and positive aspects, and they are distinguished as follows: (a) dialectic on the negative side is the reduction of a given assertion to an absurdity, particularly to the absurdity of self-contradiction. This reduction is brought off without appeal to matters of fact. The typical form negative dialectic takes is: a given viewpoint affirms and denies something at one and the same time; but this is absurd, therefore etc. The "etc." means that neither the affirmation nor the denial need to be taken seriously until the viewpoint has found inward peace. An important specific application of negative dialectic may be seen in pointing out that a particular set of definitions and the corroborating empirical generalizations cannot really be reconciled with each other. And another useful function of dialectic is the exposing of faulty methods of generalization from experience, and faulty application of these generalizations to other aspects of experience. (b) The positive aspect of dialectic consists in showing that a given position is a confused and fragmentary form of the truth. This is denominated "positive" because the position under attack is asserted to have an important element of truth in it. It is a lower and incomplete form of a completed body of truth. A typical expression of this positive dialectic was given above: the proposition, "the world is such as to make truth and knowledge achievable," is implicitly identical with the proposition, "God (as defined in the Christian faith) exists."

Taking the negative and positive aspects together as one method, we say that dialectic employs certain very broad logical laws or principals to exhibit formal inadequacies and errors in the specific or material sciences. We are not able by dialectic to resolve difficulties apprehended by dialectic. These problems must be resolved in the particular material sciences by recourse ultimately to matters of fact.

The two major functions of analysis are first, to determine the meaning (or the "possibility," as an earlier generation would have said) of the principal terms of a proposition or of a system of propositions (referred to hereafter simply as system); and second, to determine the conditions the fulfillment of which could be reasonably regarded as having made out the case for that proposition or system of propositions.

Empirical generalizations are descriptive and explanatory principles drawn from the observation and inspection of experience. Intuition or direct apprehension, and inference are the two operations that figure primarily in empirical generalization. Let us see how these are woven together. A particular aspect of my experience, *e.g.,* anxiety, is directly apprehended, and I judge this to be constitutive of my whole being. Strictly considered, "my whole being" is never directly apprehended as such by me, except possibly in a very vague way, and this generalization accordingly

consists in part of direct apprehension, and in part of extrapolation. Suppose now I judge that a particular aspect of my experience is characteristic and possibly even a defining characteristic of human nature as such. Thus I may say that anxiety, *Sorge,* etc., is the veritable core of human existence as such.

Here the element of extrapolation is relatively very large. My observation of the experience of others and my weighing of their interpretation and description of their experience certainly figure in this second type of empirical generalization. However, I do not seem directly to apprehend the core of their being, even though there may be so substantial a *rapport* between myself and another that we participate in each other's feelings.

These are the three methodological factors examined in this paper, in order to see whether anything can be said concerning the proper and productive synthesis of these factors in systematic theology and philosophical theology. Reinhold Niebuhr's, *The Nature and Destiny of Man* is used as an illustration of problems of synthesis of methods in systematic theology, and A. Farrer's *Finite and Infinite* serves the same purpose in philosophical theology.

Niebuhr employs both the negative and positive form of dialectic without any recognition of the difference, so far as I can find.

A negative dialectic is found in his claim that non-Christian interpretations of human nature and history are inherently contradictions and riddled with paradoxes. "Every affirmation which he may make about his stature, virtue, or place in the cosmos becomes involved in contradictions when fully analyzed. The analysis reveals some presupposition or implication which seems to deny what the proposition intended to affirm."[1] Thus these views might well be discharged summarily, not because they fail to account for the facts but because of internal contradictions. Niebuhr does not actually so dismiss them—he finds them too useful as foils to do that—but pure dialectic would counsel such a course.

Another application of the negative dialectic is made with reference to modern (if not *all*) philosophical anthropology. The modern philosophical understanding of man is split down the middle by the conflict of idealism and naturalism. Neither perspective can be reconciled with the other. And this contradiction annuls the possible validity of the philosophical interpretation of human nature. Here Niebuhr's policy appears to be to cry havoc upon both these houses, possibly on the assumption that since both cannot be right both must be wrong.

This is far from being his whole case, however. He argues that the philosophical understanding of man is a distortion of the truth for at least

[1] R. Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man,* Vol. I, p. 1. This would seem to be an overstatement of his own position, since he nowhere acknowledges that the real Christian view is riddled with contradictions. Indeed, the Christian view transcends "the canons and antinomies of rationality" (Vol. I, p. 12).

two additional dialectical reasons. One of these is that the philosophers do not acknowledge the significance of sin as profoundly modifying the whole set of human life. Even the Christian philosophies habitually seek to hold some corner of reason immune from sin. The refusal to admit the depth and inclusiveness of sin into their presuppositions produces a double or compound distortion of philosophical understanding of man. "Double or compound" because all human comprehension is now (*i.e.*, through the Fall) distortion, but where sin is not acknowledged this distortion is itself distorted. Or, to express it differently, the sickness of the human spirit cannot really be known to be that so long as the mind clings desperately to the illusion of health.

The other dialectical reason for the shortcomings of philosophy is very closely related to the above: the philosophers do not see or do not admit that "having the truth" is really the work of grace and that having the truth even under optimum conditions is at the same time a not having of it.[2] How then shall they have the truth who cannot or will not see the inward affront to truth that sin is, and who cannot or will not see that grace alone worketh truth in us?

The principal form of Niebuhr's positive dialectic is the assertion that a given viewpoint can make sense only if the Christian viewpoint is presupposed. Thus, the tragically wrong and futile efforts on man's part at self-transcendence can be understood adequately only from a perspective in which this drive towards self-transcendence is really consummated. Or, again, the historical and the temporal imply the supra-historical and the eternal—the former can only be understood on the presupposition of the reality of the latter. Thus, the awareness of a temporal series reveals a partial transcendence of this series in finite spirit; but this partial or finite transcendence "inevitably carries with it, by way of implication"[3] an absolute or divine transcendent awareness of temporality. (Strictly considered, no "sense" can really be said to imply another "sense." A judgment or a proposition may imply another judgment. And one intuition may be in fact indissolubly bound up with another intuition. But implication is an affair of propositions, not of concrete entities and events.)

Niebuhr's dialectic is of the pattern: if system A (here the Christian system) is right, then systems B, C, D, etc. are wrong, even though these mistaken systems might be arranged in an ascending scale of approximation to the truth, *i.e.*, according to the degree of awareness of the fact that they participate in a truth that is too much for them. And like most dialecticians Niebuhr suppresses the initial "if." It is true that the vigorous religious life also suppresses this "if"—faith in the fullest sense is no tenta-

[2] *Cf.* Niebuhr, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 243; and this entire chapter, "Having and Not Having the Truth."

[3] Niebuhr, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 9.

tive affair. However, the vigorous religious life is hardly above error and confusion; and when these occur, the grounds for one's commitments must be reviewed in the light of the alternatives, alternatives which presumably were available all the time.

This dialectic, it must now be said, is not really an *argument* at all. What it says is doubtless true enough, but it contains no suggestion for the removal of that initial "if."

A buttressing argument for inconclusive dialectic frequently appears in theological discussion. It is sometimes said[4] that the non-Christian systems, *e.g.,* secularism, are wrong, not merely because the Christian system is right, but because they have produced or are largely responsible for the present disordered and diseased state of affairs in human life. This seems very much like saying to a man who has just lost his bank that this dreadful thing wouldn't have happened to him if he had really believed in God—a diagnosis that may succeed handsomely in completing his ruin. And there is nothing he can say to his spiritual adviser, unless it should occur to him that this judgment may indeed be true *but that there is no conceivable way of knowing whether it is or not,* because it supposes a state of affairs significantly different from the actual one, and simply proposes that if the actual state of affairs had not been what it was, another (and more favorable) one would have taken its place; but since the past is irrecoverable, no ideal state of affairs can be substituted for a part of the past temporal series.

Furthermore, the buttressing argument is fallacious. It begs several important questions, *e.g.,* the effect of philosophical theories in general upon concrete modes of behavior, and, in particular, the rôle played by a theory of a particular sort (say materialism) in the determination of unsatisfactory concrete life patterns.

Thus the inherent weakness of the dialectic cannot be effectively and properly corrected by the addition of this specious and fundamentally rhetorical pleading. But there are additional deficiencies in dialectic. One of these is exemplified in Niebuhr's critique of philosophical interpretations of human nature. Take his view that philosophical anthropology falls apart into the antinomic parties of idealism and naturalism. Since neither of these can theoretically synthesize body and soul in conformity to the deliverances of actual experience, philosophical anthropology must be written off as self-abrogated.

The principal dialectical device here is arbitrary definition with a forced exhaustive disjunction. (There is also appended to this device an appeal to empirical data, but this appeal is reserved for later examination.) That is, *philosophy* or *modern philosophy* is so defined as to involve the exhaustive disjunction: idealism-naturalism. (The prior question is of

[4] *Cf.* Quick, *Doctrines of the Creed,* chap. III.

course whether that definition is adequate for the facts, the answer being that it is not. But I am concerned at the moment with the exclusively dialectical features of Niebuhr's case.) And back of this arbitrary definition of philosophy stands the presupposition of the final inadequacy of rationality for the comprehension of the world. It seems then that the philosophical reason is simply the sort of thing that *cannot* come to grips with concrete reality. It can comprehend at best but one side of experience, never both or all sides.

This charge is either an illicit argument from the nature of the case, or it is a generalization purporting to show how in fact philosophy has actually worked out. As an argument from the nature of the case it is very similar to the one mentioned above, *i.e.,* it is a deduction from a merely arbitrary definition of something, which definition is simply assumed to be the real essence or nature of that thing. Thus "philosophical reason" necessarily breaks down into irreconcilable antinomies, because that is its very nature: the antinomies, idealism-naturalism, are inherent or implicit in it. Apparently on this account a philosophical dualist and even a philosophical theist would be obliged to confess that their perspectives were not really philosophical at all but belonged to another genus of cogitation. And I suppose that their cries of "Bad deal!" would arouse at least a passing ache of sympathy.

One final word about dialectic. I cannot quite make out whether Niebuhr's interpretation of sin, and particularly of pride as sin, is implicitly and in part an *ad hominem* appeal. It is certainly alluringly simple to make it that. What could be simpler than saying to one who refuses to acknowledge his sin or himself as sinner that this refusal, this pride, exemplify the truth thus denied? This is one way of expressing the folk-wisdom axiom that what a person is speaks much louder than what he says. A perfectly sound observation, no doubt, but it is very easy to blunt its edge by indiscriminate use, and particularly by conceiving of it as an argument. It is not an argument, and it cannot be legitimately used to make out a more than plausible case for the Christian doctrine of sin. Why not? Because it is either dialectic, or it is empirical generalization, and I shall briefly indicate again why it will not stick as dialectic, leaving its status as empirical generalization until later. It is either the dialectic of asserting that System B, properly understood, is really a part or a disguised expression of System A (but even if this were true and did not violate the real intent of System B, we should not yet know whether System A itself were true); or it is undiluted dialectic and *ad hominem* appeal, namely, that he who denies he is a sinner has after all his motives or "reasons" for doing so, and an examination of these motives would annul his denial. But everybody has his "reasons" or motives for what he says about sin, and for what he says, in his waking moments, about everything else. And

it is much more than a social requirement of decency that we should take motives for granted when talking intelligently about anything—even when talking about motives; for unless the content of language and thought can be considered apart from the consideration of the motives behind language and thought, then the jig is really up for human thought and communication. Finally, the *ad hominem* appeal prompts a rejoinder in kind, for if B's opinions are determined by his motives or by his general character, *prima facie* the same holds for A; and the rejoinder prompts a rejoinder to itself, still in kind, etc. Thus the logical result of the *ad hominem* appeal is a vicious circle of mere yammering, infinitely wearisome and intrinsically unilluminating.

The purpose of dialectic is to remove any possibility of successful competition with a favored system by showing that the competitors are merely parts of the whole, which is System A. Sooner or later, however, the philosopher or theologian must get around to showing that System A is true. Here he will move into analysis and empirical generalizations.

The methodological principal denominated analysis is employed by Niebuhr when he delineates positively the content of the Christian faith. This is a matter of setting forth the working capital of System A and of defining its central claims. Niebuhr appears to find it difficult to do this without constant reference to competing systems, but logically this is not essential to the analysis of the central notions of Christian thought, for if Christian notions can be thought only in connection with their competitors, then his claim that the ultimate truth is beyond antinomic thought is nonsense.

The second aspect of analysis—determining under what conditions the case could be said to have been made out—seems to me to have attracted very little of Niebuhr's attention. He asks whether experience validates a certain conception,[5] only to add that the validating experience is made possible by the conception itself. Again, he suggests that the superior illuminating power of the Christian view is the mark of its truth.[6] These are hardly more than casual suggestions, and they fall very far short of a demonstration of the theoretic possibility of the central claims of Christian theology. In general he seems to be satisfied either with the assertion that these claims are intrinsically meaningful, *i.e.,* that they are really not absurd, or with the belief that the canons of human reason are not after all final. To the latter I can only say that the canons of human reason are at least as final as the canons of human unreason and that it seems dubious theology even to suggest the identification of the canons of human unreason with the canons of divine reason.

Making out a case for the Christian faith involves, in addition to analysis, the application of the case to experience, or if it seems better

[5] Niebuhr, *op. cit.,* Vol. II, p. 119. [6] *Idem,* Vol. I, p. 249.

religion to some, the application of experience to the case. This is the province of empirical generalization.

What Niebuhr says about anxiety, pride, sensuality, etc. presumably constitutes a set of empirical generalizations. These generalizations are the concrete filling, the empirical meaning of the key Christian conceptions of sin and guilt; and they are, as empirical generalizations, compounded of intuition and inference. Actual concrete experience exhibits pride, fear, anxiety, guilt, etc. as organic aspects of it. Pride, anxiety, bad conscience etc. are, it would seem, directly apprehended as primary, pervasive and constitutive qualities of human nature. If this is true, then there would be no sense in speaking of concrete human existence in abstraction from or unencumbered by these actualities.

These qualities (or "dimensions"—to use a word that is more flavorsome for many at present) cannot be made to follow from the definition of human nature, *i.e.,* they cannot be properly regarded as implications of the definition of man. Such a deduction would be doubly fraudulent in this context: first because these qualities would have been concealed in the definition of man to begin with, and secondly because, as Niebuhr rightly sees, such a deduction would be a denial of man's freedom in sinning. The only necessity that underlies the appearance of these qualities is historical, not logical or metaphysical. Then this must be the pattern that is actually revealed to the observation and inspection of experience, and it is accordingly a kind of functional definition of man, or a descriptive principle of universal extension. Even if it were exalted into a presupposition of experience and of the reflection upon experience, we should not really know what we were talking about in saying *that,* until the attempt was made to apprehend the real flow and phenomenological structure of experience.

Now the question may be asked: What is done with these empirical generalizations, once they are established, *i.e.,* what is their function in Niebuhr's system? Empirical generalizations are tied both into dialectic and into analysis. First for the relation to dialectic: experience and reflection upon experience that appear to be exceptions to the Christian empirical generalizations are in fact but disguised forms of the qualities or dimensions generalized about. For example, the denial of the reality of anxiety or of pride in one's experience presupposes its reality in that experience. How can this be shown? Recourse to dialectic seems inevitable for this purpose. It might, for example, be asserted that anxiety is an intuited quality or mode of experience and that as such it can only be known by being had. Therefore he who says he is not anxious either literally does not know what he is talking about, *i.e.,* has never had anxiety, or if he *does* know what he is talking about, he is either self-deceived or is trying to deceive others in saying that he has no anxiety: he is either a fool or a liar, and high and profitable disputation can be had with neither.

But this is very confusing and difficult. To clear up some of this confusion we need to know whether, for example, anxiety is an explicit quality or tone of observable behavior in general, or, on the other hand, whether it is implicit—even for the self's awareness of and direction of itself—in something like the way a motive is or may be implicit in action or behavior.

Now if anxiety is an explicit quality of an act, it is of course patent absurdity to say that it is present and not present at the same time. An explicit quality cannot be intelligently discussed if it is not explicit at all. (Its possibility can be discussed, but this is insufficient for the above dialectic.) On the other hand, if anxiety is *not* an explicit quality but is understood to be implicit, such as a motive, or an emotional tone, we should do well to pause in all sobriety before the epistemological quicksands awaiting the dialectic at this point. The motives of another person do not appear to be directly inspectable by myself. For my knowledge of them I must rely upon inference and upon his testimony. Upon inference: I may infer from his behavior that he is determined by certain motives. The grounds for this inference may be my knowledge that my actions of similar character are determined by such motives, or my knowledge that actions of similar character on the part of many other persons are also determined by such motives, (which depends upon the testimony of the "many others"). But inference it remains. I do not intuit his motives, and I cannot legitimately deduce his motive from a metaphysical postulate. And if these inferential processes are to produce reasonably adequate results, *i.e.,* if they are really to serve as media of knowledge, the element of distortion, of warp due to my own motives and my own history and my own sin etc., must be subject to control—must, indeed, be all but irrelevant, except possibly in atypical instances. Otherwise A's inferences about B's motives might very well have more to do, if not exclusively to do, with A's own motives than with B's. Again, this is probably true in some instances, but to pretend that is always and necessarily true, is nonsense.

A's knowledge of B's motives rests also upon B's testimony. Indeed, this knowledge depends more upon B's testimony than upon A's inferences, because in the end A's inferences concerning B's interior world remain but guesses until B confirms them, one way or another. To be sure, B may give a mistaken or a perjured account of his motives, but the truth about them must be statable, if not solely by B, then by B under the stimulation of A's guesses and dialectical criticism.

The dialectical exploitation of empirical generalizations is not overwhelmingly productive of positive results, and it is, as I have tried sketchily to indicate, capable of achieving some rich confusions. What now is to be said of the relationship of empirical generalizations to analysis?

Empirical generalizations provide the concrete filling for the terms and

principles of the Christian faith—as indeed they do for any really negotiable metaphysics although their presence in a metaphysics is not the only sign of its negotiability. Accordingly the real proof of the faith lies in the sweep and the penetration of its empirical generalizations, and in the illumination it sheds upon the human scene in its entirety. The formulation of these particular empirical generalizations certainly appears to involve at least a provisional acceptance of the possibility of the faith;—*i.e.*, the successful formulation of the verifying generalizations presupposes relatively clear definitions of the principal terms. It is not quite accurate to say that this is therefore simply a matter of discovering what one was looking for and was antecedently disposed to find; but it does mean that the successful search for truth is fundamentally not a random or trial-and-error affair.

The truth of the faith as the "illumination of the human scene in its entirety" includes the illumination both of why some persons embrace it and why other persons do not embrace it. This means that the faith enables us not only to understand *it* but also to understand why I do or do not acknowledge its truth. Let it be noted in passing that substantially the same claim is made by every really influential metaphysical system. It is part of the drive towards inclusiveness in description and explanation that a metaphysical system attempts to account for the existence and limited fertility of the competing systems. But in religious systems this drive goes farther: in them it reaches down towards the explanation of psychological reasons—*i.e.*, of motives—for the stubbornness with which some persons cling to competing but inadequate systems.

It may be granted that ultimately such thoroughgoing explanation becomes an *ad hominem* affair. This is only to say that the gospel is addressed to the whole man and not merely to his powers of ratiocination. But the broad *ad hominem* method of Christian teaching (and presumably of most religious teaching) cannot legitimately be supplemented with a battery of minor dialectical *ad hominem* arguments. The truth or falsity of the Christian system can never be established by inferential and/or purely dogmatic imputations concerning the interior world of persons either affirming or denying the truth of that system.

Ways in which dialectic, analysis and empirical generalizations figure in philosophical theology will be illustrated from A. Farrer's *Finite and Infinite.*

I believe it is fair to say that we encounter in *Finite and Infinite* a much clearer awareness of methodological problems than is revealed in *The Nature and Destiny of Man.* Indeed this difference in explicit recognition of the significance of method and in explicit formulation of methodological principle is so great that it serves as a convenient occasion for asking whether it is proper to philosophical theology as such to deal more directly and fully with methodological principles than does systematic theology.

This question must be answered in the affirmative. And therefore in this respect, *i.e.,* relative to methodology, systematic theology presupposes philosophical theology. Granted that so far the dependence of systematic upon philosophical theology is wholly in the *ordo cognoscendi* rather than in the *ordo essendi* or of concrete content of faith, the dependence is nevertheless real and significant.

But does philosophical theology fix the methods of system? And if it does so, is this not a capital instance of paltry and pettifogging human reason trying to cabin, crib, and confine the operations of divine grace? To the first we say that philosophical theology determines the methods of systematic theology only to the degree (a) that mental processes are the same in both, and (b) that conditions and principles of cogent and probative argument are the same in both. To the latter question we say that it is the "thing talked about," the *intention,* of systematic theology that represents the operations of divine grace; and it would be hard to credit the claim of a systematic theologian that the results of his cogitation were influenced by divine grace and were warranted as truth therefore. Both of these claims might be true. There is no *prima facie* reason for believing that either is.

It can also be established that relative to certain matters of content systematic theology is dependent upon philosophical theology, *e.g.,* the doctrine of divine providence clearly presupposes the doctrine of divine existence. But this and similar questions must not be ignored in the interest of completing the examination of methodology in philosophical theology.

Among the dialectical theologians there seems to be an astonishingly limited concern with the nature and limitations of dialectical thought. Surely the dogma that all thought is dialectical can hardly satisfy such theologians anymore than it satisfies the rest of us. One of the merits of Farrer's essay is its uncompromising clarity and its substantial persuasiveness at this very point.

He holds that dialectic deals with the dramatic order of thought rather than with essential order, *i.e.,* it aims at the production of certain psychological effects—no one of which is necessarily pernicious—rather than at the achievement of intrinsic cogency and a broad-based empirical substantiation.

In the presentation and defense of theism, philosophers have habitually followed the path of dialectic, by arguing that all nontheistic systems worthy of even passing consideration are really parts of fragments of theism. Thus these opposing systems are so many "crypto-theisms," each confusedly seeking the whole and explicit truth, that is, theism. Now no one will deny that some of these defenses and "proofs" of theism have been ingenious and even masterly philosophical achievements, although, as he acknowl-

edges, ability to contrive and to confute arguments is hardly reserved for professing Christians. But what has frequently been overlooked by such yeomen of the faith is that dialectic is obliged to rest upon analysis and empirical generalization. That is, the proposal to silence the "gentiles" either by reducing their systems to howling absurdities or by showing that as far as their systems make sense they presuppose theism, ought really to be subordinated to the proposal to analyze the principal terms and claims of theism in order to see whether a substantial and positive case can be made out for such a system. If it can stand on its own feet on the solid ground of actuality, well and good: if it cannot, no amount of trampling upon the moldering remains of its competitors will really help it any, even if they were willing to lie down and be counted as dead.

Dialectic has its uses, such as pointing up the formal inconsistencies and inadequacies of challenging points of view. For instance, a theory that cannot account for itself is so far unacceptable: its own house has not been put in order. Farrer feels that certain formulations of logical positivism are liable to this dialectical criticism (and he is an agile and adept wielder of this weapon). Even so the decisive failure of a point of view, or of its cruder formulations, is simply its failure to account for a sufficiently inclusive range of data. Hence, it is more important to show that, *e.g.,* logical positivism has left something out of its account than it is to show that the account rendered incorporates formal fallacies and undissolved antinomies.

Once the case for theism has been defined and established, then dialectic may have its day. For if theism is true, and if the wider religious life of which theism is but a part is the only ultimately adequate life, then dissident points of view are either outright errors or are limited aspects of the truth. In this context dialectic is respectable and is entitled to credit for any converts it brings into the fold.

Analysis consists first of the examination of the principal terms of the theistic position. The dominant term in theism is of course, *God,* and analysis of this idea shows that it is not absurd, or, to put it positively, that the idea of God is at least a possibility. It is true that certain of the definitions proposed in the history of theistic thought do not survive rigorous analysis, such as the definition of God as the pool of all possible predicates—a notion which Farrer quite rightly calls the most abject error of all definitions of God. Yet a meaningful definition can be advanced, *e.g.,* God as pure activity. Such a definition certainly does not reveal what kind of activity, or whether pure activity pertains only to God, etc., but it is at least an intelligible starting point.

Analysis also involves the formulation (*re*formulation he feels is the best philosophical theology can afford) of reasons "why so ambiguous a notion (*i.e.,* of God) should be taken as veridical." Analysis cannot produce such reasons out of its own substance, but it can mine and purify

the patterns into which such reasons will fit in order to form a reasonable and persuasive whole. The prime reason for taking the idea of God to be veridical is, he believes, simply that God is concretely apprehended, just as in the end any idea is held to be veridical because it takes hold of reality in our apprehension of the world.

To show that God is concretely apprehended in our apprehension of the world is by no means an appeal to religious experience. It is a call for the examination of the real character and structure and movement of existence. And thus empirical generalization is the next step.

In Farrer's essay empirical generalization is very nearly exclusively occupied with the delineation of the structure and process of the self, with particular reference to the will. This concrete inspection of the self is preceded by a painstaking analysis of the meaning of substance in general, the purpose again being to show that *substance* is a meaningful term, in spite of what logical positivism has argued about it. And so empirical generalization has these two tasks: the formulation of descriptions of the structure and activity of the self, and the generalizing beyond that for the ultimate problem of metaphysics—God.

The will—or the self as expressed in will—exhibits a pattern or structure that is a clue to the concrete understanding of the definition of God as pure or absolute activity, for it is a pattern embracing real continuity, *i.e.,* real connection within distinguishable aspects; and it is one in which causal activity is internal to the process in some significant degree, and not wholly derived from an external agency. The will is not all there is to the self, but it is its "essence-in-motion" and it is a self-actualizing agency. While it is true that the self as finite substance could always be defined as something else, we should always have to try these definitions against the apprehended real character of the self. Again, it may be asked how we can be sure, in such examination of and generalization about experience, that we are not dealing with an entirely private and subjective pattern. That is, suppose that this pattern is abstracted from only one aspect of one person's experience: with what right is it extended to serve as the core or the essence of experience in general?

I believe the answer to this sort of question can be made out much more easily here than it can in Niebuhr's theological methodology. The answer runs somewhat as follows: this pattern manifestly includes both the objective and the subjective, for (a) at no point do we have any better reason for supposing that we are dealing with the real world than in the will; and (b) this pattern arises out of the bodily or the organic, and brings the bodily into itself. Relative to (b) it may be said further that it is impossible to say as much, with any possibility of direct verification, of any other aspect of the relationship of the mental and the physical.

Another answer is also forthcoming: emotional and motivational

qualities and states are correlates of activity, and are, moreover, interiorly apprehended correlates of activity. As such they do not exhibit the essential *structure* of that activity. But only the real structure of real activity, as it is apprehended by and in the finite, can give us fertile clues to the understanding of the definition of God. This is to say that generalizations of the real structure of experience have a wider significance and applicability than generalizations of the correlates of the activities that form the core of experience.

We come now to the question, What can be done with empirical generalizations in philosophical theology even granted that reasonably secure ones are obtainable? "Reasonably secure ones" is obviously one way of remarking that their truth is sufficiently certified to; and that I suppose means that such generalizations cover what ought to be covered by such and that they say what they ought to, although neither of these is ascertainable with apodictic certainty or with mathematical exactitude.

Such substantiated empirical generalizations are the anthropic content of philosophical and theological thought. Theological thought at least runs in intention beyond the merely anthropic, but the fundamental nature of this "running beyond" is the analogical extension of a pattern or structure of apprehended experience. This pattern is set forth in empirical generalizations.

It may be said that the "running beyond," or the reality intended by analogical extensions, is itself apprehended by us in the same way or in a way equally firm as the "running within" experience. Thus significant pattern *is* significant pattern; and its pulling together, its solid grasp of the "near" and the "far," the finite and the infinite, the creaturely and the transcendent, is precisely what we mean by "significant" pattern.

I do not want to linger long over the dialectical puzzles in the above claim, but one of these will probably serve as representative of the others, *e.g.,* there can be no apprehension, strictly, of a pattern-running-beyond experience, for the apprehension of it would simply be further experience. If this holds, we are compelled to say that what we apprehend in experience evinces such-and-such a pattern or pervasive character; and we judge that this pattern, in some degree or other, holds good for all reality. Reality may indeed be rich and bright with many another pattern, but only the poets can talk about them with any plausibility before they appear.

From the foregoing I shall try to pull out and put together certain principles which comprise the rules for the synthesis of the methods. Such an undertaking, were it done in sufficient scope and with adequate discernment, would in effect be the statement of the logic of theology.

It would appear that theology could get along rather well without

such a schematism; but perforce this seems to me to be a rather pitiful and dreary illusion. If theology is to become synonymous with polemic and counterpolemic and with all the hues and cries of partisanship and of school loyalties, then it can assuredly do better without a clear methodology than it could with one. But theological success that was merely din of that sort would be worse than trivial. It would be unforgivably confusing. And in its present condition it trenches upon mighty confusion.

This confusion, specifically, is the conversion of *content,* the value of which is the positive elucidation and concrete clarification of experience, into dialectical apparatus for siege warfare. Thus the doctrine of sin begins to take its place alongside the Freudian contribution of rationalization and the Marxist freewill offering of the ideology of class economic interest. This is a battery of meretricious empirical generalizations, or of pseudo axioms, the only plausible defence of which is dialectical—a dialectic that can as easily be turned upon itself as upon anything else. This may be an instructive spectacle but it is not an edifying one.

The rules of productive theological synthesis of the methods discussed in this paper are:

I. *Analysis is the* PRIUS *both of dialectic and of empirical generalization.* A person may feel that the Christian faith is absolutely and invincibly true; and in this mood he will probably declare that concrete commitment to Christianity is the presupposition of all understanding of Christianity. I am deeply sympathetic to this claim, but it has nothing to do with making out a cogent case for the Christian faith for injection into the arena of open discussion. For that purpose, the central ideas of the faith must be carefully defined and the lines staked out along and within which empirical corroboration will be sought.

II. *Empirical generalization is the positive fulfillment of the case merely promised or set forth as a possibility under analysis.* Such generalizations cannot ride blithely over broad (particularly epistemological) problems. And such generalizations cannot pass muster as necessary truths—or as descriptive principals of demonstrable universal extension. It follows from this that a case is never fully made out, logically considered. The question is, whether it is tighter analytically and broader and deeper empirically than its competitors.

III. *Dialectic is the critical instrument for discovering how tight the analytical case is, and for discovering whether empirical generalizations have violated the principles of inductive thought, and for showing whether a different set of empirical generalizations ought really to have been tied up to a particular set of definitions.* A case can never be established by dialectic, but it may be clarified by dialectic. And this is its proper logical rôle, whatever its psychological effects may be.

THE LEGITIMACY OF ILLITERACY

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IF THE STATE of indecision in the world today proves anything in particular, it is, unquestionably, the theory of the legitimacy of illiteracy. With the articulation of questionable ideologies from pulpit, rostrum, stump, and microphone, plus glaring headlines in newspapers, books, and periodicals, mankind needs to enunciate a new doctrine in the form of freedom *from* speech. It is, forsooth, a veritable blessing, no less, to be illiterate in an age gone mad. The sounds against the ear, no less than the blows against the eye, render one helpless and well-nigh defenseless as the semantic barrages continue apace and propaganda, colored with a pirated nomenclature and couched in an historic terminology, is hurled with lethal impact against the weakening mentality of the world. It demonstrates, as I have said, the legitimacy of illiteracy.

Obviously, the sense in which I here use the term "illiteracy" is, less or more, in the function of contingency. That is to say, if by chance we are subjected to the spoken and written word to the extent that, if accepted as true, would break us away from our democratic and intellectual moorings, then we should, in self-protection "hear no evil," "see no evil," or, for that matter, "speak no evil." We should, then, try to react as though we did not understand. It is in this sense that our self-imposed illiteracy would become legitimate *pro tempore.*

Since sanity has all but vanished in our day and a premium for dishonesty is paid in the debased coinage of both individual and collective integrity, where indeed shall the liberal soul turn in his search for homestead rights in a land as barren of intellectual honesty as it is hostile to truth? Truly the foxes have their holes and birds of the air have their nests, but where, in very truth, can the liberal find a place to rest his weary and battered head, save under a guillotine or within the hangman's noose?

I use the term "liberal" to identify the individual who, while both pragmatic and scientific in his outlook on life, is at the same time as devoid of dogmatism and coercive tendencies as a human may be. He is the type who approaches life realistically and subscribes to the belief that we live in a naturalistic universe where the method of science is, to date, the best-known method of assembling, evaluating, and classifying data in our efforts to acquire and use properly knowledge of ourselves and the world in which we live. The liberal, as a rule, is not so much interested in ideologies as he is in discernment and knowledge, for he realizes that any system which is

dependent upon either revelation or interpretation for its function immediately involves the development of a special type of leader who, usually, in revealing and interpreting for the masses, becomes what today is known as a dictator. Believing that the universe and mankind operate under immutable laws of nature and are uninfluenced by external interference, the liberal finds no valid evidence of the existence of any power external to nature. He usually considers ideas of God and man as being two sides of the same shield; hence they are one, even as man is one with all other expressions of nature. It is not unusual, then, that today the liberal finds little comfort or hope in the chaotic world in which he lives.

When original thinking, or for that matter *any* thinking not along the party line, is taboo—and here I am being purposely conservative—surely it is a crime to confess literacy, and it is a danger as real as it is immediate. It is not sordid pessimism, nor is it negativism in the slightest degree, to confess that when one makes bold enough to ask: "Watchman, what of the night?" too often the answer which comes in return is a whispered "Iscariot," which resounds through the valley of despair. Have we betrayed our trust, seduced truth, and violated our rich heritage in our drunken search for security? Do we find the price too dear to pay for the damaged wares of history's foulest harlot?

And since the struggle today is for the acceptance of one's definition of symbols, I hasten to say that the security of which I speak is not to be confused with social security or with the many social gains which we have made and are making. These are hallmarks of democracy in action and, as a matter of fact, have been somewhat late in coming to us. The security of which I speak is the mistaken idea that there is a way of life available to us which would relieve us of our personal responsibilities and remove the moral disciplines under which free men must live. This is a sordid tale, told by idiots, for it attempts to define liberty so that it means license. Such spokesmen truly are the anointed ones; yet the ointment with which they have been set apart is that of deceit, with no little conceit intermixed.

The false security of which I speak involves also the notion that the state becomes the fount of every blessing. This neodemocracy of the mid-twentieth century reflects the proletarian concept of equality in contradistinction to the theme of individual liberty which our bourgeois society developed during the past two centuries. A new type of idealist—if I may momentarily debase a good term—has emerged in our day, who would posit the thesis that every man is to be both the equal of, and at the same time as free as, his fellow man. It is a novel idea in view of the fact that equality is achieved at the loss of individual liberty. As man becomes freer, he necessarily loses equality; as he becomes equal, he loses individual liberty. How, now, can there be a wedding of the antithetical which will

produce a bastard synthesis of the two in terms of total security? It is an effort to rationalize the irrational, perhaps through the employment of a new technique which, no doubt, due to the faulty optics of our times, we are unable to visualize clearly. In short, in our refusal to comprehend, we legitimatize our illiteracy.

Another aspect of the new security method, and one which to an even greater degree demonstrates the legitimacy of illiteracy, is the plea for man to surrender his individuality. Notwithstanding the fact that the group is but a collection of individuals, the plea is for the submergence of the individual in the interest of the group. Thus emerges the concept that the group assumes importance over and above its component parts. It is an invitation to return to the herd. It therefore opens the door to a new type of demagoguery: group control and, hence, power. An early concept of the democratic adventure was the development of the free individual in a free society. We are currently asked to place approval on the plan which would render this ideal *passé* and substitute in lieu of it the idea of rule by the majority. Now, this poses an interesting development. For, unless the majority approach the total number, then we could have a fallacy of the first magnitude. Fifty-one per cent is a mathematical majority, and yet it is only two per cent more than the minority. Hence it is conceivable that this slight difference of only two per cent could actually constitute a balance of power whereby it would, in fact, exert control over the ninety-eight per cent. Such a small fraction of the total has repeatedly controlled; and with little difficulty this could be documented in terms of American politics, labor unions, world conferences, etc. It is an old game, but remains ever-attractive to those individuals or nations who grasp for power. Hence, if we have outgrown the individual application of democracy, then it becomes necessary, if the group is to be democratic in function, to insist on the application of the principle of the greatest good for the greatest number. And in this, too, it will become necessary to arrive at some agreement in terms of valid definitions for goodness. Desirability must, likewise, be considered by the group.

Then, also, as we shout, "Freedom!" with our lips, we must not fall prey to the *mores* of totalitarianism. The insidious spread of the doctrine of totality is destroying much that is good and noble, imperfect though it may be, in our struggling culture. Men of otherwise sound minds have too often fallen victims to this sort of thing. It needs to be remembered by Americans, and more especially by liberals, that man cannot live by abstract ideologies. It is the implementation of theories in terms of action that makes for real living. Many, seeking to be of assistance to their unfortunate fellow men, have become entrapped in the web of illusion which, in time, becomes a nightmare of delusion. In their efforts to secure equal rights,

for example, for those who are discriminated against, they often find themselves enmeshed in the net of equalitarianism, which aims, not at the progress of man, but at his degradation. Many indeed are the pitfalls to be avoided. When we seek to gain more liberty for those who have been, and still are, in slavery of one kind or another, we should not approach the task with the false notion that freedom is the gift of the democratic state, for it is not. While the state can confer liberty alike on all, freedom is achieved only through personal discipline. We too often confuse the symbol with the thing for which it stands and thus establish a value system having little meaning and significance. We cannot, for example, confer education on all of our people, even though we pay taxes for the support of our public school system. We can guarantee to every child, alike, only the liberty of attending school and pursuing an education. The same might be said of health and other phases of democracy.

Total freedom, in the sense that too many use the term, could result only in chaos and anarchy. The identical thing may be said of equality. This is indicative of the fallacy of totalitarianism. And we cannot refrain from condemning, in the same breath, the fallacy of private opinion. A man does not have the moral right—even though he be within his legal right—to apply private opinion on matters where tested evidence is available. Man cannot nullify the laws of nature with private opinion—the process is illegitimate. For example, a man's opinion may lead him to assert that water will run up hill or that an airplane will remain aloft when its motors fail, but the opinion is not valid as against the proven laws of gravitation. May I hastily add, lest I be completely misunderstood, that men's opinions lead them to invention and discovery and that this is well, but so long as the method of science provides us an acceptable *modus operandi,* we have available the means of establishing opinions as truths; and the moment this is done, then the opinions cease to be such and they become tested truths. Liberal ministers would do well to give serious consideration to this matter in terms of religion. It could produce interesting results. Any scheme, then, offered in terms of totality should be considered by liberals, and others who love democracy, with an attitude of legitimate illiteracy.

Fortunately, we are developing new techniques. We have learned, for example, that we can have collective effort without the evils of collectivism; we can strive for equal rights and opportunities for all without becoming equalitarians; we can continue in our struggle for social gains without becoming socialists; we can build our nation consistently into the beloved community without becoming communists; we can strive for total world brotherhood without subscribing to totalitarianism; we can have government "for the people" without statism; and we can have peace in our time without being cowards. These things, and more too, we can have within the

framework of democratic and representative government, *if we but remain mentally alert and morally honest.*

Democracy is indeed on trial, not for the first time, for it is not a first offender—it has offended many times before. So, too, is capitalism under attack, and we must surely replace the spirit of competition with that of coöperation. Political, social, economic, educational, and religious democracy must be integrated into a meaningful way of life for all of the people. Church and state must remain separated as institutions, but the truths of life and the same moral and ethical principles must animate both, and both must be equally free, enlightened, and rid of superstition and myth. Democracy is in a stage of transition and seems to have outgrown the direct function of the period when individual pressures exercised corrective control. We are moving into the period of indirect function, when groups will exercise control. We are, in these early days, floundering badly, due to both our inexperience and to the novelty of the new relationship. There are many lessons to be learned, not the least of which are the obligations and responsibilities which the group must assume if it is to be the recipient of individual rights, liberties, and sovereignty. By the same token that individuals must establish character, credit, skill, and importance, so must groups achieve their status. As the individual responded to law and order and was liable and accountable, so also the group—for if control is to be exerted, then it must be in terms of ability and responsibility. There can be no assumed status; it must be the real thing.

If the group is to negotiate contracts, then it must be a valid contract, and responsibility must be bilateral. For, be it remembered, groups acquire character and even personality: they become entities in their own right. These collective entities, then, which so profoundly affect the lives of the individual constituency must respond democratically to the wishes of the members. For, indeed, if the struggle for power within the group produces domination either by an individual or a clique, then progress and democracy have been thwarted. Thus the individual group member would not have gained greater freedom within and by virtue of the group, but, instead, he would have been committed to a type of collective slavery from which the hope of escape would be minimal. And the resultant tragedy of such a situation would be that, having surrendered his individual liberty to the group, the individual would thus have lost the methodology for recovery and would have, in truth, reached the point of no return. This is the gamble that must be made in projecting the group concept of democracy. The problem becomes one of function, and through the group the individual is afforded the opportunity of either a greater freedom or no freedom whatever. There the problem rests.

If individuals are grouping themselves together for mutual benefit and joint expression, so also are nations. Today, therefore, the struggle for power goes on from the individual to the international level. The implications are relatively the same at any level. Be it also remembered that America may not always have a bloc of nations, bound by the Marshall Plan and other financial obligations, to support blindly whatever measures she proposes in the United Nations. If the titanic struggle between the U. S. A. and the U. S. S. R. continues, it is entirely within the realm of the possible that the lesser nations may form a third power bloc which could become the balance of power and, thus, assume control. There are many of our best thinkers who firmly believe that America must come to learn that compromise is not of necessity appeasement and that we can, with honor and without loss of status, learn to seek areas of agreement and of compromise—and this even when we have a substantial majority on our side. It is a lesson to be learned.

We dislike the idea of a war of exhaustion, for none can know the future; to all alike the future is a closed tome. Yet we cannot fail to realize that when and if we do go down, whether in defeat or in victorious exhaustion, the jackals will be on hand for the feast. So it is a most serious situation that confronts us, and we must be on guard. When sounds din against the ear and words stab at the eye, in efforts to divert us from our way of life, we would do well to demonstrate our loyalty to the democratic ideal by maintaining an attitude toward these techniques of doom which could justify what we have called: the legitimacy of illiteracy.

RAMSEY'S *BASIC CHRISTIAN ETHICS*: A CRITIQUE

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In his *General Introduction to Ethics,* William K. Wright, after emphasizing that Christianity is an ethical religion, writes:

> *there is no one ethical system that can exclusively claim the designation of Christian Ethics.* Every moral philosopher who has professed and called himself a Christian has believed his to be *a* (if not *the*) true system of Christian ethics. Moreover, no moral principle loses its place as a part of Christian ethics because it has originated independently of Christianity. . . . All true ethics is Christian ethics: and Christianity teaches no moral principles that are contrary to the best reasoning and observation of moral philosophers generally (pp. 135, 136).

Ramsey's *Basic Christian Ethics*[1] is a challenging and systematic attack on all such attempts to conceive Christian ethics as a composite of the Sermon on the Mount and "the best in other moral perspectives." Ramsey writes in the conviction that Christian ethics at no crucial point stands in need of aid from other systems of morality.

> Our task is not one of first discovering what in any event is true in the field of ethics, and then piously calling that Christian. It is rather the task of discovering what may properly be described as basic Christian morality (p. xiv).

Were this book simply an exegesis of "the way the Bible views morality" (p. xi), the writer, who is a layman in these matters, would remain silent. But Ramsey, taking cautious advantage of the moral philosophies of St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Martin Luther, and (less fully) Sören Kierkegaard (p. xiii), writes in the conviction that Christian ethics can overcome the fatal weaknesses in Greek and Roman ethics and in modern amalgams of Christian insight and philosophy. In what follows, then, the writer will neither argue matters of biblical interpretation, nor debate possible misrepresentations of philosophical perspectives. He will try, rather, to expound several of Ramsey's crucial theses and suggest that if we are to present this conception of Christian ethics to our generation of students and scholars we shall confront them with questions and difficulties that may well force them to look away from the Christian perspective.

Is Christian Love Irreducible to Human Experience?

Christian ethics, as Ramsey sees it, revolves around the central conception of "obedient love." All other fundamental ethical notions—justice,

[1] Paul Ramsey, *Basic Christian Ethics,* New York, Scribner, 1950, pp. xviii, 404, $3.75. Unqualified page references hereinafter are to this book.

right, obligation, virtues—are to be seen in the light of the meaning of obedient love. But obedient love is an ultimate which cannot be defined in terms of non-Christian ethical categories. The only light we have on the meaning of obedient love is Jesus Christ; there is no other centre or source of illumination. So anxious is Ramsey to drive home the uniqueness of obedient love as seen through Jesus that he suggests that we substitute *x* for the English word *love* or St. Paul's *agapē* in I Corinthians 13. The Christian notion of love is analogous to a mathematical "primitive" which cannot be defined in terms of other ideas; we can indicate Christian love only by pointing to Christ (pp. xvi, 259). The norms of Christian ethics "are to be found only in the biblical conception of righteousness, and not elsewhere in some moral norms derived from reason operating apart from the Hebrew-Christian religious heritage" (p. 3).

But it is not enough to say that the *x* we see in Christ is irreducible to human terms. It is a relation between God and man initiated and made the standard by God. As Ramsey puts it, in "the strange, new religious world of the Bible" we find the two sources of Christian love in "(1) God's righteousness and love and (2) the reign of this righteousness in the Kingdom of God" (p. 2). God's righteousness, a righteousness intent on saving men, a righteousness which *is* justice and mercy, is "the plumb line for measuring the rightness of human relationships" (p. 5). What this means, for example, is that since God secures justice for the orphan and widow, it is wrong for men to do otherwise. It is not wrong or right because of "anything they themselves think or do" (p. 12). The standard of justice is "a supernatural measure," a standard "radically different from any other which has commended itself to the human mind" (p. 13). Again, redemptive justice or righteousness "which strictly speaking never first occurred to the mind of any man but represents in human thought a prolongation of the righteousness of God" overturns "the normal human sense of justice" (p. 15) as found for example in the corrective and distributive justice of Plato and Aristotle.

What is this unique "biblical notion of justice"? The reply: "To each according to the measure of his real need, not because of anything human reason can discern inherent in the needy, but because his need alone is the measure of God's righteousness toward him" (p. 14). Indeed, "Jesus' lifetime of humility and obedience was simply a logical continuation of the great act of self-emptying love by which alone the Christ could become any sort of man. His life was but an extension into human history of a line started in eternity going down toward man" (p. 19). And Ramsey draws the conclusion: "As a consequence, Christocentric ethics contrasts both with humanism's cutting the pattern to fit man and also with any religious or mystical ethics which may indeed be theocentric and pious

enough but in a general or cosmic sense not historically related to this particular man, Christ Jesus" (p. 23). In "imitating Christ," Ramsey continues, "one thing the Christian never attempts: he never imitates the fact that Jesus had no Christ to imitate" (p. 24). While Jesus thought less of himself than he thought of God, no Christian may follow suit!

We may now pause for several questions and comments. First, is not this insistence that "obedient love" cannot be reduced to any experience which man has ever had, or could ever have apart from the Hebrew-Christian heritage, much too costly? Does it not lift Christian ethics above the range of human experience only to sever all bonds of relevance to human experience? If indeed the pattern of Christian ethics was not cut to fit human potentialities, why should any human being be blamed for not giving allegiance to them? This conception of Christian ethics plays right into the hands of those who criticize it as impositionist and indifferent to the structures of human need and ability. Actually, however, is there not a silent premise which never gets articulated in this argument: namely, that the God who created men would not after all require what is basically unrelated to their nature? If this is the case, we can hold that a careful analysis of human experience will reveal in it the capacity for, if not the full actuality of, obedient love. Unless this is the case, a very disturbing situation confronts us. For if "obedient love" is discontinuous with human love at its best, if it is characteristic of God's nature and no part of "normal" human nature, how can it become a meaningful claim upon man? Is it not like asking the blind to see, and the maimed to walk? How can we in this area go from the unknown x to the known?

Secondly, it is not helpful to compare *agapē* to a mathematical primitive and then say that it can be known simply by *pointing* to Christ. The mathematical primitive is a human experience in the realm of logic. But "obedient love" is not. Presumably, therefore, the person who has not already known in some sense the meaning of obedient love in his own experience will either not recognize it in Jesus or declare it to be sheer foolishness. If there is discontinuity between the experience of love as human beings know it and the "supernatural measure" which is extended into history through Jesus, the relevance of Christ to the supposedly insensitive and unenlightened nature of man has no meaning, especially if the spirit of his actions and not slavish imitations are to be recommended. At any rate a passage from Kant whose argument cannot be lightly set aside comes to mind:

> Nor could one give poorer counsel to morality than to attempt to derive it from examples. For each example of morality which is exhibited to one must itself have been previously judged according to principles of morality to see whether it is worthy to serve as an original example, i.e., as a model. By no means could it authentically

furnish the concept of morality. Even the Holy One of the Gospel must be compared with our ideal of moral perfection before He is recognized as such; even He says of Himself, "Why call ye me (Whom you see) good? None is good (the archetype of the good) except God only (Whom you do not see)." But whence do we have the concept of God as the highest good? . . . Imitation has no place in moral matters *and examples serve only for encouragement.*[2]

We shall not expatiate here the fundamental question as to whether an act is good simply because God does it. Ramsey might insist that this question never comes up in a biblical world view which simply assumes that God's way is good no matter what happens to human beings, and then proceeds to show that God's way is a "self-emptying love." But this still begs the logically prior question: Why must we assume that what we know about human goodness apart from this supernatural measure should not be a way of measuring the goodness of the supernatural? "Shall not the judge of all the earth do right?" asked the author of Gen. 18:25. Cries of blasphemy and pride of reason will not down this logical question, especially when they presuppose an unargued claim that whatever the Cosmic Being does must be good. If the best in human experience (apart from "the revelation") can give no light on the true nature of the good, Christian ethics at the very beginning faces the theoretical disadvantage of at once by-passing the question: How do we know that God is good? and insisting that persons must accept a supernatural measure if they would discover the human good for human beings. The whole problem of the autonomy of ethics is here solved without discussion.

On What Grounds Can an Eschatological Ethic be Universalized?

Ramsey holds that some of the more "strenuous" teaching of Jesus—such as "unclaiming love" and overflowing good for an enemy—must be understood in the light of Jesus' eschatological expectations. Jesus, it seems, ultimately depended upon God to bring in the kingdom "violently" in order to destroy the evil that love itself could not overcome. But Ramsey believes that it is improper to extend the strenuous teaching, about nonresistance for example, beyond its eschatological setting and claim that nonresistance is God's way of dealing with armed injustice. But what was expected in the apocalyptic situation? We must mark Ramsey's words carefully:

Here we must . . . look squarely into the mystery of how ideals were manufactured in this Christian world, for obedient love for neighbor, which is the distinctive "primitive idea" of Christian ethics, had its origin and *genesis* in apocalypticism. . . . In face of the inbreaking kingdom, moral decision was stripped of all prudential considerations, all calculation of what is right in terms of consequences. . . . likely *to fall upon* the agent *himself* [and] all sober regard for the future performance

[2] Immanual Kant, *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals,* trans. by L. W. Beck, University of Chicago Press, 1949, p. 68—italics mine.

of his responsibility for family or friends. . . . Preferential loves, even those justifiable in normal times, were supplanted by *entirely non-preferential regard for whomever happened to be standing by,* friend or enemy, bullying sergeant or indigent beggar. All that mattered was perfect obedience to God . . . complete readiness for the kingdom to come. . . . Thus, standing so entirely before God with *all* prudential righteousness gone, "the neighbor," *the neighbor in any man,* was decisively discovered."[3]

Again, in this apocalyptic setting, all enlightened selfishness or unselfishness—indeed, all obligations to any but the individual who happened to be standing by—could be forgotten "because all neighbors except the one actually present were apocalyptically removed from view and taken care of by God" (p. 40). Because Jesus saw himself "on the border between these two worlds," his own day and the coming kingdom, he "brought his strenuous teachings for the first time into human reckoning" as "the absolute disclosure of what God's reign means" (p. 40).

Now our author is aware that such an account of the genesis of the supreme ethical revelation has nothing to do with its validity. He therefore frankly poses the fundamental question:

> What possible bearing can an ethic which specifies to the full what a man should do in relation to a single neighbor, an ethic which reveals with no qualification at all what the reign of "righteousness" means in regard to any man, what bearing can this possibly have upon moral action in a world where *there always is more than one neighbor* and indeed a whole cluster of claims and responsibilities to be considered? (p. 42).

This question is indeed crucial for an ethics which claims universal validity, let alone relevance to the complicated problems of choice. But it is at this very point, when one would suppose Christian ethics has reached the nadir of irrelevance to the human situation, that Ramsey steps in to save the day with an observation which reveals one of the basic orientations in his thought. It becomes clear that he would rid the moral agent of any excuse to rationalize self-preference, social provincialism, or relativism. Thus he says:

> A chief problem in morals arises from the fact that the vast network of neighbor claims tends to dim our perception of obligation and provides us with a too ready excuse for a lapse into concern for self. We need to see clearly how we should be obliged to behave toward one neighbor (or how our own group should act toward one neighboring group) if there were no other claims upon us at all" (pp. 42-43).

If we could see, as Jesus in his eschatological outlook was able to see, what our obligation to any one person should be, we should be unable to justify prudential self-interest by claiming that the normal situation we confront is complicated by many claims. If we know the norm of action toward a man when there are no other claims upon us, we have a standard which cannot possibly be derived from custom, culture, or self-interest,

[3] P. 39—italics mine.

let alone a norm which "can never be identified with the structures of any particular civilization" (p. 44).

But again, has not Ramsey, in his desire to find a clear-cut moral orientation which will be at once safe from tempting self-preference and the relativities of human habit, proved too much? If, as he says, the strenuous ethic arises in, and is valid for, the eschatological situation, a situation different from all other human situations in that it is a one-man-to-one-man situation, then why indeed suppose that what is true in that situation could become a norm for one-man-to-many-men situations? What justification is there for the statement: "Christian ethics constitutes a standing judgment upon all human conduct and upon every human culture, requiring of them absolute obedience to God and singleminded love for neighbor"?[4] And, to leave no doubt in our minds about the conclusion to be drawn from the apocalyptic ethics, Ramsey continues in the next sentence save one: "Christian ethics may claim to be relevant in criticism of every situation precisely because its standard derives from no particular situation and is not accommodated to man's continuing life in normal, historical relationships . . ." (p. 44).

Can this line of reasoning be acceptable as an answer to the original question: How can an ethics which stipulates what a man should do in a single-neighbor situation have bearing on a situation in which there is no place for self-preference or confusion of issues? One must ask: How do we know that the same standard prevails in other complex social relations where concern for one neighbor endangers the good of others? To confess that one starts with an atypical situation and then say that "precisely because" it is atypical we may claim the universality of the maxim involved therein is surely strange reasoning. One wishes he could see his way out of this impasse as he examines what is more fully implied by "obedient love."

Is Christian Love Intelligible without a Scale of Values?

In his second chapter, "Christian Liberty: An Ethics without Rules," Ramsey delineates the ethics of Jesus by contrasting it with the legalism of Judaism. ". . . Christians are bound by Jesus' attitude of sticking as close as possible to human need, no matter what the rules say, as the primary meaning of obligation, which, seriously undertaken, requires at least *more of us than we are capable of performing* and gives us no opportunity for becoming authorities."[5] The essence of Jesus' ethics is a nonresisting love which "renounces all claims on behalf of self" (p. 68); it forces one, in forgiveness, to abandon all claims upon another, however

[4] P. 44; see also p. 57.
[5] P. 57—italics mine.

just those claims may be, since only the needs of another have first claim upon one (*cf.* p. 69). This "supernatural principle of perfection" (p. 73) does indeed make it impossible for morality to become a matter of conventional habit; it makes it impossible for anyone ever to feel self-righteous because it "requires at least more of us than we are capable of performing" (p. 74).

Now Ramsey is quite aware that such an ethics "seems always in peril of opening the floodgates of anarchy and license in the name of freedom from law," but he warns against the attempts of "Judaism, Aristotelianism, Stoicism, or, in recent times, personalistic idealism" to guard against such excesses by laying down "in advance" what is and what is not permitted by "faith working through love" (p. 77). For Christian love, "far from being directionless, lays down its own directions, internal self-regulations conformable only to the needs of neighbor" (p. 78). The point is central and further quotation must confirm it:

> While love itself never submits to external rule and does not proportion its benefaction according to some rule, it never becomes unruly, since the needs of other persons are the rule of love and quickly teach such love what to do. . . . What should be done or not done in a particular instance, what is good or bad, right or wrong, what is better or worse than something else, what are "degrees of value"—these things in Christian ethics are not known in advance or derived from some preconceived code. They are derived *backward* by Christian love from what it apprehends to be the needs of others. Christian love which teaches the Christian what to do is itself *teachable* without restriction (pp. 78, 79).
>
> By being immoderate about this one thing, namely Christian care for the neighbor's needs, Christian ethics is *on principle* alternatively more lenient (more free from regulation) and more severe with itself (more subject to command) than any other ethic (p. 79).

Finally, we are once more reminded that it matters not to Christian ethics whether there is "a natural morality inscribed in every human heart" (p. 84), for the primacy of Christian ethics rests neither on external nor internal law, nor on any "normal, universal promptings of conscience" (p. 85), nor on empirical generalizations from the capacities of men, but on the will of God manifested in Jesus. "Whether in the old Law or the new covenant, God manifests himself in something objectively given to which man must conform rather than something conformable to man. Christian ethics is an ethics of perfection which cuts man to fit the pattern, not the pattern to fit man: how, then, can any major part of its fundamental content be drawn from man?" (p. 85).

We have already suggested the difficulties faced by an ethics which boasts of not cutting its pattern to fit man even though it demands allegiance from him, but we are now confronted by an interesting internal situation. The Christian must not have any concern for himself, but, as he proceeds

selflessly to love his neighbor, he must be taught "without restriction" by *his* needs. The very ethics which claims not to derive its ideal by generalization from anything human is unique by virtue of the fact that it is *more* human, *more* person-centred than is any other ethics! Again, I am aware that the quality of selfless love demanded of man in his relation to neighbor constitutes the standard not derivable from man's nature, but it is worth noting that what love specifically commands takes on meaning *only* in terms of studious concern for a specific neighbor's need (in the apocalyptic ethics) and for the needs of neighbors (in every other).

To see the same point from another angle: "Love!" we are told. "Love in a way that *you* normally never can love! For this love is no kind of human pattern but only becomes evident in the living of Jesus. However, let your effort be guided by your neighbor's need!" One is tempted to remark that the unique thing about this ethics is that it commands a primary attitude which, though not derived from human nature, is nevertheless forced to conform to human needs. Furthermore, it seems to be cunningly contrived to ensure that persons feel obligated to serve others' needs. In the last analysis, what Ramsey is trying to protect—indeed, as we shall see, what he feels cannot otherwise be protected—is a kind of altruism which he believes is the only cement that can bind human beings to each other.

That Ramsey believes there is no other way of motivating self-sacrificial care for others becomes clear as he rejects philosophical proposals, or deceitful substitutes, for obedient love. To begin with, Christian love is not based on the conviction that every individual has some inherent worth, for this would lead the individual "logically" to subtract from his obligation to the need of his neighbor the just claims of himself as a person! "Response to the general worth of human personality always hesitates a little in confronting the neighbor. Hereby the full particularity of neighborly love finding the neighbor out would be lost" (p. 94). Instead of seeking *the human* in another, "neighborly love in the Christian sense, discovers the neighbor in every man it meets and as such has never yet met a friend or an enemy" (p. 94). The Christian begins by loving his neighbor, the first man he meets, "*any* man"; he does not begin with love of mankind which is so prone to degenerate into a self-calculating concern for others.

Here the basis is laid for the next contention and corresponding denial. The acid test of neighborly love is an altruistic deed done with *no hope of requital.* Love for self in any conceivable form can be no motive in Christian ethics; any ethics of self-realization cannot be relied upon to fulfill the Christian requirement. "No more disastrous mistake can be made than to admit self-love [self-realization] onto the ground-floor of

Christian ethics as a basic part of Christian obligation" (p. 101). We must rather realize that: "Christian ethics begins with a 'leap' by which alone Christian love gives the name of 'duty' to the claims of neighbor" (p. 101). Explicitly emphasizing that the leap is grounded in faith, Ramsey continues:

> However faith accomplishes this, Christian love comes into existence only by a "leap" which carries a man beyond all enlightened self-interest, beyond all intentional concern for self-realization, beyond the mixture of motives in pursuit of some common good; a leap which breaks entirely through the circle of self, goes bareheaded out of the "I-castle," and sets the agent fully on the side of another person. . . ." (pp. 101, 102).

Another explicit rejection once more reveals Ramsey's primary concern to get man to the side of his neighbor. For, he insists, we shall never find the full meaning of Christian neighbor-love by discriminating the higher and the lower values on some scale of values. Ramsey does not believe that a solution of "man's chief moral dilemmas is to be found merely by ascending some vertical scale of values" (p. 112), for the central problem is to get men to share values. As he sees it, while Christian ethics does not object to definitions of value by any philosophical school, it does not wait for agreement on any such scale. "A Christian hedonist is no more anomalous than a Christian self-realizationist or Christian pursuit of any other values, since *how* things are sought, not *what,* makes all the difference" (p. 113). Furthermore, Ramsey is convinced that "out of greater responsiveness to the entire range of his neighbor's need" [one] may "for the first time become sensitive to certain higher human values to which formerly, even in his own case, selfishness blinded him" (p. 113). For the Christian, in other words, the question: *What* is the good? is subordinate to the question: *Whose* good? The opposition is to "philosophical ethics only when the latter pretends to answer the question in terms of selfish enlightenment or by general, value-centered appeals to the acquisitive aspirations of some poor love" (p. 115). The Christian is to love his neighbor! This done, he may ascend whatever scale of values he may find "reasonably creditable" (p. 116).

In every way, and everywhere, then, Ramsey keynotes the fact that Christian neighbor-love, born in responsive gratitude toward God, is obedient to God's command, and has no ulterior motive of reward for self (though such may be the unintended result). In the last analysis neighbor-love springs from faith in God, and lives through that faith. Indeed, having insisted that "Christian ethics does not draw its standard for man from man himself, and, moreover, that this standard goes far beyond what is natural to sinful men," Ramsey asserts his conviction: "Neverthe-

less, on condition of faith, Christian love is not impossible for man" (p. 144).

We must not, in passing, overlook this method for saving the situation. Man *can* fulfill a moral obligation which takes no root in his given nature but is imposed upon him. "On condition of faith" *man* can find the capacity for neighbor-love. We might pursue the question how it happens that the man he starts with can conjure up such faith. We might even dare to ask why a God of complete goodness and omnipotence would allow Everyman to drift about in so dreadful an isolation when it was possible presumably to grant him some of that power to begin with. But we cannot pursue these problems adequately within the confines of this paper. Ramsey devotes a very stimulating chapter to the exposition of what is meant by saying that man is the image of God. But since his argument here depends to a great extent upon the validity of his conception of neighbor-love, it becomes all the more important for us to raise the question which cries out for an answer on every page of this book.

Let us assume for the moment that "whose good" takes priority over "what is good"; let us also assume that this account of the leap to the neighbor's side is justified. How shall we determine the neighbor's need? Do we grant him anything he desires? Do we select among his claims—yes, even in the one-neighbor situation? In a word, can any responsible ethical attitude be developed toward *any* other person without some principle which guides the selection of needs especially when needs conflict? Indeed, if the neighbor tells us what he needs, how can *he* select among his needs? How does *he* determine priorities? Can *he* escape guidance by some scale, or, as we should prefer, some system of values? Yet, if he derives this system from his own life and experience, he will be branded guilty of self-love. His obligation is to leap in faith to my side and consider my needs. But the moment I try to guide him, let us say, to select among my needs, I am engaged in some system of need realization.

If this reasoning is correct, it would seem that even though we have reached the neighbor's side by a leap of faith—on the assumption that no other view will really allow us to get there and stay there—when we actually reach our neighbor, both we and our neighbor will be helpless unless we consult the nature of human needs and abilities in the total human situation and happily find some scale of priorities suggested by the very pattern of experiential interrelations permeating human efforts in adventurous living. While no mere description of what has happened to man will suffice for an adequate ethics, critical and imaginative syntheses of the best experiences actually undergone by human beings in their pursuit of values seem to be the best we can do as we try to guide our choices.

But we need not develop a countertheory of value to justify our suggestion that obedient love is less than a completely supernatural measure.

Again, assume that we are to love our neighbor as we love ourselves without consideration of merit, are we not immediately forced to consider merit in the context of his own varied needs and abilities? This simply cannot be done without developing insight into the textures, interrelations and interpenetrations of value as revealed in human experiments in value-actualization. Obviously no investigation of a value system can stop with the individual, for the value of his need-ability pattern is largely determined by its relation to the need-ability pattern of others. This does not mean that a value-system investigation necessarily arrives at obedient love as the highest value, but that conclusion is not precluded by the investigation! Meanwhile the majority of philosophical moralists have, for differing reasons, to be sure, made altruistic concern for other persons central to their systems of ethics. In any case, one thing seems clear from even this analysis: Christian ethics cannot make a scale of values (let alone a system) secondary, and it cannot be indifferent to the concrete meaning of self-realization if its fundamental concern is that every individual leap to the neighbor's side and really help him.

But Ramsey would no doubt claim that while here, as in its search for a social policy, Christian love may make *use* of philosophical analyses of value, these can never be the *"base* of operations" (p. 340). Before attempting to evaluate this most fundamental claim, we must stop for the moment to summarize further his essential contention with regard to the place of duties to self.

Are Duties to Self Derivative in Christian Ethics?

Duties to self, we have seen, cannot be admitted on the "ground floor of Christian ethics." Nor is there any primary appeal to treating humanity as such as an end, for this would imply as part of the agent's duty making his own good also the intentional object of action (p. 159). But Ramsey holds that there is a "legitimate concern" for self, "even if only as a secondary and derivative part of Christian ethics" (p. 159). Once "a radical leap to the neighbor's side" has been effected, the way is clearer to an *"enlightened* unselfishness" (p. 160)—that is, a concern for oneself for the sake of one's neighbor! Ramsey develops his view of Christian vocation as he insists that

> Not anything in the neighbor, not anything in the agent himself nor any treaty of peace between them but the controlling love of Christ reverses natural self-love into neighbor-love and, at the same time, requires of a person infinite willingness to be himself, not fleeing his post under any circumstances, but with complete self-acceptance developing whatever abilities in himself his vocation requires (p. 162).

Everywhere his central contention is that duties to self are "forms of neighbor-love, they are really duties to the neighbor performed first upon the self" (p. 163).

Far-reaching consequences follow from this view. For, as Ramsey considers problems arising from such enlightened unselfishness, he realizes that the lives of some persons are actually of greater value than others. The value of the President of the United States, for example, "when impartially viewed from the point of view of potential benefit to his neighbors" must not be guilty of "rash self-sacrifice" (pp. 163, 164). Ramsey also realizes, however, that ethics at this point seem to switch from neighbor-centred to the value-centred ethics of self-realization. For the distinction between reasonable and rash self-sacrifice is made on a system of self-realization in terms of the total *quality* and quantity of values to be preserved in the determinable situation. The actual decision is of course very difficult, but presumably the self-realizationist will be guided by the degree of self-sacrifice, and the consequences for all persons in the moral situation as far as they are foreseeable. But Ramsey fears that the self-realizationist will not, as a self-realizationist, achieve his end. So he asks: "Indeed, is not constant and clear-headed concern to insure that self-sacrifice actually serve some purpose more likely present where selfish partiality has been dethroned by the leap to the neighbor's side?" (p. 164).

Now, unless one *assumes,* contrary to historical fact, that a self-realization ethics logically or psychologically *must* result in partiality to self, one may wonder what it is *exactly* that a Christian ethics adds at this critical point. The theoretical situation here is quite serious for Christian ethics. Further argument is needed for the assertion: "It is a fatuous assumption that a person cannot perform an enlightened action without abandoning his position of existing in grateful obedience 'before God' and 'for' his neighbor" (p. 165). For a radical shift from neighbor-love seems clearly to take place when neighbor-love faces the needs of more than one neighbor. Thus Ramsey says: "Love, which by its nature would be non-resistant where only the agent's own rights and the perhaps unjust claims of a single neighbor are involved, may change its actions to resistance by the most effective possible means, judicial or military" (p. 165). And the shift is all the more embracing when we realize that the one-man-to-one-man ethical situation is, to say the least, the exception and not the rule. As Ramsey himself says: "Since *there is always more than one neighbor,* men have special need of an ethic which defines with utter clarity and rigor their full duty toward any and every one of them" (p. 181). It is our thesis that once we realize that one has duties to oneself within the context of neighbor-love the Christian can neither reach this conclusion nor know what action to take once he makes a value system or scale of some sort

central in moral deliberation. And the shift here is so radical that actually the total orientation of ethical judgment shifts from a neighbor-centred ethic to a value-centred ethics.

Can Christian Ethics Disengage Itself from the Ethics of Self-realization?

Nevertheless we must be clear about Ramsey's main bone of contention. As he sees it: "In idealistic, self-realization ethics, rights for the self are forms of service to the *common* good." This view cannot be acceptable to the Christian, for "a Christian agent gives no express consideration to whether he participates in, or is a mutual recipient of, the good he does" (p. 187). The clue to this whole orientation becomes clear in the statement: ". . . Christianity knows that only when governed by the intentional orientation of self-sacrificial love toward the welfare of another can mutual love be prevented from degenerating into divisive self-interest" (p. 189; *cf.* also p. 190).

Many statements such as this last one throughout the book make one wonder whether Christian ethics is not unduly motivated by strategic, psychological considerations deduced from prior convictions about the nature of man. Now we must frankly ask ourselves whether our task in ethics is to discover what it is that will motivate a man to love his neighbor, whether we should build an ethics around an unargued theory of God and man, or whether we are to develop our conception of man and God in the light of the data of value experience open to man. These questions are complex and no easy answer is possible. But if we are to challenge the ethics of self-realization which, in the name of truth, holds that men *ought to will* the complete realization of human personality in themselves and others as far as possible, it is hardly fair to argue that the ideal of self-realization be given up because human beings will fail in their attempt to do so—unless we are prepared to give up Christian ethics, or any other, which fails of achievement owing to human abuse of free will and other weaknesses.

What needs to be argued, then, is whether Christian ethics can in fact disengage itself, as Ramsey says it must, from the ethics of self-realization centred in a value system. We have already insisted that consideration of neighbor-need is impossible without a system of values which does not begin "wholly outside of ordinary human nature itself and from beyond our general experience of moments of self-realization" (pp. 194-195). And we have now seen that it is impossible to adjudicate the claims of one neighbor's needs against the neighbor-needs of others to whom we are obligated, without a scale of values. We seem driven, then, in Christian ethics to choose among neighbors in terms of their ability as bearers of value to preserve the maximum values of all persons involved.

But if this is so, are we not forced beyond the consideration of *whose* good to *what* the good is; from the neighbor to the person-in-relation-to other persons? In a complex situation we cannot know *whose* good without considering what goods are being realized and can be realized in the community of persons. If the neighbors must not be forgotten out of a concern for neighbor, then any person who has real concern for his fellow men will develop his own capacities and enrich his own life *both* for his own sake and for the sake of his obligation to others. Ramsey would probably interpose that to develop oneself for one's own sake runs counter to the basic obligation in Christian ethics, since it brings self in "on the ground floor" rather than derivatively. But we must again suggest that no person can possibly appreciate what values have to be promoted in the lives of others—unless he is simply to give others anything they desire—if he has not, in interaction with others, found values and struggled with the problem of hierarchy and priority, of range and unity among them. One cannot presuppose, to begin with, that selfishness or altruism ought to be willed; we discover in the process of living itself that it is better to treat other persons as ends in themselves and not as means only. And if we did not have experience after experience which justified this hypothesis as to the best way of protecting all human values, the doctrine of "obedient love" would be words without referent.

Only if we assume that altruism is the only good and that it must be protected above all values must we make sure that the leap to the neighbor's side comes first. Only if we are sure that unless we do leap to the neighbor's side there is no rational way of getting there, do we insist that the leap must be made to start with. But alas, even when we do so leap to the neighbor's side, we are forced by the total situation to say that the person must realize himself for the sake of his neighbor! And all that because of the underlying, and unproved, conviction that full self-realization might be unable to get to the neighbor—which is cynicism indeed! Since we are forced in any case to return to the person and to the meaning of his values to others, it would seem that *the logical starting point for this ethics of obedient love resides in the person as the centre of value realization, and not in the neighbor.* It is the neighbor as a person, as a centre of value realization, whose search for values relates him to the value pursuits of others—it is the person and his capacity for "obedient love" as the high point of his experience of value in this cosmos, on which Christian ethics rests in the last analysis.

It is very important, in other words, not to sever the person from his values, as if values were something added on to a metaphysical unity of mental activity. There is no more reason, *a priori,* to prefer the metaphysical structure we call a human being to that of a stone, or a fish. It is

because the human metaphysical structure is transformed by the ends or values to which it dedicates itself, it is because the metaphysical person can take on and incarnate value patterns expressive of love at its best, as in a Socrates, a St. Francis, and a Gandhi, that the human being takes on special significance among the beings that compose the world. For God or for man to take such a being lightly, or to use him simply as a means to his end, is simply to give up the best light we do have on the worthwhile ends of life. A person in the ethical situation *is* his capacity for value realization. And as such he ought not treat himself lightly or neglect the values possible in his life except as these are related to the need of his neighbor. But by the same token he has no obligation—whether he likes it or not—to prefer his own values at the expense of, or without the support of, the values in other persons. He is a person; his neighbor is a person; and he will have a hard time indeed making a *reasonable* case for preferring his values at the expense of another's values.

Finally, if we cannot find, in the long and varied experiences of human beings with values, any suggestion of the ideals or true values by which their lives ought to be guided, then, whatever the values we find in moments of religious experience, and whatever the values exemplified in the life of Christ, we would have good reason to doubt that the universe was conceived in and controlled by sacrificial love. It is rather because we find in the life of man, interacting with his varied total environment, persistent inklings and trends of the supremacy of sacrificial concern for mutual welfare and enterprise in value, that our conviction grows—supported as it is by prophets in every land and by the unique place of Jesus in our Western tradition—that we are blessed by living Love whose fellowship with our ventures in fellowship is the supreme fact and value of existence.

THE PROPHETIC MINISTRY

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First Baptist Church, Elizabeth City, N. C.

THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY is currently publishing a series of articles in which the new leaders of the world church answer the question, "What shall I preach to a fear-stricken age?" In the issue for February 14, 1951, Dr. Gordon A. Sisco, general secretary of the United Church of Canada and a member of the executive and central committees of the World Council of Churches, makes this assertion:

> As a preacher, I turn for inspiration and guidance to the prophets of Israel, who dealt with events in history very similar to those of our own day, though enacted on a smaller scale. Their nation was engulfed in the conflicts of vast empires that surrounded and endangered it. They knew from experience the bitterness of defeat, the scourge of cruelty, and the chilling horrors associated with the mass evacuation of their people. . . .
>
> Lacking some of the insights which, at a later period, were given to the Christian, they nevertheless struggled with the belief that a divine purpose runs through life and that morality has to do with the processes and the course of history. They condemned mere formality in religion and insisted that it must manifest itself in justice, mercy and reverence. At one particular point the outlook became so foreboding that the prophet Zephaniah did not hesitate to declare that God would cut the very foundations from under an order of life which sought to found its security on mere economic power and find its outlet in international rivalry and cruelty. . . .
>
> It is the calling of the preacher to declare that in Christ man finds true freedom and genuine community, a freedom that submits to the will of God and a community deeply concerned about the rights of others.[1]

Here is the foundation of the prophetic ministry. Here indeed is where Jesus began, continued, and ended his ministry. "This day," he said, as he concluded the reading from Isaiah, "is this scripture fulfilled in your ears." The cardinal idea of the eighth-century prophets was theocracy or the reign of God in the here and now. The master theme of Jesus' teaching was the kingdom of God on earth as it is in heaven. This kingdom was, in Elton Trueblood's apt phrase, a "fellowship of the concerned" in which the mint, anise, and cummin of ceremonialism and legalism, of sectarianism and nationalism, of race and class would be transcended by the supreme claims of justice, mercy, and reverence in the hearts of men. This kingdom, though a gift of God, would not come without prayer and fasting, without resistance and sometimes violence. It would not drop as the gentle rain from heaven upon the place beneath. The evil in men's hearts would see to that. Jesus the prophet of Nazareth was no idealist. He knew what lay ahead. Dr. Halford Luccuck reminds

[1] Gordon A. Sisco, "Fixed Points of Destiny" in the *Christian Century* (LXVIII, 7), Feb. 14, 1951, pp. 201-203. Quoted by permission.

us that Jesus was not crucified for saying, "Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow," but for saying, "Consider the thieves in the temple, how they steal."

The early followers of Jesus understood clearly that they were in the succession of the prophets. It is significant that they assigned in the apostolic church the highest gift of the spirit to the prophet. With the apostle Paul the gift of tongues had a very poor rating indeed. Other matters which today might be classified under the heading of administration, promotion, organization, etc., these wise leaders classified as "serving tables," from which the prophets were to be exempt as much as possible. God had acted in time and in history. The kingdoms of this world must become his kingdom. They were the heralds of this good news, and if later on they shifted into an otherworldly emphasis, it was largely because they forgot the explicit word of their Master that they were in the world though not of the world, they were the leaven and the light and the salt of the world.

Today, as then, the prophetic ministry is the strait gate and the narrow way, and few there be that enter in thereat. The demands are stringent, the requirements tough, and the journey lonely. In every way the minister who chooses it is tasked and challenged far beyond his brethren who travel highways surveyed by tradition and paved with orthodoxy. While his consecration may be no deeper or his sincerity no more unquestioned, he must nonetheless demonstrate a superiority to the rank and file of the regular clergy in certain personal qualities or surrender his gift of prophecy. To put it bluntly, he is on the spot; and unless he is top-flight he had better climb down. "Serving tables" is also important. It is the purpose of this article to show in what ways the prophet must be superior to the priest.

In the first place the prophet must outstudy the priest. Whatever the pressures of the pastorate, he must remain a consistent and laborious student. In Carlyle's phrase he must "toil terribly." Unlike his brethren of the regular clergy, his use and interpretation of scripture will be perennially suspect. Unless his knowledge of the Bible exceed that of the priests and the Levites, he will make of himself a perfect target for the shafts of orthodoxy. Such vulnerability will hamstring his prophetic witness, for no fund of what we might call secular knowledge, no passion for social righteousness, no clear vision of a world that is not yet but ought to be, can compensate for fumbling with the scriptures.

Likewise he must be an equally careful student in economics, sociology, finance, politics, race relations, labor-management relations, and family life, for in order to make his witness relevant to these fields of human activity he must understand, not of course as a specialist but certainly as a minister with a sort of documented sympathy, men and women in these

interrelationships. Such knowledge and understanding will not come from the *Reader's Digest* or *Time* or Fulton Lewis or the local newspaper. He will have to dig much deeper, and, when he comes up with nuggets of the truth, he will have to be prepared to defend his position as handsomely against the devotees of the *status quo* in these fields as he will his use of scripture against the defenders of the faith. Here too his zeal must not outweigh his research. There is no place among the prophets for undocumented passion.

In the second place, the prophetic ministry calls for more courage than the conventional ministry. It does not necessarily take courage, as generally supposed, to expose the evils of the liquor traffic or legalized gambling. It does not take too much courage to declaim against divorce and infidelity, though quite a number of the congregation may think the minister is getting personal. Everyone, even his enemies, expects the minister to take these stands, and when he stops here he might well say of himself that he is an unprofitable servant who has only done the expected. But it does take courage to tell a Southern congregation that drawing the color line in the church is a betrayal of the gospel and indefensible before God. It does take courage to remind a comfortable people who have just about equated their economic order with Christianity that capitalism with its glorification of profits and its depersonalization of workers is as materialistic as atheistic communism and has often been as destructive of human values. It does take courage to assert that the common people who once heard Jesus gladly realize today that their hard-won social legislation and economic betterment were wrested from his church in the teeth of its opposition. As long as Calvin Coolidge's preacher in the famous yarn was just "agin' sin," the President was unmoved. Had the preacher been specific as here suggested, the canny, complacent New Englander would have had the shock of his life. How many of us have the courage really to shock our congregation? How many of us could say to our people what Robert Dale said to his, after years of commanding success in the pulpit: "I have never feared you and I have never flattered you"?

The quality of this kind of courage increases when we consider the risks involved. Ecclesiastical preferment forever dogs the pilgrim's progress. A young unmarried Amos may flash before his first pastorate with a heart on fire for social righteousness, but when he takes a wife back to Tekoa, and later adds Amos Jr. and Deutero-Isaiah, to his clerical equipage, his courage may have to be tempered with discretion. Soon it may become financially necessary that he serve in a larger field. But alas, the larger fields through some mysterious divinity are under control of the regular clergy whose theology of the "God of the things as they are" make them more acceptable to the powers that be in the economic order. In other

words, since conservatism in theology and Bourbonism in politics and business have kissed (as the psalmist said of righteousness and peace), the young prophet is apt to find the door to the marriage feast shut and hear the bridegroom saying, "I know you not." And now the pressure is on. To rise he must compromise. To hold fast his witness he must stake the economic security of his family. Perhaps he can bank his fire under the ashes of conventionality. Who is sufficient for these things? Maybe, after all it were better that he had used up his courage fighting the liquor traffic.

Again, the prophet must be a better pastor than the conventional preacher. With less time on his hand he must convince his own people that his yearning for liberty and justice for all does not hamper his cure of souls. Somehow the preacher too busy with revivals and promotion to visit the sick and bereaved is more easily forgiven than the preacher too busy addressing labor union Local 67 or meeting with the Citizens' Inter-Race Council. Thus the prophet must beware lest anyone dub him a social reformer, period! There is a risk here of ulterior motive in his pastoral ministrations; yet there need not be. It has been said of Karl Marx and John Wesley, both of whom shared a deep concern for the economic needs of men, that the former saw man only in the mass, while the latter saw him as an individual. The prophet is in the Wesleyan tradition. His very desire for justice and hope and opportunity for all is a part of his shepherd's heart for the individual. He will always be willing to leave the ninety and nine for the one. The employer, whom he has alienated by his support of the laborers in their just demands, he will win back with his genuine and loving care in an hour of sickness, sorrow, or confusion. It is said of Dr. Ernest Fremont Tittle, who for years was pastor of what is generally regarded as Protestantism's wealthiest suburban church, that on an occasion when a group of men were disturbed by the radicalism and possible subversiveness of his preaching, one of his laymen said in effect: "I don't know just how true these things are. I do know that when my boy lay critically ill Dr. Tittle stayed by his bedside with us through the whole night. I'm for him."

Finally, the prophet must go beyond the priest in preserving an unimpeachable character. This is not to say that he is a more virtuous man but that he must face the prospect of considerably less impunity if he lets down the bars. He must realize without one tinge of the martyr complex and with a good pinch of humor and challenge, that they are all out to "get" him; his brethren in the ministry; his irate, privileged member; a controlled chain press; some outraged representative of a veterans group; the chamber of commerce; or the D.A.R. "Christian, dost thou see them?" He has offended these folk or he has not been preaching the prophetic

gospel. One slip is all they need. How they will make the welkin ring when, unable to discredit his presentation of truth, they find the Achilles' heel in his character!

Dr. Herbert A. Keck, pastor of the Kenwood Methodist Church in Milwaukee, wrote these words of warning to the prophet in the November, 1949, issue of the *Pulpit:*

> At the meeting of the American Sociological Society in 1932 Professor E. A. Ross of Wisconsin University was addressing his fellow sociologists, and he said: "There may come a time in the career of every sociologist when it is his solemn duty to raise hell." We can paraphrase that for preachers. We have in mind what Dr. Charles H. Parkhurst did for the cleansing of the Augean stables of New York politics; we are thinking of what Bishop Francis J. McConnell did relative to the twelve-hour-day in the United States Steel Corporation. But when you do "raise hell" beware of any joints in your armour; beware of any evil chapters in your personal history. The black forces of evil will try to "get you," to "smear you." Many a prophet has been gibbeted in the public press. He has been "downed with faint praise" or stigmatized as a "pink." Everybody believes in brotherhood in principle; it is when we begin to apply it to concrete situations that we get the backfire. Too often we are *flutes* when we ought to be *trumpets.* If the church cannot produce prophets to warn and lead the people, then she will produce priests to read her own burial service.[2]

To all of which we add, In the name of the prophet of Galilee who said, Which of you convicteth me of sin? Amen.

Today, we are told, the church in Soviet-dominated areas has five choices before it. It may be the political church, the state church, the otherworldly church, the underground church, or the silent church. Any other alternative is an invitation to liquidation. Here in America, which one of her Presidents has called "this nation under God," the church faces no such choices. Here the church may be in word and in deed a free church in a free state. Here the church may say to the state: "We are in you but not of you. Where you are right, we shall uphold; and where you are wrong, we shall condemn." Here the church may say to society: "We are not bound to be conformed to your *mores* and traditions, but we are bound to transform both after our vision of the city of God." Here the church may say to the economic order: "We do not regard you as sacrosanct, nor shall we remain silent when you place profit and power above service and love." And here the church may turn the searchlight upon itself and pray: "Father, forgive us our pride, our divisions, our moral compromises, our hesitations, our seeking to save ourselves, our loss of vision. Give us the new birth in Christ, though it come with travail and repentance." But if the church does these things, she will be led by prophets and not priests.

[2] Herbert A. Keck, "The Prophetic Ministry" in the *Pulpit* (XX, 11), November, 1949, pp. 261-262. Quoted by permission.

CLERGY OF MY HOME TOWN

MITCHELL BRONK

1862-1950

THE SMALL boy stood in great awe, not to say fear, of the cloth. His earliest recollection of a clergyman may have been partly responsible, for besides being forbiddingly dignified this man had heavy, very black eyebrows, and wore his hair excessively pompadour; and then his sombre frock coat and silk hat—stovepipe hat, we called it. Perhaps there would be a shawl. Men were still wearing shawls.

Our ministers were always spoken of as "Elder." There was Elder Bounds. His church job may be said to have included the tilling of a small farm—twenty acres or so, a sort of parsonage farm. He was a lover of fast horses, and usually possessed one or two. It wouldn't have done for him to take part in a formal horse race at the county fair, but he did occasionally try it out with a neighbor's fast horse on the country road. That passed with his flock. His trading horses didn't: not when he got the best of one of his leading members.

It was a sight to behold when Elder Bounds drove to the village on his sulky—weekdays he always used that sulky—but wearing the high hat just the same. A large, handsome, elderly gentleman, with nothing of the sanctimonious "third sex" about him.

His church practiced the rite of baptism in the immersion way, and his *baptizo* sermon was famed in our part of the State. He had preached it countless times; it had eighteen points, after the "firstly"; it knocked out pedobaptism mercilessly, for he knew Greek from *alpha* to *omega*.

The immersion baptisms were usually in midwinter, following the annual revival meetings. The baptistery was a great opening cut in the ice of the Canandaigua Outlet, which flowed through our town. There would always be a crowd of onlookers, devout and secular. As a feature of these baptismal services Elder Bounds would invariably give lengthy selections from his *baptizo* sermon—to the discomfort of the candidates and spectators—if it happened to be a bitter cold day, with the winds sweeping down from Lake Ontario.

I was too young to take in much of Elder Bounds' preaching, but I do recall that he was constantly saying "My hearers!" and that one of his lower teeth was lacking. This latter played havoc with his sibilants. To this day I can hear the whistling of his delivery.

Nor shall I ever forget the huge horsehair sofa which stood back of the pulpit and which was the pulpit chairs of old-time churches. The small boy would wish that he might go up there and stretch out on that sofa

when Elder Bounds preached beyond his customary limit of an hour and a half. Or he would be listening for the snap of Aunt Betsey's snuffbox. Her pew was directly behind ours. When she, too, judged that the sermon had reached a decent *terminus ad quem,* there would come a loud warning from that snuffbox, a warning which the Elder dared not disregard, for was not Betsey's better half the senior deacon?

I am not well up in the ecclesiology of the Hicksite Friends and am not sure that they have preachers, officially; but we always referred to William Fisher as the "Quaker preacher." He was the outstanding Hicksite of Ontario County.

Now Gus, foreman of the moulding room at the farming implement factory, was pretty sick one winter. I went to see him, for we had been good friends. I used to hang around the foundry Saturdays and holidays, finding it great fun to wax his patterns, shovel sand into the flasks, even to throw up slag into the cupola. To be present at the pouring-off was ample remuneration: the flood of red liquid metal, throwing off showers of sparks, was as good as Fourth of July fireworks to a small boy.

As I was coming away that time, Gus said, "Kid, I wish you'd do something for me. I'm in a bad shape; looks as though I'd die. My folks think a lot of your mother; they'd do anything she asked. Now we're Baptists; not very much so, but that's our church when any of us die or get married. However, if I die I don't want the Baptist minister to bury me, I want to have the Quaker preacher. That Baptist man may be all right, but he could never get me into the Good Place, and I guess the Quaker could. You see I've been devilish wicked all my life, a tough case; but that Quaker minister, they tell me, can see most anybody into heaven. So, if I die, you have your mother persuade my folks to call on Fisher for my funeral; will you?"

Gus didn't die. He was at work again down at the factory in a couple of weeks. It goes to show, however, the reputation Mr. Fisher had in our community as an officiant and shriver. I wouldn't say that he squeezed folks through the pearly gates. He was honest and didn't mince matters even for the dead; but he sort of smoothed and eased the last journey for hard cases, painting the deceased as no worse than he was, raking up his few good qualities and the few good things that maybe he had done. Mr. Fisher was, in short, the kind of cleric anyone would like to have at one's obsequies.

He was a large man, very genial, with a good word for this one and that. My mother used to say she felt sorry for him; that he had to officiate at so many difficult funerals. The hardest proposition of this nature that he ever ran up against was undoubtedly the funeral of John Beasley.

Beasley was a well-to-do farmer—but well-to-do only in a very worldly

sense. He had run through a lot of whisky, two wives, and several women who were not his wives. He was certainly the limit for pure wickedness in our part of the country. My mother once remarked that when she looked at Beasley she didn't know whether to be reminded of Judas Iscariot or of Satan himself.

His funeral naturally drew a big crowd. The house and yard were overflowing with folks who had come, in particular, to see what the Quaker preacher would do with such an apparently damned soul as Beasley.

This is what he did.

He didn't say anything at all about the deceased there before him in the coffin; just left him alone. He started off with the Lord's Prayer; then repeated the Fifty-first Psalm, the one that begins, "Have mercy upon me, O God!"; then related a dream that he was supposed to have had.

He was in the Good Place. He pictured its splendors: golden streets, pearly gates, and all that sort of thing. But he was greatly surprised to see there so many he hadn't expected to see. It didn't look just right. He asked one of the angels about it. The angel replied: "It's like this. God himself has let these people come in; so what can we do about it? He has found them at least admissible. You see when he sizes up a sinner he looks him straight through and all over and so finds a lot of good that humans wouldn't be likely to see. Besides, he's out to find the good, and humans mostly are not; they look for the bad, in a man or woman. It takes sharp sight to distinguish the good in some folks, don't you know—but God has it." This was the Quaker preacher's dream and preachment—as the small boy sensed it, and has remembered it.

My mother said she was watching Uncle Daniel, to see how he would take it, hard-shell Calvinistic Baptist that he was. She noticed that his head wasn't nodding negatively, as it did at some preaching; and she heard James McGinty, who was right behind her, softly repeating, "Dimitte nobis debita nostra." Jim knew Latin; he had studied for the priesthood for a while, then gone into the law.

Speaking of Uncle Daniel, his friendship with William Fisher was worth remarking upon. Their visits back and forth were frequent, long, and theological. They disagreed about practically all the doctrines: and remained great cronies.

The lounge of the Benham tavern was outdoors—in summer, that is. It consisted of a dozen or so armchairs, set in a row, on the long veranda. These chairs were almost never unoccupied. It was Manchester's "town meeting of the air." Many and various matters of global, national, and local importance were discussed. The good and bad in Andrew Johnson's administration was still a favorite topic, notwithstanding the fact that that President was fading from the public view. Why Horace Greeley failed

of election in the presidential race of 1872 was another question that was much debated but never settled. And, of course, General Grant, *pro* and *con.*

Coming nearer home, they had several times taken up the matter of the town's churches: Didn't we have too many churches? Were all four needed in such a small village? No one could suggest how the number might be lessened, for each was not only grounded in the faith, but fast grounded in the soil, material and social, of the town of Manchester, there to stay.

If the four churches did occasionally crowd and push one another, and manifest unchurchly jealousy, or even actually quarrel, their respective ministers got along amicably together. It was perhaps a Manchester tradition that they should.

Father Murphy was undoubtedly the most popular of these reverend gentlemen. This spoke well for him since the community was predominantly old New England Protestant. The Catholics do not shift their clergy around as the Protestants do, and the Father had been at St. Joseph's upwards of ten years; was a sort of fixture in the village. Jolly, friendly, everybody knew and liked him. Yet he held people to the dignity of his cloth, of his priestly office.

I remember one time when we were climbing into wagons, starting off on a Sunday-school picnic of the Protestant churches, Father Murphy happened to come along. He stopped, greeted everybody, wishing us the best picnic we'd ever had, as though he'd like to go along and as though we were all his parishioners. That's the way he was.

The Father's intimacy with Tom Healy rather surprised newcomers to Manchester, or persons who didn't know the two men very well. Healy was a shoemaker, and the priest would sit by his bench half an hour at a time, while they extolled or decried things Irish. It seemed that soon after Father Murphy located in Manchester he discovered that they were both natives of Kilkenny. It was a puzzle to the priest, he said, however a man from that part of the Emerald Isle had strayed into the Methodist church. Tom himself couldn't explain it; he simply knew that there he was—through his parents, evidently.

A change in the pastorate of the Baptist church once gave his friends and neighbors a rich opportunity to jolly the priest. When he came into the post office that Monday morning, he inquired of Postmaster Young the reason for the hilarious looks that several persons had given him as he came downtown. Postmaster Young likewise looked amused, as he asked, "Father, you haven't heard, have you, the name of the new pastor at the Baptist church?" "No; what is it?" "Murphy." "Murphy? Is that what you said?" "Yes, Murphy." "Well, if I'm not flabbergasted!

But what business has a Baptist minister doing with that name, I'd like to know?"

If any Methodists took part in the jollying, Father Murphy not long after had a good chance to get back at them. It was great fun to hear him tell about their "clerical menageries," as he called it. A Reverend James M. Bull had been at the Methodist church for the regulation period of three years. He was succeeded, for a shorter term, by a Mr. Swallow. The congregation set to wondering what kind of an animal would be assigned to them by the next annual Conference. By an almost unbelievable coincidence it was an animal—a Reverend Robert Wolf.

So Father Murphy had many a laugh, in particular at the expense of his friend and fellow Irishman, the shoemaker and Methodist class leader, Thomas Healy.

It was Tom Healy's dying wish that Father Murphy should somehow have a part in his funeral. The Father was invited. The question of ecclesiastical regularity came up. The priest journeyed to Rochester to consult his bishop about it. Some kind of dispensation was accorded. After the coffin had been lowered into the grave, and the Methodist preacher had had his say, Father Murphy kneeled in the fresh earth and recited, first, the Lord's Prayer, in English, and then a selection from his church's office, beginning, "I recommend thee, dear brother, to Almighty God, and leave thee to His mercy, whose creature thou art."

I was there, with a lot of other curious boys, and I well remember the tremor of the priest's voice, as he crossed himself and spoke the final, "May he rest in peace!"

AN ANNOUNCEMENT

CROZER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

The Board of Trustees of Crozer Theological Seminary in its fall meeting held in Philadelphia on November 15, 1951 voted to suspend publication of the *Crozer Quarterly* at the end of the current fiscal year which comes on June 30, 1952. All accepted and unpublished manuscripts will appear in the April number of the *Quarterly*. Refunds will be made to subscribers who have paid beyond that date. The suspension was decreed because of the heavy drain on the operating budget of the Seminary involved in publication costs of this esteemed journal. The very quality that made the *Quarterly* valuable also made it inevitable that publishing costs would exceed income from subscriptions. The expense of operating the Seminary, including cost of publications, continues to rise while income from endowment lags far behind. And so the suspension became a cruel necessity. The Editor has served without remuneration as have his predecessors in office. Such has been the case with the Business Manager. Professor Enslin has given to his editorial tasks diligent and skilled labors as his custom is in all the many responsibilities that are his. To Editor, Manager, book reviewers, contributors, subscribers, and others who have helped in the making of the *Crozer Quarterly* we extend gratitude for a significant job well done.

SANKEY L. BLANTON, President

Chester, Pennsylvania
November 19, 1951

Where Ignorance Is Bliss, 'Tis Folly

HAPPINESS has never been a really respectable Christian virtue. It has always seemed inextricably intertwined with softness and sluggardliness. It is our *duty* to love God, our *duty* to go to church, our *duty* to remain steadfast and faithful to our families, our *duty* to enter the ministry. To regard these—any or all of them—as incomparable joys and privileges seems somehow to make them worldly and suspect.

Support for this so-common attitude is found in the traditional portrait of Jesus. Regularly his life has been presented as one of resignation, abnegation, patient endurance, suffering, and death. That these qualities are to be found in his life—as they are in the lives of most men and women—is not to be denied or minimized. Yet this is but one side of the picture, and a side unwarrantably high-lighted. There is another side, and it appears to me stressed where we might least expect to find it, in the Epistle to the Hebrews: "Who for the joy that was set before him endured the cross, despising shame, and hath sat down at the right hand of the throne of God" (Hebr. 12:2).

Not infrequently this word, constantly repeated though it may well be, is utterly evacuated of its meaning. It has often been contended that not "for" but "instead of" is the proper rendering of the crucial preposition. This would mean a glimpse of his preëxistent state; God's first-born of all creation turning his back on all that might rightly be his—his power and glory—to choose deliberately the path of suffering. However acceptable such a note, surely not unknown to Paul, might have been to this author, it apparently is not what he is saying here.

Nor is it: "instead of the world, the acclaim which might have been his, the heady wine of popularity and power suggested in the third temptation." No rendering "instead" does justice to the author's insight. Rather it is "*because* of the joy, *for the sake of* the joy." I would go farther: it is "for the sake of the joy *which the choice involved,*" not for the coming centuries of triumph which he would be proleptically glimpsing.

Nor is this a mere recondite and academic distinction which turns inconsequentially on the meaning of an obscure Greek preposition. On the contrary it is of the most important and practical concern. The figure who is the ideal for millions of men and women was a happy man because he had the opportunity of doing what he most wanted to do. Were that believed and stressed, life might be very different.

Happiness may involve a cross, and often does. In words of one syllable, happiness is doing what we want most of all to do. When that basic fact is admitted, all else pales into insignificance—washboard hands, sleepless nights, empty pockets. A cross can be taken in one's stride. And more than that, as the writer of old so clearly discerned, such an attitude, such a slant towards life, turns what many thoughtlessly style "shame" into mere nothingness and, occasionally at least, assures a triumph which nothing can destroy.

From Off the Campus and On

Once again Crozer Quarterly wishes its readers and many friends "A Happy New Year." We hope that you will share our regret that this is the last time that that greeting can be extended from this column. In the April issue we are planning what we hope will be an especially interesting number. Until then, while the aura of the all-loveliest season through which we have just passed is upon us, may we repeat again the familiar word of Tiny Tim: "God bless Us, Every One."

Dr. Hartt is associate professor of theology at Yale, where he has taught since 1943. He is a graduate of Dakota Wesleyan, Garrett Biblical Institute, and of Yale (Ph.D.). Between college and seminary he was a rural minister for two years. Before returning to Yale as a professor, he had taught for three years at Berea College.

Mr. Shute will be remembered for his provocative article, "Attention All Southerners" (January, 1950). We think that you will find his present essay of interest too. He retired as mayor of Monroe, N. C., last May after two terms. In addition to his many business duties he is district director of the Office of Price Stabilization for western North Carolina and eastern Tennessee, an active officer of the American Unitarian Society, and a member of the staff of its *Christian Register.*

Professor Bertocci too needs no introduction. His reviews and articles have assured him a secure place in the thinking of many of our readers. He is a professor of philosophy at Boston University on the faculties of the College of Liberal Arts and the Graduate School and was for several years secretary of the American Theological Society. His most recent book is *Introduction to Philosophy of Religion* (Prentice-Hall).

Mr. Finlator is minister of the First Baptist Church, Elizabeth City, N. C. A native of North Carolina, he is a graduate of Wake Forest and Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. Before coming to his present church he was minister of Baptist churches in Pittsboro and Weldon.

The name Mitchell Bronk was frequently found in these pages. His death, October 31, 1950, brought sadness to his many friends. Just prior to his death this article had been submitted and accepted. To those who knew this gifted man—pastor, editor, writer, friend—it will surely not seem out of place to say, "Though dead, he yet speaketh."

Forty-nine reviews, thirty-nine reviewers: we continue to be very proud of the grist which comes from these competent and generous scholars. And we know that our readers share in this appreciation. Dr. Aubrey is professor of religious thought in the University of Pennsylvania. For several years he was president of Crozer. Mr. Batten is dean and professor of religious education at Crozer and business manager of Crozer Quarterly. Professor Bean has the chair of church history at Crozer. Dr. Beck is professor of Bible and religion at Syracuse. Professor Bertocci has already been introduced. Dr. Blanton is president of Crozer. Professor Bond is head of the department of religion at Bucknell. Dr. Brush is professor of church

history at Andover Newton. Dr. Cadbury is Hollis professor of divinity at Harvard and head of the department of New Testament. Dr. Coffin is president *emeritus* of Union Theological Seminary and a churchman of international reputation and influence. Dr. Cranston is dean of the School of Religion of the University of Southern California. Dr. Cully, until recently minister of the First Congregational Church, Haverhill, Mass., is minister of education of the First Methodist Church, Evanston, Ill. Dr. Davis is professor of theology at Crozer. Mr. Ebersole is an instructor in the department of sociology at the University of Maryland. Mr. Ellis is an instructor in Bible and religion at the University of Richmond. Mr. Enslin is a writer and farmer on Cape Cod. Dr. Ferm is professor of philosophy at the College of Wooster and the author or editor of many important volumes. Mr. Gehr is minister of the (Universalist) Church of the Restoration, Philadelphia. Dr. Hart is professor of sociology at Duke. Dr. Hightower is dean and professor of sociology at Kalamazoo. Dr. Hough was for many years a professor and dean of Drew Theological Seminary. Dr. Igarashi, a recent graduate of Crozer and Harvard, is at Chicago assisting in the work of the International Greek New Testament. Dr. Johnson is dean of the Church Divinity School of the Pacific and a former professor of New Testament at the (Cambridge) Episcopal Theological School. Mr. Jones is a member of the department of romance languages at the University of Pennsylvania and president of the Philadelphia Civil Service Commission. Mr. Keighton is professor of preaching and worship at Crozer. Dr. Kevin is professor of Old Testament at Virginia Theological Seminary. Dr. Knudson is dean *emeritus* of the Boston University School of Theology and an eminent systematic theologian. Dr. Lehmann is Stephen Colwell professor of applied theology at Princeton Theological Seminary. Dr. MacColl is the distinguished minister *emeritus* of the First Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia. Dr. Moehlman is professor *emeritus* of church history at Colgate-Rochester and the author of many volumes. Dr. Pittenger is instructor in apologetics at General Theological Seminary. Professor Post has the chair of Greek at Haverford and is the editor of the *Loeb Classical Library*. Dr. Roberts is professor of the philosophy of religion at Union Theological Seminary. Dr. Seifert is associate professor of Christian ethics at the University of Southern California. Dr. Stanger is director of religious activities at Lynchburg College. Dr. Tuck is professor of New Testament at Andover Newton. Mr. Ware is a patent lawyer and a member of the Philadelphia Classical Club. Dr. Williams is associate professor of theology at Chicago Theological Seminary. Dr. Wright, without whom this column would never seem complete, is Stone professor of philosophy *emeritus* at Dartmouth.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Interpreter's Bible, edited (in twelve volumes) by George A. Buttrick, Nolan B. Harmon, *et al.,* Vol. VII, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1951, pp. xxiv, 917, $8.75.

To keep this review of an encylopædic volume within printable limits there will be three parts: 1. a general statement about the whole project of which this volume is the first publication; 2. a rapid summary of the introductory articles on the New Testament; 3. a few selected comments on the exegesis and the exposition of Matthew and Luke.

This book has a lengthy subtitle: "The Holy Scriptures in the King James and Revised Standard Versions with General Articles and Introduction, Exegesis, Exposition for Each Book of the Bible in Twelve Volumes." The editorial board consists of George A. Buttrick, chairman, Walter R. Bowie, Paul Scherer, John Knox, Samuel Terrien, and Nolan B. Harmon. This board is aided by thirty-six consulting editors and 124 contributors. Fourteen of the consultants appear among the contributors. While most of the men come from the United States, some of them are English, Scotch, Canadian, and Australian. The ratio of professors to ministers is three to one. Many of the best-known names of biblical scholars in the English-speaking world are represented among the contributors. Theologically they range from conservative to liberal, and they come from all of the main Protestant churches. Their common mission is "to interpret anew the timeless truths of God's holy Word." They began their work seven years ago and expect to complete their task in 1957 with a total of eight million words. They divided their work into three areas: 1. introduction to the Bible in the form of general articles written by specialists, which condense much information about the Bible as a whole and about each Testament, with well-selected brief bibliographies for each article; 2. exegesis of the biblical text; 3. exposition of each book. For the exegesis and the exposition two collaborators were appointed. The exegete writes the introduction to each book which includes a detailed outline of it and a brief bibliography. Then he proceeds, verse by verse, with historical explanations with occasional Hebrew or Greek in parentheses, with Scriptural citations and with quotations and references from the works of learned men of the past and the present. The intent is to present as clear understanding as possible of the text in its original meanings. The expositors, with the exegetes' work before them, undertake to interpret the eternal truths of the Bible to the changing times in which we live. They attempt to correlate the work of the biblical specialist and the need to preach and teach the Word of God to meet the religious concerns of every man today. There has been no comparable coöperative venture in Protestant biblical scholarship since the *Expositor's Bible* and the *International Critical Commentary* were separately launched about seventy-five years ago. The *Interpreter's Bible* is an up-to-date combination of competent scholarship and religious devotion which takes account of all the amazing advances of a half century of biblical knowledge and which also retains an interest in the practical value of the message of God for man. Many a minister will find it an ever-present help in time of sermon trouble. Any teacher of the Bible will find it a flowing fountain of information, and any literate Christian will greatly enlarge his knowledge and appreciation of that library of his faith which is collected in the Bible.

The quality of Vol. VII justifies the fanfare of world-wide publicity which has

accompanied its issuance. The publishers report an anticipated cost of one million dollars. Their care in the details of publication needs commendation. The heavy book has good paper and is substantially bound, and the page arrangements are compact but easily used. The general articles are printed in smaller type double columns to conserve space and provide shorter readable lines. The text of the Bible in double columns is printed in the King James Version at the top of the left page and in the Revised Standard Version on the right. Lower on the pages the exegesis stands in larger type single column form with Scriptural quotations set in boldface type. Each section of the exegesis is given a heading and a numbering of Scriptural chapter and verse so that any reference can be found immediately. The exposition comes next on each page under the exegesis and reverts to the smaller type double column form. There are three black-and-white maps: of Jerusalem, of Palestine, and of Galilee and Samaria. The proofreading is miraculously good.

There are eight general articles on the New Testament, some of which contain subdivisions which require a total of fourteen authors. These articles occupy 224 pages while Matthew and Mark cover 394 and 288 pages respectively. Each article is headed by a clear outline and ended by a selected bibliography of eight to ten books. These are superbly written accounts in which only a highly skilled expert could select, arrange, and condense his large field of knowledge into the compass of articles which run from ten to thirty pages. They are basically historical information, collected, edited and distilled from the careful research of many years by top-grade biblical scholars. They represent the reliable positions which command the consent and the judgment of most scholars who adhere primarily to the historical method in the study of the New Testament. This does not mean that on uncertain or disputed points there is unanimity, but it is interesting to observe that where their trails cross each other, they trend toward the same observations and conclusions. It is heartening to find that a wide range of facts has been established by careful, competent scholarship and that in matters of dispute there is a free give-and-take in criticism which aims at sifting out the truth.

In a longer lead-off article, "The Gospel in the New Testament," R. H. Strachan discusses the gospel as good news from and about God and Christ and traces in excellent summaries its statement in the primitive church, in the gospels, in Paul, and in Johannine writings. He rightly unites both preaching and teaching as correlative parts of the gospel. He stoutly defends the reliability of the speeches in the earlier parts of Acts and since he finds but two references to the Second Advent in these speeches he infers that the coming of Christ again did not control the thinking of the apostles (p. 7). This point is at variance with most of his colleagues in the book.

"The New Testament and Early Christian Literature" by H. J. Cadbury is a brief but informative essay on literary aspects such as motives, materials, methods and forms, groupings, date, and order of the New Testament, the Apostolic Fathers, and the Early Apologists. It is notable that in his arrangement according to literary types Cadbury sets both the Acts and Revelation ahead of the letters of Paul. He favors a wide range of date, second or third century, for the Didache and omits Papias from the Apostolic Fathers.

B. M. Metzger discusses "The Language of the New Testament" which includes a survey of the history of the Greek language and the characteristics of each of the books of the New Testament and the interpretation of the koine, Semitic, and Christian elements. This is packed with rich insights, particularly about some of the most important words in the Christian language. It should be expanded into a book.

"The Growth of the Gospels" by A. M. Perry is an unusually clear presentation of the intricacies of the Synoptic Problem which covers the source criticism with its two- and four-document hypotheses. Then Perry turns to the Aramaic theory, and follows with a highly helpful analysis and estimate of the oral tradition (form criticism). This is an aspect of gospel criticism, widely known among scholars but little known to laymen, where the *Interpreter's Bible* can help to lessen the gap. The discussion on John, owing to limits of space, is much too brief compared with the Synoptics. The article concludes with a useful reconstruction of the growth of the gospels from A.D. 30 to A.D. 150.

"The New Testament Times" is divided between S. V. McCasland who writes of "The Græco-Roman World" and M. S. Enslin who writes of "Palestine." Each of these articles is the nucleus for a whole book. McCasland rapidly reduces the vast complexities of the Hellenistic Age to orderly summaries of its geography, history, morality, philosophy, and of its multiplicity of religious and distinctive developments of Judaism in the Dispersion. This world civilization into which Christianity moved stands forth in "sunny outline bold and clear." Enslin traces the historical developments in Palestine under the rule of Rome, the Herods, the procurators, and the fatal revolts. Then he turns incisively to Judaism, with its devotion to the law, written and oral, and its Pharisees, Sadducees, and varied hopes for the future. Enslin's observation that the first Herod was "Israel's greatest king" will probably not find assent from Jewish scholars. His rejection of the term *Zealot* for the revolutionary "home rule party" in the time of Jesus points to a revision of a label often used to describe this group.

There is a long article by Vincent Taylor on "The Life and Ministry of Jesus," while another article, equally long, "The Teaching of Jesus," is triply subdivided: 1. "The Proclamation of the Kingdom" by C. T. Craig; 2. "The Sermon on the Mount" by A. N. Wilder; 3. "The Parables" by W. R. Bowie. Taylor outlines the life of Jesus in five periods: 1. "Before the Galilean Ministry"; 2. "The Galilean Ministry"; 3. "The Withdrawal from Galilee"; 4. "In Judea"; 5. "The Passion and Resurrection." He admits that "many things in the story of Jesus are mysterious and some problems are insoluble" (p. 114) and candidly tells the reader that he will be left to distinguish personal opinions from well-based historical inferences. Taylor exhibits the solid British scholarship which relies on Streeter's four-document hypothesis and historical sequence in Jesus' life rather than upon the findings of form criticism with its stress on the Christian community, "a convenient phrase which tells us nothing." He accepts the Markan framework for his outline and weaves together a substantial historical reconstruction of Jesus' life by the use of all the gospels. He accepts Goguel's view, based on John, that Jesus had an extended ministry in Judea and Jerusalem. He does not see Jesus in the eschatological light in which he is bathed by many recent commentators. Diversity of scholarly opinion appears when Taylor has no difficulty in the thought that Jesus spoke of himself as the Son of Man "as most New Testament scholars believe" (p. 136) whereas Grant repeatedly claims that it "must be a matter of doubt" (p. 642).

In "The Proclamation of the Kingdom" Craig explains the Jewish background and the usage in the Synoptics and shows that Jesus contributed three new elements as he promised entrance into the kingdom to an unexpected group, asserted the presence of the kingdom in his own ministry, and took the kingdom with a new seriousness. The article abounds in significant suggestions about the relations of the kingdom to Jesus' teaching. The form of "his message of the kingdom cannot be held by us today in the same way" (p. 153), but there still are values in his

"eschatological conditioning." Wilder gives a careful literary and historical analysis of "the Sermon on the Mount," then turns to its interpretation and relevance as found especially in writers like Dibelius and Windisch. Wilder provides wise and wide-ranging counsels in the use of the Sermon on the Mount. Bowie lists the parables in the Synoptics, discusses their nature, their Old Testament background, and their interpretation by the evangelists. Then he uses the parables to throw light on Jesus and the various gospels and finally suggests three principles for present-day interpretation. The article contains more helpful thoughts from the parables for present-day living than historical information. The bibliography should not omit B. T. D. Smith's important work, *Parables of the Synoptic Gospels.*

"The History of the Early Church" has a fourfold division: 1. "The Beginnings" by E. F. Scott; 2. "The Life of Paul" by W. H. P. Hatch; 3. "Paul the Apostle" by Paul Minear; 4. "The Post-Apostolic Age" by M. H. Shepherd, Jr. Scott covers the church in Palestine with his easy mastery of materials based on the early part of Acts but arranged in topical form. The article is marked by no references to other scholars. The discussion on the meaning of the church could profitably refer to Johnston's *The Doctrine of the Church in the New Testament.* "The Resurrection must always be a mystery" (p. 177). The accounts in the gospels are secondary while Paul's account is primary. Scott concludes with an excellent summary of the all-important significance of the primitive though temporary Palestinian church. Hatch traces the career of Paul and retells the narratives given in Acts, interwoven with data from Paul's letter, with appropriate comments on the alternatives when debatable points arise. There is a strong current of support for the historical trustworthiness of Acts. This is a judicious life of Paul which traverses the traditional viewpoints. Minear gives a colorful interpretation of Paul as a man of conflict, a slave of Christ, an apostle to the Gentiles, and a builder of the church. His points about Paul are supported steadily by references from Paul's letters, but the approach is fresh and full of a striking appreciation of Paul as he faced powerful enemies without and within the church, yet lived "in Christ" and fulfilled faithfully his mission to spread the gospel and to foster the life of the church. In the use of Paul's letters Hatch accepts Goodspeed's theory of Ephesians as the work of a Paulinist whereas Minear quotes Ephesians as from Paul. To their bibliographies should be added John Knox's *Chapters in a Life of Paul.* In one of the least illuminated periods of early Christianity Shepherd guides his readers through Palestine, Syria, Asia Minor, Greece, Egypt, and Rome as he capably puts together a tentative reconstruction of the first half of the second century. For his sources he uses the later writings of the New Testament, its Apocrypha and the Apostolic Fathers. He places these writings in their appropriate geographical areas and interprets their significance for the development of Christianity.

The introduction and the exegesis of Matthew by S. E. Johnson and the exposition by G. A. Buttrick combine into a "most excellent way" to this gospel. This work stands in the front rank of any study of Matthew and the same high estimate can be accorded to F. C. Grant for the introduction and the exegesis of Mark and to H. E. Luccock for exposition. It is to be expected that succeeding volumes of the *Interpreter's Bible* will be equally good, but the treatment of Matthew and Mark has set a high-tide level that will stand for years to come. It is no derogation of the expositors to say that for this reviewer the exegesis of these gospels is so good that he wishes there had been at least twice as much more.

In his introduction Johnson discusses the early popularity of Matthew and analyzes effectively its many-sided catholic character. He accepts the view that

Matthew used Mark as a framework and combined into it five great discourses from Q. Matthew's use of these sources and his own editorial contributions are fully outlined with a clear recognition of the delicate obligation of the historian today to distinguish between the actual words and deeds of Jesus and the influence of the interests and the needs of the church upon the tradition. Matthew's Greek is classified, his date is put about A.D. 100, and his location is preferably given as in Syria. As for the author, though the apostle Matthew may have collected sayings of Jesus, yet the present gospel is "a compendium of church tradition, artistically edited, not the personal observations of a participant" (p. 242). In primitive Christianity the gospels of Matthew and Luke served to unify Christians. The historical study results in a clearer picture of Jesus and in a distinction between earlier and later interpretations and a discovery of the stages of Christian development. This study in turn casts new light on the continual interpretation of the gospel. Johnson explains the textual status of Matthew and closes with a long detailed outline of the gospel.

Lack of space prevents more than a few brief comments on the abundant stores of information, brought forth in the exegesis. Names and titles of persons are explained, places are located geographically, pertinent historical facts given, Old Testament references are cited and interpreted, the Markan parallels are named, the sources of separate narratives are suggested, the distinctive Matthean language, theology and interests are indicated, the best ancient interpreters and modern scholars, Jewish and Christian, are given by book and page, publisher and date, for important verses, the Palestinian scene is described based on firsthand experiences there, the church usages of Matthew are pointed out, the Greek words and the Semitic phrases, whether Hebrew or Aramaic, are skillfully translated, the social, economic, political and religious customs are accurately portrayed and explained, the points of parables are suggested by appropriate titles, wherever possible the motives, the attitudes, the actions and the words of Jesus are illuminatingly discussed; yet there is a discriminating and reverent reserve lest speculation exceed its historical authority. Many fruitful ideas appear in evaluations of the truths of the gospel. There is a frank facing of controversial questions. Concerning the virgin birth "We do not have data which enable us to pronounce on the historical value of Matthew's account" (p. 254). A miracle is "an event which evokes wonder and religious awe and leads the beholders to give praise and thanks to God" (p. 337). No categorical decision can be given about the powers that Jesus exercised or about the event that lies back of this or that story. Full understanding can be had only through faith, but present-day medical science and psychology can aid understanding. No attempt is made to explain the "nature miracles" though the feeding of the 5,000 suggests a foretaste of the great coming banquet in the kingdom of God. "The nature of the resurrection appearances and their ultimate validity is an issue beyond the scope of scientific and historical investigation and belongs in the realm of faith and theology" (p. 615). Johnson does not hesitate when he thinks Matthew has been mistaken or biased in his record. Matthew was probably incorrect when he attributed the teaching of Jesus about the kingdom to John (p. 263); it is very unlikely that Jesus spoke the words to Peter in Matt. 16:17-19 (p. 448). All these things and much more will enrich any reader of this exegesis. The only lack noted is the absence of any explanations about the angels which flit so conveniently through some of Matthew's special narratives.

Buttrick's exposition will feed heart hunger and stay the spirit. It will encourage the weak, bring solace to the repentant, and teach men to pray and to worship. It will reveal the unsearchable riches of God's grace manifested in the Jesus, in his

wondrous words, in the power of his healings, in his helping hands, in his searching looks, in the glorious triumph of his death and resurrection, and in him as "the contemporary and eternal Christ, our Redeemer, Friend, and sovereign Lord" (p. 625). Buttrick illustrates great biblical preaching of the expository type as he points out the shining facets of truth in the gospel record. He brings out treasures new and old as he ranges with winged words through poetry, biography, history, art, drama, and theology to present the gospel in its endless attraction for needy mankind. When Jesus prayed "not as I will but as thou wilt" Buttrick comments, "This prayer is all prayer in one prayer" (p. 580).

In the introduction to Mark, Grant enforces the view that the gospels "main purpose is . . . to set forth the message of salvation through Jesus Christ" (p. 629) and the interpreter's first duty is to understand the text, the passage, and the book which he expounds. After citing the early evidence of Papias and Irenæus which led to the traditional view that Mark wrote in Rome the things Peter proclaimed about Jesus, Grant strongly questions the authorship by John Mark. He finds it advantageous to study the gospel as if it were anonymous and based not on personal authorship but upon the broader support of a common tradition in the church of Rome. Its theological significance far outweighs its historical" (p. 632). It was written with the practical purpose of guidance and support for Christians facing persecution and death; hence the story of Jesus, the first martyr, steadied them. It was composed out of independent, oral and written units of materials like stories, parables, controversies, sayings, and miracles, together with the longer connected account of the last days of Jesus in Jerusalem. Its general outline is "entirely natural, consistent, and historically probable" though single stories are not chronologically ordered except in the passion narrative. Then Grant sketches the essential Roman and Jewish backgrounds of Jesus' life in Palestine. Then he gives a careful analysis of Mark's theology which he differentiates from the thought of Jesus. Mark shared the common gentile, Christian thought of his day but also has his special viewpoints. "Mark is one of the most precious books ever written" (p. 645), but it is not a full account of Jesus. Grant closes with a detailed outline and a good bibliography which lists thirty-one titles.

In general Grant's exegesis proceeds in parallel fashion to the work of Johnson. A common pattern may have been adopted for the exegetes. Grant has no undivided loyalty to the Revised Standard Version. He prefers the King James at several places (pp. 652, 655, 657, 887, 891) though he also rejects it many times. "There is little prospect of any satisfactory solution of the problem of the 'nature miracles' upon a naturalistic basis or by a purely rationalistic method" (p. 741). But they were natural in the ancient world where the centre of interest was not in the miracle but in what it proved: "the presence, the power, the saving purpose of God" (p. 711). Grant often distinguishes the viewpoint of Mark from the thought of Jesus. Grant discards the modern theory that Jesus' baptism marked the birth of his "messianic consciousness" because for Mark the emphasis is not on an inner experience of Jesus but upon the divine announcement of what Jesus already is. On doubtful questions about text and translation Grant makes excellent decisions with reasons to support them. In Mark 1:1 he thinks the words "Son of God" were probably original (p. 648). In 3:21 "friends" is a better translation than "family." In 6:3 Jesus is probably "the son of the carpenter" rather than "the carpenter" (p. 727). Mark's strange geography (7:31) is due to the fact that he was a Roman and not a Palestinian (p. 756). The obscurity of everyone "salted with fire" (9:49) remains. For some of the difficult interpretations Grant gives striking comments.

Mark's theory of parables which were told to prevent acceptance of the truth "can only be described as perverse" (p. 700). The references to gentiles as "dogs" must be due to the prejudices of Jewish Christians during the oral period of the transmission of the gospel (p. 755). "For Mark the vision [*sc.* of the transfiguration] was real; God actually proclaimed Jesus as his Son, and commanded the apostles to hear him" (p. 777). For Mark the last supper is (a) an anticipation of reunion with Jesus in the kingdom; (b) a kind of sacrament of loyalty between Jesus and his disciples; (c) a sacrifice in which the disciples should participate. The abrupt ending of Mark presents a fascinating but insoluble problem at this time. As a whole, this exegesis gives much information about Mark and much less about Jesus. One final question may be asked. Since the unauthentic ending of Mark stands as canonical scripture and since it is printed in *The Interpreter's Bible,* why is it left with no exegesis or exposition?

Luccock's exposition will be known for its apt quotations, its outstanding aphorisms, ("All true greatness consists in pointing to Someone beyond"—p. 651), its penetrating observations in the religious deficiencies of our day, its unique turns of thought as he explores the infinite ranges of gospel thought, its clear trenchant outlines of preachable passages from Mark, and its emphatic realism in religion which well matches the thought and actions of Jesus as Mark vividly portrays them.

DWIGHT MARION BECK

The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, by Edward J. Carnell, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1950, pp. 250, $3.50.

This is a basically dishonest book. Its author, the professor of apologetics at Fuller Theological Seminary, is a dogmatist who offers the gratuitious admission that "one cannot shed his own presuppositions as he would a straight jacket" as a credential entitling him to participate in the search for truth by responsible and critical intellectual discussion. Like a communist "technician" in a satellite country, his weapons are concealed (really quite clumsily) but loaded. The artefacts of scholarship are there but the integrity of scholarship—the will and the capacity really to listen to the truth that another man sees and expounds—is missing. Reinhold Niebuhr never gets a chance to speak his own mind *out of his own concern.* He is made to speak his own mind *out of the author's concern.* Like the commercial in a broadcast, Mr. Carnell is always ruining whatever worth the program itself may have had by peddling his own merchandise.

This book is not about the theology of Reinhold Niebuhr. It should have been called, "Niebuhr's Doctrine of Time and Eternity." The author says that "the dialectical relation between time and eternity" is "one controlling concept" of Niebuhr's theology. What he argues is that this is the decisive concept of his theology. The prospect is held before the reader that if "he can clearly grasp this fundamental point, he will then be in a position to interpret the corpus of the literature for himself." But what the exposition offers is a concentrated attention upon Niebuhr's Gifford lectures, supplemented for the appearance of comprehensiveness by scattered references to other works, in complete disregard of the actual context and development of Niebuhr's thought. Mr. Carnell, who thinks that Niebuhr was a Lutheran pastor in Detroit (he served in fact an Evangelical and Reformed Church), could scarcely be a reliable guide to Niebuhr's other connections. The same kind of distortion explains the author's self-identification with "classical Reformation theology" in the preface and his repeated assumption of the rôle of spokesman for "evangelical Christianity" in the course of the book.

All this does not mean that Niebuhr has been inaccurately quoted. Mr. Carnell is accurate, on the whole, both in the text and the context of the passages cited. But instead of setting out Niebuhr's mind as Niebuhr himself sets it out, Mr. Carnell continually forces Niebuhr into the mould of his own dogmatism. It is alleged that Niebuhr is Kierkegaardian, and therefore existentialist. It, therefore, follows, according to the author, that Niebuhr has no mind of his own and has been shaped by no other influences. Niebuhr could, for instance, not possibly have read the Bible as a believing Christian and have learned anything from the Bible apart from S. K. Nor could the vast alienation of the intellectuals of our day from the church in reaction against Mr. Carnell's monotonous dogmatism have taught Niebuhr anything about the relevance of the gospel. The cardinal errors of Niebuhr are two: he is antimetaphysical; and he is guilty of "destructive higher criticism" of the Bible. It is plain from these pages that the second is the real outrage; the first is intellectual window dressing.

Here is a typical instance of the kind of distortion to which the author's dogmatism leads. He declares that there is a critical epistemological gulf between the Christian and the existentialist mind (by inference between himself and Niebuhr). "The evangelical says that inward experience is to be explained in terms of the Biblical revelation, whereas existentialism says that the Biblical revelation is to be explained in terms of our inward experience" (p. 138). As though there were no semantic problem about the phrase, "to be explained," the author concludes, "a *toto cælo* difference separates these two epistemologies." Perhaps it does. But the difference is not to be stated as Mr. Carnell has. Indeed, any one who read S. K. or Niebuhr apart from metaphysical dogmatism, not to mention Calvin or Luther or the Bible, would know that the Reformers, and those whom Mr. Carnell rebukes for their "existentialism," were wrestling with the problem *both* of understanding inward experience in terms of the biblical revelation and the biblical revelation in terms of our own experience.

Here is another instance of distortion. Niebuhr is being charged with repudiating the finality of truth by means of the adolescent observation that if this is so, then, not even the affirmation that there is no final truth, is a final truth. The logicians have long ago abandoned this kind of victory over skepticism as cheap. We could pass over it here if Mr. Carnell had not used it to make Niebuhr say what he does not say. "The objection," Carnell writes, "to the claim that we have no final truth is perfectly obvious. If no truth is final, then it is not final either . . . etc." What is "perfectly obvious" to any one who has tried to understand Niebuhr, as Niebuhr wishes to be understood, is that Niebuhr never claims that "no truth is final." Least of all, does he claim that *because* "we have no final truth" no truth is final. What Niebuhr says is that all historical apprehensions and formulations of the truth lack finality; and that precisely this demonstrable fact gives relevance to the claim of revelation that Christ is the truth, the final truth.

It is really a pity that the author's proper claims against Niebuhr—that his doctrine of the Incarnation is incomplete, that he carries his historical relativism too far, that the relation of myth to fact requires clarification, etc.—should have been denied their real contribution to the understanding of Niebuhr's thought by relegation, along with Niebuhr's theology, to the blind alley of an orthodoxy that never was and refuses to become evangelical. I do not know about Mr. Carnell, but I do know that people like him have for too long managed to collect doctor's degrees in reputable graduate schools without having to face the uncomfortable emancipation of the critical search for and service of the truth. And that is a pity too. It makes one

very sure, to quote a telling phrase of Barth's, that "it has not exactly been revealed to us that in the nineteenth century, God withdrew His hand from the Church."

PAUL LEHMANN

By the Finger of God, by S. Vernon McCasland, New York, Macmillan, 1951, pp. xi, 146, $2.75.

Professor McCasland of the University of Virginia argues, in this clear and thoughtful little book, that Jesus' exorcisms of demons are well-attested historically, that they are healings of recognizable mental diseases, that they were performed by his personal command alone, and that they bear witness to a unique conception of his own vocation which Jesus held, namely, that he was Messiah in the later apocalyptic sense of Son of Man.

These theses have often been defended, but seldom so ably and systematically, or with such prudent and scholarly reserve. McCasland recognizes that the New Testament and early Christian literature contain much evidence of exorcism—no one, indeed, exercised this power so frequently or fully as Jesus—but he bases his case mainly on the four best-preserved stories, Mark 1:23-26; 5:1-15; 9:17-27; and Acts 16:16-18. The fact that Paul and the Fourth Gospel tell us nothing of Jesus' exorcisms might seem to be a difficulty—why do the miracles of Jesus play no part at all in Paul's Christology?—but McCasland finds this to be an argument for the authenticity of the stories: the later evangelists were not at all interested in heightening the exorcisms for apologetic purposes. A comparison of the gospel materials with Tobit, the rabbinic literature, and the *Life of Apollonius of Tyana,* proves to McCasland that exorcism was largely a Palestinian phenomenon, and that the gospel accounts are far more sober and credible than comparable stories, which show many legndary traits. Furthermore, when we can find eyewitness accounts of Christian exorcism, as in a modern Syrian missionary story and in Acts 16:16-18 (a "we" section), they bear a strong resemblance to Jesus' exorcisms.

McCasland draws a careful distinction between the phenomena of mental illness, particularly the delusion of possession by a demon, and the popular animistic interpretation of it. That we do not interpret psychoses as demon possession does not alter the fact that the diseases exist. Those in the four New Testament passages are, he believes, identifiable: two are hysteria (Mark 1:23-26; Acts 16:16-18; perhaps also Mary Magdalene's seven demons), one is epilepsy (Mark 9:17-27); and the Gerasene demoniac was suffering from the manic-depressive psychosis. This seems more reasonable than the approach of Friedrich Fenner, who in *Das Krankheit im Neuen Testament* tends to explain everything as hysteria. McCasland has taken pains to acquaint himself with psychiatric literature, and Dr. David Cole Wilson, professor of psychiatry in the University of Virginia, writes an introduction in which he commends some of these positions.

Most exorcists in all periods of history have driven out demons by spells and incantations or like Tobias in the Book of Tobit, by the use of religious or magical objects. Christians gradually adopted such techniques, beginning with prayer and ending with fasting, asceticism, and formulæ. But the earliest Christians vanquished demons by the name of Jesus alone, and in this their pattern was their Master, whose sole method was his personal command. It is only occasionally that a Jewish rabbi was able so to command the demons, and rabbinical tradition explains the healer's power as due to his knowledge of Torah. Jesus' exorcisms were more frequent, and the problem is, on what did he base his unique conception of his own power?

McCasland finds the explanation in Jesus' Messiahship. Using the pseudepigrapha

and the New Testament to document his statement, he argues that one of the most important functions of the Messiah in later Jewish thought was the delivery of the righteous from the power of Satan and his hosts. Jesus' enemies found something unusual and baffling in his character and work, as shown by the criticisms that he was "beside himself" or "possessed by Beelzebub." And Jesus himself was conscious of an immediate and intimate fellowship with God, a possession by the Holy Spirit, as shown by the story of his baptism. McCasland takes the position, often held, that the story could have come from no one but Jesus. Not that the Jewish apocalyptic idea of Messiah explains his person and mission altogether; but it is one element which must be taken into consideration.

There are, of course, difficulties in this line of interpretation. One is that the apostle Paul is, as we have said, silent on this whole aspect of Jesus' ministry, though this can be explained from the fact that Paul's theological interests are quite different from those of Mark and the author of Q. A second difficulty is that McCasland puts so much weight on the story of the baptism as a self-witness of Jesus, and as a witness to his *Messiahship,* not merely to his sonship and possession of the Spirit. The third is that Messiahship is interpreted almost entirely in terms of the Son of Man and Elect One passages in Enoch. Was the Son of Man a species of Messiah or an entirely different redeemer-figure? Is the term Messiah, most of whose associations were royal, the most appropriate word? These are objections that are often raised. Finally, we know that the message of the kingdom of God was the most important element of Jesus' preaching; and, as Sharman pointed out, the kingdom of God and Son of Man sayings come to us from separate and distinct cycles of tradition.

Certainly in the kingdom of God cycle itself exorcism is presupposed—"if I by the finger of God cast out demons, then no doubt the kingdom of God is come upon you"—and this goes far to substantiate the main point that McCasland wishes to make. But should we not think of Jesus as having conceived for himself an utterly unique place in the scheme of redemption, a place which he was reluctant to describe in conventional terminology? He may or may not have spoken of himself as the coming Son of Man; he certainly addressed God quite simply and directly as *Abba;* but his followers tried to express his person and mission by using the various terms applied to him in the New Testament, one tradition using one word and another tradition a different one. This does not change the massive fact that, according to the earliest accounts we possess, Jesus drives out the demons by his own command.

Only here and there does the author fail to exercise his usual caution and care. He is perhaps too confident in assigning the writing of Tobit to Egypt (p. 78). And can Tertullian be called a bishop of Carthage (p. 55)? According to Jerome he was a presbyter.

SHERMAN E. JOHNSON

God and Man at Yale, by William F. Buckley, Jr., Chicago, Henry Regnery, 1951, pp. xix, 240, $3.50.

As I read *God and Man at Yale,* a number of memories haunted me. This volume seemed to be pioneering in introducing the fundamentalist controversy, from which so many theological schools suffered between 1920 and 1930, to the university campus; and while Yale might laugh at its naïvete, the smaller college alumni might yield to the urge to preach a crusade against the economics department. That is what did happen back there—the strong schools retained their freedom; the weaker school faculties signed on the dotted line.

One of the books of that decade had been written years earlier by an ex-divinity

school president who did not believe that I Corinthians 13 applied either to his successor in the chair of theology or to his successor in the presidency and therefore resorted to pre-McCarthy smears. A second came from the pen of a "good man" who broke out in a rash entitled *The Leaven of the Sadducees,* holding up many theological professors to both scorn and ridicule—the damage, while only indirect, was excessive and produced fundamentalist hardening of the arteries. Another memory was about a college president who emphasized that the courses in religion were primary on any college campus but who during his four years in college had never looked in upon, to say nothing of visiting or condescending to elect, a religion course.

These men were along in years, but here are put down the reflections of a one-year-out Yale alumnus who wants to help God, country, and Yale—"in that order." He claims that he loves Yale to almost irrational fondness and knows that volumes "could be written commending the virtues of countless aspects of Yale's education," "the diligence and patience of her scholars, the kindness and understanding of her administrators, the joys and sustaining pleasures of friendships she makes possible." But there are those defects in her religious life, there is her noble attempt to counteract man's inhumanity to man, to do something for the other half, to settle international friction by peaceful means and methods, and above all to insist upon academic freedom which seem to irritate the author. So he would apply the method of the authoritarian; he would summon the alumni to the use of coercion and force to secure the discharge of very able professors who do not accept his religious or economic point of view.

The study consists of two parts, what might be called the "I accuse" section (religion at Yale and its emphasis upon a coöperative interpretation of life) and the propaganda section (the summons to Yale alumni to act, to draw the line, to secure the discharge of professors who think of the other half). One wonders whether this passage can be matched anywhere in sophomoric literature: "if several hundred thousand people . . . elect to pay Joe DiMaggio $100,000 a year for the privilege of seeing him at bat . . . and the government promptly turns around and absorbs the greater part of this sum, *who is thwarting the most directly expressed will of the people?"* And he has a firm belief in Christianity, which has made so much of the exhortations of Jesus," ye cannot serve God and Mammon" and "if thou would'st be perfect, sell all thou hast and give to the poor." Were not those "communistic" passages in Acts 2:44-47 and 4:32—5:11 a part of his home training in Christianity? A re-reading of Amos and Micah would be illuminating; passages like Matt. 5-7, James 2:1-11, Rom. 12, I Cor. 13 are still in the Bible.

For me one of the puzzles of the volume was Appendix VII. What prompted the author to weaken his case against Yale by listing the more than 150 other colleges and universities which also use the most popular text in economics, especially when the other institutions include Cambridge University, *the Catholic University of America,* Denison University, Hunter College, Princeton, Rutgers, *St. Francis Xavier,* St. Olaf, and Sioux Falls College? Since the battle has gone against him at Yale, is this a summons to alumni in more hopeful situations to get busy? But if the Yale texts are also used at Babson Institute, College of Holy Cross, General Motors Institute, and so on, does not his case against Yale collapse?

His equation that Christianity is to atheism as individualism is to collectivism is assuredly vulnerable. For three centuries in the Roman culture, Christianity was identified with atheism, and Protestantism is described as atheistic in many a non-Protestant passage. To the sixteenth century, western Catholicism was collectivistic

in practice and is so in theory today. It cannot accept economic liberalism which was a revolution against mediæval ecclesiastical economic control.

The author should give a few hours to mastering the history of secularism which appeared in Christianity in the fourth century in connection with the emergence of Christendom, the amalgamation of Christianity with the political system of the Roman empire, and which since the sixteenth century has been part and parcel of the modern world and is imbedded in the Constitution of the United States, particularly in the religious clause of the First Amendment.

The note on p. 8, in which the author quotes from Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr to define Christianity is somewhat amusing: "Christian faith stands or falls on the proposition that a *character*(!) named Jesus, in a particular place at a particular time in history, is more than a man in history, but is a revelation of the mystery of self and of the ultimate mystery of existence"—tell it not to the fundamentalists, mention it not in Gath! It would have caused a rough-and-tumble at Nicæa and is more nebulous and ambiguous than the formula of Chalcedon. The phraseology of the Christian creeds is conspicuous by its absence. Certainly no professor at Yale could be declared heretical for not affirming this. Way back in 1902, the most orthodox professor in the United States taught our class over and over again that the existence of God could not be proved, and it is still in his compendium used as text in fundamentalist theological seminaries. But the author seems to regard this as revolutionary truth (p. 21).

Some of the grandest men in theological education today are criticized here, and when at last he could praise the two orthodox souls he has discovered, he writes regarding the one that the "enrolment in this course is very small," and regarding the other that his course is "even more lightly subscribed" (p. 9). And then he demonstrates his high regard for religion by labelling the courses as "gut," "snaps," "crips," and "A."

The heart of the study is Chap. II, about sixty per cent of the "I accuse" section. Personally I felt like saluting the economics faculty. If some day a syllabus were to be prepared showing that the Bible does stress otherism, this critic would be compelled to cancel out either Chap. I or II, for the one contradicts the other.

In conclusion, there is an article by Willard L. Sperry in the *Virginia Quarterly Review,* Spring, 1951, pp. 206-218, on "The Decline of Conscience" which contains this helpful suggestion to any who would understand the bewildering present:

> The great religious peril of these days is ethical disillusionment and cynicism, *not doctrinal unbelief.* . . . The only solution of our distresses and moral perils lies in some bold co-operative plan of peace. . . . An uneasy conscience makes a better Christian than a sense of moral complacency.

Religious and economic totalitarianism and *Gleichschaltung* will create more problems than they solve. A back-to-Hitler crusade will not win enough support from this bruised world.

CONRAD HENRY MOEHLMAN

The Wall of Separation between Church and State, by Conrad H. Moehlman, Boston, Beacon, 1951, pp. xvi, 239, $3.

Word has been getting around in certain circles that the simple clause in the Constitution providing for separation of church and state does not mean what it says. Indeed, the civil liberties of Americans have already been seriously undermined by that diabolical law, according to many spokesmen for the hierarchy. (See Professor J. M. O'Neill's *Religion and Education Under the Constitution.*)

For just so long could Professor Moehlman accept such flagrant misinterpretation. In this book he challenges hierarchical pretensions and intentions as they relate to

the true meaning of the separation of church and state. It is the product of an immense knowledge of history, an intense love of America, and righteous anger. The finished result is another volume in the increasingly influential series known as "Beacon Studies in Freedom and Power."

The task the author sets for himself is "to present in detail the historical background, the significance, and subsequent development of the religious clause of the First Amendment; and to show why the Roman Catholic tradition of the union of church and state is antithetical to the American emphasis upon government neutrality in religious matters" (p. xiii). That task is admirably fulfilled. This book will long serve to illuminate the thought of those who are honestly concerned to know the roots and branches of the principle in its American setting.

Providing for background a view of the establishment of the Roman Church as a power monolithic and undeviating, the author sets against it the unassailable individualism which is at the core of American tradition. It comes out clearly that there can never be compromise between these two. The ideology of either calls for the complete surrender of the other. Basically there is nothing American about Catholicism, and there is nothing in unchanging Catholicism to match the spirit of freedom which is the soul of America.

Recent Supreme Court decisions, the arraignment of Mrs. Roosevelt by Cardinal Spellman, lobbying for federal aid to parochial schools, manœuvres to secure an ambassador to the Vatican, are likely to impress the public as being completely new developments. Actually they are but new incidents in a struggle of ancient standing. This book casts a powerful searchlight down the years. "One of the foundation stones of separation of church and state was laid in the structure of Rhode Island, namely, *voluntary support of the ministry*" (p. 68). We behold Jefferson ridiculing religious coercion in his *Notes on Virginia* (p. 77). James Madison is seen fighting against odds for the removal of a general tax which benefits the established church (p. 79). We read Washington's words to the Baptists, words heartily applauding their stand against state-supported sectarian education (p. 86). It is demonstrated beyond reasonable question that the clause, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," is living bone and flesh of the American Way. Long may it live!

No fear is expressed that the American conception of religious freedom is in imminent danger. The author shows the actual weakness of those who challenge it and infers that their bold attempts are really tactics of desperation. He indicates that there are persons of influence in the Catholic Church—if not members of the hierarchy —who lend vital support to the conception of separation.

It is perhaps unfortunate that the title of the book, and Jeffersonian phrase, makes it seem that separation is only to be defended or that it is a rigid doctrine needing continual strengthening. Actually this aggressive treatise is much more concerned with application of the idea than with the strategies of a static defense. Glowingly, the bounty that has flowed from the grand conception is described—the splendor of our American educational system, unrivalled opportunities for scientific investigation with attendant results, prophetic religion meeting the demands of changing times with self-respect born of independence. Has any idea begotten in our brave new world been more fruitful of good?

HARMON M. GEHR

Geschichte der neuern evangelischen Theologie, by Emanuel Hirsch, Gütersloh, Bertelsmann, *Lieferungen* 6-11, 1951, pp. 456, DM 3.50 each *Lieferung.*

These six sections constitute the second volume of this work on modern Protestant theology, and carry the history from the middle of the seventeenth to the middle of

the eighteenth century. It is concerned mainly with the development of the rationalism of the Leibnitz-Wolffian school and the pietistic reaction of Spener and Francke, with the opposition of orthodox theology to pietism, with Jacob Boehme, and finally with sundry less-known theological movements and leaders which made the transition to the German Enlightenment of the late eighteenth century. As the author says at the end of this volume, "What we have so far presented is really not the history, but rather the prehistory, of modern Protestant theology."

European Protestant orthodoxy had erected its theology on two main pillars: a rationally constructed world view based on mediæval science and metaphysics, and the divinely inspired Bible newly interpreted by the Reformers. Both of these were subjected to increasingly bold critical study until each in its own way proved too weak to be reliable. This situation called for some radical reconstruction of faith. From the philosophical side this was attempted by Leibnitz, whose elaborate and impressive system offered a basis for the harmony of reason and faith but was at bottom a rationalistic philosophy. The rationalism implicit in Liebnitz was developed explicitly by Christian Wolff, who even dared to say that revelation is genuine only when it is in harmony with reason, and that even though it may transcend our rational understanding, this transcendence is more psychological than ontological. The effect of this was really to bring all theological truths to the bar of judgment of natural law, and in this Wolff is properly characterized as the one who did more than any other to pave the way for the Enlightenment in Germany. His influence on Buddeus and Baumgarten later on is clear.

From a quite different angle the Pietists sought to reinstate Christian faith by a return to religious experience of rebirth. The church, they felt, had become book-ridden, and preachers were arguing about the Bible rather than speaking from the heart and from firsthand experience of God's grace. By the same token philosophy could not lead to faith. Christian truth is of a different order from other truth and has its own distinctive basis. But the statement of what this basis is led Spener to a point close to the Rationalists: it is the life and teaching of Jesus as found in the gospels which are the touchstone for all sound belief. It is not surprising, therefore, that the orthodox theologians attacked the Pietists as they were later to war against the Moravians, since these minimized both creedal theology and the rôle of the visible church in salvation.

In their discussion of the Bible the Pietists made important distinctions between the "shell" and the "kernel" of the Scriptures, insisted that theology is really biblical science, and encouraged careful linguistic study. Thus it was that Bengel, the father of Swabian Pietism, came to write his *Gnomon Novi Testamenti* (1742), a book with great influence on subsequent biblical scholarship and on the now current idea of *Heilsgeschichte,* which views biblical history as a distinct type concerned, as secular history is not, with human history as the story of the salvation of mankind.

The revival of the old notion of secret, mystical meanings in the biblical teachings made possible the appearance of that strange figure Jacob Boehme; but his introduction at this point in the history is confusing, for Boehme lived from 1575 to 1624, before the period of the present volume opens.

The justification offered is that Boehme had great influence on certain side developments of Pietism, and that his collected works did not appear till 1683, but in placing him after Spener and Francke Hirsch has distorted his significance and failed to give due credit to his originality as a thinker.

It would have been better had the author followed on from Bengel to J. Lorentz Schmidt and the Wertheimer Bible (which actually appeared seven years before

Bengel's *Gnomon*) where the biblical writings are treated in scientific fashion so as to earn for him Hirsch's verdict: "der erste klare und entschiedene Rationalist unter den deutschen Theologen." The storm of protest against the Wertheimer Bible and its "mechanistic" philosophy was comparable to the antideistic polemics in England. Schmidt was exiled and forced into an anonymous existence, but the damage had been done. Modern biblical interpretation was on its way.

Students of contemporary theology will do well to return to this period of which Hirsch here writes. Many of the same issues are in debate again, and the careful delineation of the theological development which he gives should serve to clarify them and to point to some of the consequences of a biblical theology which seeks to withdraw the Bible from the desk of scholarly investigation by attributing to it a special kind of truth incommensurable with reason or history. Biblical interpretation, when detached from scrupulous biblical criticism, is a dangerous discipline prone to offer attractive but abortive results for piety.

EDWIN E. AUBREY

The Sociology of Knowledge, by Jacques J. Maquet, Boston, Beacon, 1951, pp. xix, 318, $5.

The subject of this book (according to Professor Northrop's preface) is "the relation between the facts of social existence and the ideas making up human knowledge." The author proposes the following definition: "The sociology of knowledge is the study of mental productions in so far as they are related to social or cultural factors."

"The sociology of knowledge was born of a movement greatly emphasizing the role of irrationality in human activity" (p. 257). "Laymen and social scientists often assert that the ideas of men are but afterthoughts, mere rationalizing—in the derogatory sense of the word "rationalize"—the group interests, the class aims, or the forces of power politics which supposedly determine the beliefs and the behavior of men, both as individuals and as groups" (p. xi). But these two quotations suggest that, in a very serious sense, the term "sociology of knowledge" is a misnomer. Knowledge means awareness of truth. A belief, an opinion, a prejudice—these may or may not be untrue, but knowledge is not knowledge unless it is true.

As indicated in the subtitle, "Its Structure and Its Relation to the Philosophy of Knowledge; a Critical Analysis of the Systems of Karl Mannheim and Pitirim A. Sorokin," this treatise is based on a critical analysis of two systems of "the sociology of knowledge." Mannheim's system seeks to explain mental productions in line with the socialistic theories of Karl Marx. He holds that men use their cognitive faculties principally with an aim to gaining economic and political power. Sorokin's system seeks to prove that men's methods of seeking truths are determined by the type of culture within which they live. When "ideational culture" is dominant, the criterion of truth will be religious revelation, mystical experience, or even magic. When the "sensate culture" is dominant, men tend to believe that nothing is real beyond this tangible world and that their senses (with such extensions as telescopes and microscopes) will put them in authentic contact with reality. When the "idealistic culture" is dominant, men trust in reason and logic. Dr. Maquet points out that the Mannheim and the Sorokin systems are not very harmonious, but that they are more complementary than contradictory.

In many respects the present volume does an admirable job of scholarly analysis. The logical analysis is searching. The Mannheim and Sorokin conceptions of the factors which influence mental products are brought out in sharp relief, and the contrasts between the two systems are clear-cut. Dr. Maquet's analysis will be highly stimulating and illuminating to a great many social philosophers.

But the present reviewer has the feeling that if certain fundamental concepts had been more clearly discriminated, and if these more philosophical approaches had been more fully integrated with the great volume of recent inductive research, a far more useful understanding of the genesis of ideas might have been achieved. Human attitudes and valuational behavior can be objectively described. Attitudes and values are obviously determined to a major extent by economic and political needs (as emphasized by Mannheim) and also by dominant systems of culture (as pointed out by Sorokin). In order to fulfill their needs and desires, men must develop valid means to their ends. Insofar as these means go beyond mere common sense they have to be based upon systems of ideas. But these ideas also are prone to be conditioned by economic, political, and other cultural factors. While the social philosophers have been theorizing about this, the students of attitude-and-opinion-measurement have been accumulating objective data on the subject.

Karl Marx, as well as Karl Mannheim, recognized that "the perspective" of a class-conscious political and economic group may constitute mental distortion which falsifies everything which comes within its range. Dr. Maquet says "the sociology of knowledge . . . will endeavor to determine the perspective of any mental production, its own included." Perhaps the social philosophers have had their own thinking warped to a considerable extent by the vested interests of academic groups who have inherited a growing body of sociological "authority." It is a curious—and a highly significant fact—that Dr. Maquet, as a social philosopher absorbed with the "sociology of knowledge," has completely ignored the swiftly growing science of attitude-and-opinion measurement. This new branch of social science has been discovering, applying, and improving inductive techniques for the study of the factors which determine men's value systems and their approximations towards knowledge of how to attain their values.

Dr. Maquet suggests the possibility of liberation from "perspective" distortions. He says: "Since perspective originates in the identification of an individual with the interests and collective aims of his group, the individual must attempt to dissociate himself from his group in spirit or even in fact. . . . This kind of renunciation corresponds to what Mannheim expects from his pure intellectuals. . . . Even in the political field, it is possible to free ourselves from the social equation."

But perhaps, instead of repudiating the viewpoint of one's group, one needs to transcend that viewpoint. The social philosophers need to hold fast to the insights they have achieved by their scholarly and philosophical approaches, but need also to merge with these the swiftly growing knowledge which is being attained by systematic measurements of attitudes and opinions. By thus progressively rising above our prejudices we may perhaps achieve a more and more valid set of mental tools for understanding and promoting those basic and universal human needs which undergird the values—and which help to shape the attitudes and the opinions—of all the diverse groups of mankind.

HORNELL HART

Rufus Jones Speaks to Our Time: An Anthology, edited by Harry Emerson Fosdick, New York, Macmillan, 1951, pp. xv, 289, $4.

This is a precious distillation for our day from the writings of a religious seer, who thought on and taught the things of the Spirit for fourscore years. It is a distillation made by another outstanding man of the Spirit, who surveys Rufus Jones with admiring sympathy and a keen sense of personal indebtedness to him. The anthology could not have been compiled under wiser auspices.

The headings of the sections pose basic questions: "Where Is God?" "How Does

God Reveal Himself?" "What Is Man?" "How Explain Conscience?" etc. Sections occasionally overlap, for the mind of a mystic is not sharply divided into clearly defined areas. The selections under "What Does Prayer Mean?" might almost as fittingly have been classified under "What Is True Mysticism?" But never mind; every item in this anthology is pure gold.

Rufus Jones thought profoundly and had the gift of clear and beautiful expression. Fosdick rightly divines both the profound and the lovely. This is a treasure house for all who would think in the secret place of the Most High and place their minds in his immediate presence. It will serve many as devotional reading of the most satisfying character, for it lays hold of the intelligence and warms the heart.

Rufus Jones, as those of us who knew him can testify, was a charming combination of saintliness and shrewdness, of adoration and humor. Fosdick's selections do justice to both sides of his character. "What Is the Matter with the Church?" contains penetrating diagnosis eminently realistic. "What Is Vital Religion?" exposes varieties which lack life and renders them absurd. Humor is a sense of proportion to which the big is big and the trifling trifling. When the petty poses as momentous, Jones punctured it and made it laughable.

The selection headed "How Deal With Dark Days?" concludes with an account of Rufus Jones' life with his only son, Lowell, who was taken from his widowed father at the age of eleven. One marvels at the insight, good taste, and courage with which this most personal story is written. It will lift many a man and woman called to walk through the midnight of a similar loss.

Fosdick's Introduction is a just and well-rounded appraisal of one of the towering spiritual geniuses of our generation. Few have realized the stature of this man of God. Now from his many writings Fosdick lets him speak his devout mind and show its largeness. Friends of Rufus Jones will be grateful to Fosdick both for this true estimate of the man and for the adequate and timely anthology which opens the door into the realm of the Spirit where Jones was so manifestly at home, and the rest of us are at best casual visitors. This is a rich book, and will surely make wealthy towards God the souls of many readers. HENRY S. COFFIN

Christ and Culture, by H. Richard Niebuhr, New York, Harper, ©1951, pp. x, 259, $3.50.

The basic concern of this volume is to determine the place of Christianity in society. What place, if any, does Christ have in the culture of our time or of any time? Niebuhr's purpose is "to set forth typical Christian answers to the problem of Christ and culture and so to contribute to the mutual understanding of variant and often conflicting Christian groups."

Five answers are found to have been given to this problem of what Christ's relation should be to society. Some hold that he is against the culture of this world. Those who flee the world as evil, who hold that a Christian cannot be associated with the evils in society, have given this answer to the problem. The ascetics and monastics, as well as outstanding Christians like Tolstoy, would classify here. The second answer is that Christ and culture should be in agreement. In Jesus we see what culture at its best should be. Hence there is no tension between Christianity and society when society is what it should be. The Gnostics of early Christianity sponsored such a view, as also did Albrecht Ritschl in the nineteenth century and the social gospelers in the twentieth. The third answer is that Christ is above culture and that hence society cannot be fulfilled unless Christ thrusts into it from above. Representing "the great majority movement in Christianity," this answer envisages the attempt to effect a

synthesis of Christ and culture. Both Christ and culture are significant. They belong together. Clement of Alexandria, Thomas Aquinas, and Joseph Butler are examples of this synthetic solution. This answer is largely absent from modern Christianity. The fourth answer is expressed by the "Christ and culture in paradox" proponents. Their view is of the dualistic type since they hold that man's work is pitifully inadequate and sordid measured against the demands of life as found in Jesus Christ. So they hold that "the whole edifice of culture is cracked and madly askew," and that man has not the power to bring it into conformity to the gospel requirements. Paul and Martin Luther are cited as exponents of this view. The fifth position is that of those who hold Christ to be the transformer of culture. The situation is not hopeless. Our culture can be converted just as an individual can be. They believe that it is the Christian's duty to work with God for the conversion of society into the kingdom of God. They hold that Christ is not only the redeemer of the individual, but also of the social order. Augustine, Calvin, F. D. Maurice, and John Wesley are cited as examples of the conversionist view.

Which of these five is the correct view of the relation of Christ to society? Here Dr. Niebuhr finds it impossible to be dogmatic and to say, "This is the Christian answer." Nor does he believe that further investigation of these views or further refinement of them would lead to any conclusive answer. The truth is that the types are not nearly so exclusive as they first appear. Rather they overlap and offer possibilities of reconciliation at many points. What we come out with, accordingly, is not a Christian answer to the problem of culture, but answers by Christians. "The problem of Christ and culture," he concludes, "can and must come to an end only in a realm beyond all study in the free decisions of individual believers and responsible communities."

GEORGE W. DAVIS

The Cultural Concept of Christianity, by Arthur W. Calhoun, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1950, pp. 155, $2.50.

The author of this book is dean of Sterling College and comes to his theme with the perspective of a teacher and author in the field of sociology. He states that the purpose of his book is "to exhibit the meaning of Christianity as implicit in the modern way of life" (p. i), but one must confess that his view of Christianity seems to be more affected by what he believes the modern interpretation of life is than the opposite. Actually there is no explicit statement of what he believes is specifically Christian, though most chapters have a way of ending with the conclusion that the content of the chapter confirms the basic Christian perspective. Thus chap. 4, "The Meaning of Science," ends with a paragraph in which these two sentences appear: "True science, that is to say, takes the background of Christianity for granted in that it builds on confidence in the 'uniformity of Nature,'" and "Thus science corroborates the presumption of Christianity, which rests in the confidence that Christ 'is before all things, and in him all things hold together'" (p. 28). Does the author really mean that Christ is the basis for confidence in the uniformity of nature? Presumably, but he never expatiates on the reason why a particular religious perspective, and not others, is consistent with what he deems the world to be.

To turn to the constructive argument of this book, Calhoun believes that a "psychological revolution" is necessary for the salvation of mankind. Calhoun's basic demand is that atomism, individualism, and mechanism be driven from our thinking as they are being driven from the physical and social sciences, art, education, ethics, and political philosophy. In chapters which average six or seven pages each, he moves from area to area indicating the distortion of the facts which takes place

when atomic and mechanistic modes of thought control observation and interpretation. This attack on mechanism is important, and even short chapters serve to suggest the kind of evidence which mechanistic interpretations seem to overlook. But Calhoun is much too confident that if atomism and mechanism are not true then organismic concepts are completely adequate everywhere. At least he would need much more analysis and evidence than the rather selective samples he gives.

Throughout the argument Calhoun does not really resolve the tension which must be faced in any completely organismic system between the individual and the whole. Thus at one point he says: "Sociology shows us that individualism gives no ground for individuality, but rather erases personality and culture in the competitive struggle, whereas the road to self-fulfillment and community integrity lies in identification with common human purposes as expressed in the concerted efforts of mankind as a whole" (p. 72). However, the individual personality which begins to lose its identity in an all-absorbing identification in this sentence seems to lose it completely in the exaggerated organicism of the next: "The individual is, accordingly, to be understood in his social context, without which there would be no individual, and all his behavior is social behavior" (p. 98). Again, "anything done for the individual must always be done for the individual-in-society, and cannot be notably better than the quality of that society" (p. 102).

One welcomes less individualistic thinking especially in conservative religious groups, and this book is a welcome aid in that direction. Yet much more could have been done with a less exaggerated pressing of the organismic thesis—a thesis which may escape atomistic mechanism only to fall into organismic determinism!

PETER A. BERTOCCI

Liberal Learning and Religion, edited by Amos N. Wilder, New York, Harper, ©1951, pp. xi, 337, $3.75.

Higher education in America began and has been fostered by the Christian churches. The fact that the state and certain independent forces have made large contributions to the development of colleges and universities in this country in no way discounts the concern which the religious forces have in higher education. The church-related college has been one of the very significant factors in this area. Education on this level for many years preëmpted the term "Christian education." Not only was there a definite religious motivation in the founding of the great majority of our American colleges, but there was also a recognized religious purpose in the programs of these institutions.

The cultural climate of America has changed. There are many contributing factors; the almost breathless pursuit after scientific objectivity, the equally avid chase after an ever-higher physical standard of living, two world wars, a gradual decay of moral fibre, and a humanistic or naturalistic philosophy leading to a new materialism, these have been among the factors bringing about the change. In the interbellum period there arose a point of view in our colleges which discounted religion and attempted to deny the function of the teaching of religion in our colleges. The fault does not lie on one side only; some of the college administrators, with their eyes on other and more secular goals, allowed the experience of religion and the teaching of religion to drop into a place of minor emphasis and concern in their institutions. Too often the teaching of religion was assigned to good but woefully unprepared people whose efforts only brought this function, originally primary, into disrepuate.

One of the stalwarts in the field of higher education who saw the trend toward

a thoroughly secularized higher education in the first quarter of this century was Charles Foster Kent, then Woolsey professor of biblical literature in Yale University. In 1922, Dr. Kent with the help of business and professional friends, founded the National Council on Religion in Higher Education, the primary purpose of which has been to produce a group of teachers adequate to the teaching of religion in college and university and to return the insights and motivation of religion to all higher education. Several hundreds of fellows of the National Council have been at work in the colleges and universities during the second quarter of this century. It is probably not possible to measure the full weight of their influence in American higher education. How they analyze the present situation and what they believe is the place and function of religion in higher education, however, is portrayed in a book written by a group of the fellows and recently published under the title, *Liberal Learning and Religion.*

A list of the contributors and the subjects of their essays will indicate how rich are the offerings to be found in this book. Thornton W. Merriam, dean of Springfield College, surveys the status of religion in higher education during the second quarter of the twentieth century. In the various attempts to secure the proper functioning of religion in higher education, there have been false starts but there has been much learned and solid foundations have been laid. Edwin E. Aubrey, professor of religious thought, at the University of Pennsylvania, discusses the relationship between science and religion in higher education. Science in education is not enough. There must be a larger and more vital perspective. It is the function of liberal religion to supply that need. Religion must be studied objectively, but it must always go beyond the objectivity of science until it takes hold of values and provides the motivations of good living. Roger L. Shinn, of the Heidelberg College faculty, contributes an essay on the relationship of religion to the study of history. Douglas M. Knight, of the English department at Yale University, writes on the religious implications in the humanities. Dean Walter G. Muelder, Boston University School of Theology, points out the necessity of social science going beyond scientific analysis to the establishing of norms. The religious implications of religion for the study of the social sciences become evident.

Part III of this book comes to grips with the functioning of religion in the life of the college. There are excellent essays by Virginia Corwin, of Smith College, on the teaching of religion; and by Dean Willard L. Sperry, Harvard Divinity School, on "Worship in an Academic Community." Dean Sperry's concluding statement is of real significance:

> In short, the whole problem seems to me to come down to the willingness and intention of the institution to say "God" in so many words. If the institution is unwilling to say "God," imperfectly religious communal acts may be substituted for the public, corporate use of this word. The resultant act will always be, as I have intimated, a celebration of the half-gods—one more phase of that subtle secularity of our churches which is probably the gravest fault in so much of our American religious life. In the classroom in philosophy God may be, as Professor Hocking has said, discussed as "he"; in an act of worship he is addressed as "Thou." If we give up trying to say "Thou," there is little gain, other than interesting speculation, in saying "he."

In this same section of the book, Mildred McAfee Horton, former president of Wellesley College, discusses the bearing of religion on academic freedom. Here too, a quotation will point up the burden of this valuable essay:

> We cannot hope for academic freedom in an insecure society. We cannot hope for security so long as the conviction prevails that change is dangerous; that we have an inflexible, unalterable set of practices which, being endangered, endanger all that we hold dear. The true assurance of academic freedom is a fundamntal inner security which makes for an adventuresome spirit. This can never be derived from possession of atomic bombs. It cannot derive from assurance that free enterprise is ultimately stronger than a temporarily efficient dictatorship. It cannot derive from the conviction that democracy is the best policy, nor that Russia will eventually be "kept in her place" by an Atlantic and/or Pacific Pact.

This is the point at which the possibility of academic freedom rests fundamentally on a religious insight, an insight which is theistic and Christian.

There are many books now appearing which deal with the relationship of religion and higher education. *Liberal Learning and Religion* makes a major contribution to this important discussion, not so much from the point of view of methods, but from that of basic insights, attitudes, and motivations. Here is the making of a philosophy of religious education on the college level.

CHARLES M. BOND

The Supreme Identity, by Alan W. Watts, New York, Pantheon, ©1950, pp. 204, $3.

The author is concerned in this volume with what he terms "the doctrine of the Supreme Identity." By that he means that the finite universe is simply the consciousness of "the infinite, the instant, simultaneous and effortless manifestations of its own 'image.'" Thus the infinite proves to be the all-embracing ground, the cause of subject and object, and indeed of all relationship. Nothing exists outside the infinite. Applied to the human self this can only mean that the infinite Self undergirds it. When this identity is appreciated by a man, it means that he need no longer consider himself the victim of inexorable Fate. On the contrary, he can know that in identity with the infinite Self he can be just what he wills to be and have those experiences which he wills to experience. Such a man is no tool of Fate, but is on board with Ultimate Reality for the ultimate fashioning of his life in accord with the highest ideals. Such, in brief, is the thesis of this dynamic and hopeful book. It is an introduction to man's adventure of realizing his ultimate meaning and destiny in identity with the infinite Self.

Mr. Watts, who is chaplain at Northwestern University, writes this book because of his conviction that the chaos of modern civilization is largely due to the fact that our spiritual leaders have lost any effective knowledge as to man's nature and destiny. They fail to know why man's life is grounded in the ultimate centre of reality. Yet without this knowledge they cannot lead man out of his spiritual morass into spiritual fulfillment. Many religious leaders, particularly Protestants, make personal morality, based upon an external imitation of the personal conduct of Jesus of Nazareth, a substitute for an adequate doctrine of man and of Ultimate Reality. These latter, however, are imperatives if mankind is to find its way out of the swamps of horizontalism where only immediate matters engage the intellect.

One of the great sources of a penetrating view of Reality is found by Mr. Watts in the thought of the Orient. The East has thought for many centuries upon the meaning of Reality and, through its great minds, has brought forth a metaphysical philosophy for lack of which the culture of the West is suffering rapid disintegration. Hence the point of this statement: "It is essential, therefore, that while we give alms to oriental poverty, we help ourselves to oriental wisdom, lacking which, we shall shortly have no alms to give" (p. 39). Hence he advises us to turn to the ancient wisdom of India in particular, to Shankara and the Upanishads, wherein we learn of the unity of the infinite and the finite, of the One and the many. This Hindu doctrine is also expressed in the philosophy of Chinese Taoism and that of the Sufis of Islam. It is to these sources we must turn for the perception that the finite self is but an expression of the Supreme Self.

Philosophically this volume will appeal to those who are idealistically and monistically inclined. Realists will find much in it to disturb and rouse them. Yet, having said that, it should be added that the religious man will not remain satisfied with a view of reality which presents much less than that which is advocated by Mr. Watts. If there is no divine Reality which can find expression through the finite spirits of men, religion will soon wither and die like a branch cut away from its parent stem. While many will have trouble with the idealistic monism of the

present treatise, many of that number will still insist upon a realistic interpretation of religious experience, the cardinal point of which is that man does know the Absolute (God) in religious experience and can enter into working relations with Ultimate Reality. GEORGE W. DAVIS

Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis, by Pitirim A. Sorokin, Boston, Beacon, 1950, pp. xi, 345, $4.

Those who have read Sorokin find it difficult to approach his recent books in a dispassionate mood. He seizes the surcharged language of the social scientist and hurls it prophetically. Here we have it again. The twentieth century "is the period of the greatest crisis, the end of the Sensate era and a catastrophic transition to a new culture" (p. 8). Three ways of looking at this book occur to the reviewer.

In the first place, as a revision of the author's Cole Lectures at Vanderbilt University in April, 1950, under the title, "Recent Philosophies of History," it is a critical examination of some eight interpretations of history by a scholar who is eminently qualified for the job. The writer elaborates upon the extent of his agreement and disagreement with each of the following philosophers of history: Nikolai Danilevsky, Oswald Spengler, Arnold J. Toynbee, Walter Schubart, Nikolai Berdyaev, F. S. C. Northup, Alfred L. Kroeber, and Albert Schweitzer. Probably the reader will be more impressed with the major areas of agreement among these prophets, and between them and Sorokin, than in the details of their differences. "They all explicitly describe our times as the period of one of the greatest transitions from one civilization or cultural supersystem to another, different one. . . . In brief, the coming civilization or culture is going to be basically different from that which has been dominant during the last five or six centuries" (p. 298). Although revolutionaries like Karl Marx are given only a minor rôle in the discussion, the "coming civilization" is certainly not one envisioned by the industrial and political leaders of America. For this whole school of social philosophers man is in a "mortally dangerous crisis" that must somehow be superseded by a "harmonious era of history," which, for Sorokin, will be the ideational.

In the second place, here is a work on social philosophies, offered as a companion volume to *Contemporary Sociological Theories,* published by the same author in 1928. At that time the writer stated that he was preparing a monograph having to do with repetitive social phenomena (p. 741). However, it was scarcely predictable then how far Sorokin would move away from the main stream of American sociological thought. With the single exception of A. L. Kroeber, who is an anthropologist rather than a sociologist, these seers of historical rhythms and cycles have very little in common with professional sociologists today; the latter are preoccupied in the application of empirical and statistical methods to current social behavior. Nominally a sociologist, Sorokin has joined the school of prophets who rush in where their colleagues fear to tread.

In the third place, this volume may be regarded as the result of a genuine effort on the part of a student of cultures and civilizations to refine and further clarify his own theories by comparing them with similar theories of others who have studied the same phenomena. All social scientists must face the problem of the causes of the repetitive in human culture. What is the meaning of human history? These "readers of historical events," as Sorokin himself calls them, do not limit themselves to reading the past, but also pretend to read the future. This is done by concentration on the repeated aspects of sociocultural change. These fluctuations, oscillations, rhythms, or cycles, are supposed to continue into eras of civilizations yet to come. Such grandiose speculations are mostly opinions about human events stacked upon other opinions. As a cumulated body of thought, here is a definite move away from

nineteenth-century concepts of linear social evolution and the doctrine of progress. Sorokin and his school furnish us with a library of predictions which future prophets in their turn may read for inspiration and consolation. Like Sorokin they may have trouble deciding whether by taking thought man can add one cubit of value to his living.

RAYMOND L. HIGHTOWER

The Infinite in Giordano Bruno, by Sidney Greenberg, New York, Columbia University Press, 1950, pp. xviii, 203, $3.

Giordano Bruno was born about 1548 and died on Feb. 17, 1600, just at the turn of the century. He was an Italian philosopher who, because of his views on transubstantiation and on the Immaculate Conception, was forced to leave Italy. He traveled and wrote a great deal, producing his best works in Oxford. Emissaries of the Inquisition brought him to Rome, where he was imprisoned for seven years.

Apart from his disdainful and boasting nature and his attack on temporary Christianity, the chief cause of his downfall was the rejection of Aristotelian astronomy for that of Copernicus which looked for the possibility of numerous worlds. He had panthetistic tendencies. Inspired by the Stoics, Bruno asserted that amid all the varying phenomena of the universe there is something which gives coherence and intelligibility to them, and this something is God, the universal, unifying Substance. As the unity in all things, God may be called the *monas mundum,* every other thing being a *monas* or self-existent, living nature, a universe in itself. The human soul is a thinking monad, whose highest function is the contemplation of the divine unity.

Sidney Greenberg has made a distinct contribution to philosophy in his attempt to explain Giordano Bruno. The first part of the book is concerned with an introduction followed by certain philosophical discussions, of which chapter six is very difficult, and a conclusion. The second part of the volume, called "Concerning the Cause, Principle, and One," is made up of five classical dialogues. Some thirty pages of careful notes and an index complete the study.

One might say of this book that it is so simple as to be profound, so profound as to be difficult. This contradiction ties in very well with Bruno's statement that "Change is not a change of being wherein some particular thing seeks or achieves new being; change consists in the change of the Modes of the one Infinite Being, which remains eternally identical with itself."

It is in the contemplation of the Infinite that man attains his greatest good. The final goal is not to be found in particular goods, for this leads the individual from one thing to another, and merely makes more evident the fact that there is more good to be desired. "It is the presence of the Infinite in man that compels him to leave the Infinite and therefore become one with it"; or, to put it in contrast, "To see the Infinite is to be seen by the Infinite." Bruno's work, *De la causa* is his attempt to determine the constitutive principles of the universe. Greenberg makes a careful study concerning cause and principle, and tries to bring out the relationship or difference between an intrinsic and extrinsic cause. The efficient cause of the world is extrinsic, by being distinct from the substance and essence of its effects, and because its existence is not like that of other things capable of generation and corruption. "The World Cause is intrinsic and in the World Intellect there are two aspects of the same being: God can be called both Principle and Cause. The Universal Intellect is the universal efficient Cause." It is both a principle and the cause: "It is one and the same thing which fills the whole, illumines the universe, and directs nature to produce its various species, as is fitting."

A word about Aristotle. For him, there is no vacuum in the sense of empty space, "outside" the universe as Bruno's argument supposes. For Aristotle, the finitude of the universe demands that there be absolutely "no thing" outside it. "For

Aristotle, there is likewise a contradiction in supposing the existence of a vacuum within the world, because this would make natural motion impossible; for since the void has no differences in it, there could be no reason for motion." Bruno's position is the result of his own identification of Aristotle's "being in itself" with the conception of filling a vacuum. Bruno says that there is no reason to affirm that one part of space is filled and the other is not; there is no reason why this space where our world is should alone determine the category of that which is in space. For Bruno, total absence of matter is a contradiction in terms; absence of matter means an absence of substance. Aristotle would say that outside this world there can be no motion but time, because there is "there" no body. Bruno would maintain that since substance is infinite there is no "outside." "There is no first mover, such as Aristotle asserts . . . there is a First Part and the Second Cause, both transcendent and immanent, to which all movers are equally proximate and from which they are equally distant."

Giordano Bruno maintains that there are more worlds than this one and that is due to the presence everywhere of one eternal Substance. Bruno draws a nice analogy with art by saying that wood as wood has no artificial form, but can have any and all forms through an agent working on the surface. In the same way a principle has no natural form but can have any and all forms through its agent which is its correlative active principle, the universal form.

Sidney Greenberg has given a very scholarly analysis of this highly intricate philosophy of Giordano Bruno, who was considered by Schelling to be his forerunner, while Hegel, though he did not share the enthusiasm of Schelling, became the direct real source of the first studies on Bruno's philosophy.

JOHN LANGDON JONES

Types of Religious Philosophy, by Edwin A. Burtt, rev. ed., New York, Harper, ©1951, pp. xi, 468, $4.50.

This is a revised edition of Dr. Burtt's well-known and widely used textbook, surveying both historically and from the side of contemporary interest various widely accepted "philosophies of religion." The changes which have been made for the new edition are largely by way of bringing descriptive and bibliographical matter up to date. It is a useful and an objective volume. Many a student of philosophy and, above all, many a candidate for advanced degrees has found it helpful for its wide covering of the field; many more will find it so, in its new form. Of especial interest are the chapters in which Dr. Burtt gives us his considered treatment of "the new supernaturalism," which contains new material, and an entirely new section on the problem of man as sinner. The former is largely an objective statement of the theories of Barth and Niebuhr; the latter an attempt to interpret the optimists and pessimists to each other.

It is a tribute to the scholarly nature of this volume that it is difficult from the discussion of the various "types" to determine exactly what position the author himself would take. He says that he has striven, in this new edition, as in the earlier one, "to describe the most influential positions in Western religious philosophy, and to analyze the basic issues that they disclose, with the maximum impartiality that can be attained." Certainly Dr. Burtt succeeds in this aim, and the book can be unreservedly recommended to those who wish just such a survey.

The one difficulty which the reviewer discovers, even in this expanded edition, is that it belongs in the category of "the professor's writings," in Kierkegaardian phrase. For this reason it cannot enter into and give one the *feel* of the positions which are described; it lacks that element of *pathos,* of subjective commitment, which—despite all exaggerations that one often finds in the claims made for the existen-

tialist—do succeed in giving a vital, and vitalizing, quality to a discussion of religious matters. Probably this is the defect of the book's peculiar and valuable quality, but that it is a defect one is convinced. If a writer on religious ideas honestly admits throughout his book that he is necessarily "prejudiced" in favor of a given position, one can make allowances for this "prejudice," yet at the same time learn much from the depth and passion of his writing both *for* and *against.*

This, however, is to ask for another book. And we would not do that, since the teacher who uses this volume for his textbook will doubtless add his own *pathos,* and the student will benefit by the clarity and precision of the chapters themselves.

W. NORMAN PITTENGER

Leviathan and Natural Law, by F. Lyman Windolph, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1951, pp. xi, 147, $2.50.

This is a valuable essay on a vital subject. The writer addresses his work to "general readers of intelligence and curiosity" rather than "professional scholars." The book will reward the labor of careful and reflective readers of the class to whom it is addressed, for it is replete with passages which challenge reflection.

By incisive analysis the author has given clarity and precision to words and concepts which are customarily used with such varying content as to make them instruments of confusion—words such as *sovereignty, truth, law,* and *liberty.* The refocused concepts symbolized by those words are used to analyze political theory over a wide field. There are illuminating discussions of the distinction between sovereignty and government in general and in our state in particular. A "general reader of intelligence and curiosity" cannot fail to gain a clearer understanding of a subject about which it is vitally important that we think clearly.

On the critical side it may be noted that the author never quite brings "Leviathan" and "Natural Law" squarely into juxtaposition so that their lineaments may be clearly discerned both for comparison and contrast. The only sharp confrontation is in the vividly dramatic quotation from Sophocles' *Antigone.*

The author seldom descends into the arena in which ideas are currently struggling. That is not a vice because the book is dealing with principles rather than specific current applications. If one would see the political tradition of the West (natural law) at bay in a life-and-death struggle, your reviewer recommends Hans Kohn's *Twentieth Century.*

In one swift descent into the arena of current debate, the author summarily disposes of the widespread aspiration of many competent thinkers and dedicated minds for world federation. The author regards "one world" under the dominance of a single power which will enforce a *pax Romana* as a practical certainty. This could only come about by cataclysmic conquest and could only be maintained by policing the world. Would not any other solution be incomparably better than such a police state, and should we not exhaust every possibility before we surrender to such an alternative? In any event, it is too large an issue to dispose of in three pages—and we regret that the author elected to do so.

There are many profound passages in this little book—by way of instance, the following parenthetical observation: ("'What is truth?' said jesting Pilate, and would not stay for an answer. I do not agree with Bacon that he was jesting. I think he was skeptical and sad, and that he did not stay for an answer because he felt sure that no satisfactory answer could be made.") Is it not always so when the tired masters of the world confront Truth and think the prophet a deluded fool because he speaks of things transcendental?

This excellent essay is full of philosophical overtones and allusions which reflect

a wide reading and assimilation. The author's feeling for "cosmic piety" (a term he quotes from Bertrand Russell) indicates to the reviewer a strong Platonic strain.

KENNARD N. WARE

Dream and Reality: An Essay in Autobiography, by Nicolas Berdyaev, New York, Macmillan, 1951, pp. xv, 332, $4.50.

When Nicolas Berdyaev died in Paris a short time ago, the Christian world knew it had lost one of its most profound and interesting thinkers. His books are exciting documents, filled with passionate feeling and prophetic judgment. They give the impression of coming from the very crucible of thought in the process of formation. Certainly the term "fascinating" occurs as appropriate to Berdyaev's autobiography. It contains not only the record of a life which has gone through tremendous political and social upheavals, but it contains the mature reflection of an outstanding Christian mind on the meaning of that experience. Berdyaev tells us that Russians are fond of long conversations about the meaning of life. That is what this book is. It is a conversation which leaves the reader intrigued, humbled, sometimes exasperated, and always stirred by the shock of genuine spiritual experience.

Berdyaev was a layman and he takes pains to correct the common impression that he represents Russian orthodox theology. He describes himself as one who speaks "with the voice of free religious thought." He is an "individual Christian philosopher." He even sees himself as a "mystical anarchist," because the central theme of his work has been the affirmation of radical freedom of the human spirit.

Berdyaev relates his life experience with extraordinary frankness. He tells of his aristocratic Russian upbringing, his revolutionary activities, his imprisonment and exile. He associated with people of all classes, temperaments, and political convictions. Temperamentally he was an extreme individualist. Yet he found himself engaged in practical political leadership. Through these pages there passes an amazing collection of brilliant, erratic, and creative people. Berdyaev seems to have known a large number of the significant people in the Europe of his day. They are all here, revolutionaries, fanatics, mystics, distinguished scholars. Berdyaev throws some interesting light on the Russian temperament with its negative attitude toward established authority, and its rejection of much of the West's emphasis on conformity to standards, which may help us to interpret some present history behind the Iron Curtain.

It is impossible to summarize Berdyaev's philosophical outlook here. He gives vivid characterizations of his leading ideas: the centrality of the person and his freedom, the tragic character of human existence, the mystical approach to God. "The meaning of life lies in a return to the mystery of the spirit on which God is born in man and man is born in God" (p. 392). The unsystematic and contradictory character of his thought which one finds in other works is here also; though Berdyaev admits these shortcomings in such a disarming way that one's critical defenses are lowered.

It would be strange not to find any disagreements with such an explosive and individualistic thinker. Berdyaev writes frankly in the "egocentric" mode. Yet at times one wonders whether his individualism does not reveal a naïveté about himself. Perhaps he has blown up his personal shyness to the size of an ontological theory. He shares with the Greek Christian tradition a disparagement of the flesh, and an overly morbid consciousness concerning the personal relationships of life. One tries in vain to get a really clear picture of the connection between his philosophy and the demands of social action. Yet he courageously invaded the field of politics at the risk of his own life. The reader has the haunting sense that with all his contradictions Berdyaevs points more truly to the actual nature of our existence than do

many more temperate and systematic philosophers. He says his vocation was to proclaim "not a doctrine, but a vision." His vision is expressed again in this magnificent spiritual Odyssey. Anyone who would enter into the struggles of the Christian faith in our world should encounter Berdyaev.

DANIEL WILLIAMS

Being and Having, by Gabriel Marcel, Boston, Beacon, 1951, pp. 240, $2.25.

Gabriel Marcel is a French existentialist philosopher, a Roman Catholic, a dramatist, and a musician. The two volumes of his Gifford lectures on *The Mystery of Being,* which are now available in English, are sure to evoke considerable attention from students of philosophy and religion in this country. For those who wish to trace his development prior to this recent work, the present volume and the brief collection of essays entitled *The Philosophy of Existence* (Harvill Press, London) are indispensable.

As a philosophy student in Paris, and during the first world war, Marcel broke away from his idealistic training and developed his own point of view by keeping a metaphysical journal. It was only after he was well started along these lines that he discovered the affinity between some of his own ideas and those of Kierkegaard, Jaspers, *et al. Being and Having* begins with excerpts from this journal, but they are taken from a period just prior to and following his conversion to Roman Catholicism. Hence for a complete account of his spiritual pilgrimage one must still have recourse to a volume that has not yet been translated. The rest of *Being and Having* consists of a paper on "A Phenomenology of Having" which draws together one of the main lines of reflection contained in the journal; two lectures to groups of Christian students—one on "the irreligion of today," and the other on "faith"; and an essay on Peter Wust, a Catholic metaphysician.

Some of the characteristics of Marcel as a thinker and a writer can only be indicated here, without any hope of describing his penetration and his elusiveness. Among existentialists he is almost unique in his organic sense for the importance of community. Berdyaev talked about it and desired it, but was too fierce in his assertion of personal freedom to enter into it. Jaspers finds it almost exclusively at the level of intimate friendship, while Sartre, Kierkegaard, and Heidegger are, in this regard, notably blind and isolated. Another respect in which Marcel is especially interesting is his fearless independence. In accordance with his belief that metaphysics must begin with and return to the concreteness of personal inwardness, he comes into Roman Catholicism with a remarkable combination of spontaneity and inevitability. He is at times highly critical of Thomism, and his main "reason" for accepting the Christian faith is discernible only at that point where his painstaking analysis of what it means to be a self leads him to realize that his life is not simply his own to dispose of as he sees fit. At that point his response is not the solution to an intellectual problem, but an entering into communion with the ground of being.

For all Christians, including Protestants, Marcel is today one of the most persuasive guides in showing that existentialism can take a religious instead of a nihilistic direction. At many points he had worked out an impressive answer to Sartre before the latter had begun to write. In a word, this "answer" is that rootless autonomy leads away from creativity, in all spheres, instead of toward it.

DAVID E. ROBERTS

The Greeks and Their Gods, by W. K. C. Guthrie, Boston, Beacon, 1951, pp. xiv, 388, $3.75.

The author, who lectures on Greek religion at Cambridge University, has in this book given an account, not only of the ancient Greek deities and beliefs, but

also of the various methods adopted by modern scholars in the study of Greek religion. In his title appears a reaction against the attempt to find in ancient Greece every concept, such as theriolatry or totemism, that anthropologists have discovered among modern savages. He uses the Greeks to interpret the Greeks; for them religion was concerned with gods. His book is intended as a religious companion to the Greek classics. It is highly competent, is well written, and affords stimulating reading for anyone who cares about man's spiritual experience.

In spite of Mr. Guthrie's skeptical criticism of the anthropological approach, there is a good deal said about origins in his account of "The Divine Family." He knows the archæological and linguistic evidence as well as the literary and gives his own judgment with his reasons on controversial points. He notes the two inconsistent attitudes toward the gods that existed side by side, those represented by the injunction that men must not aspire to be gods, and by the principle that men should imitate or be one with the gods. It might be noted that a similar conflict of ideas is found in Christianity. The former attitude is that of the Homeric poems, which are aristocratic and display the gods as an upper class with the same kind of power and irresponsible privilege that was enjoyed by human lords. But the gods were also thought of on occasion as upholders of the moral code. In Ionia began the habit of interpreting nature without benefit of gods, though the notion of a mind in control of the universe ultimately emerged.

Dionysos and Apollo have chapters to themselves. Though the worship of the former particularly encouraged ecstatic union with the god, and the latter was the only representative of anything like ecclesiasticism in Greece, yet Apollo had his ecstatic side. Next, after a preliminary discussion, the underworld gods are introduced, to whose worship Plato in the *Laws* allotted one month of the twelve; they include many heroes and minor deities, such as Trophonius, who had an oracle, Heracles, who became an Olympian, and Asclepios, who healed the sick. The common man had his own fears, cults, and aspirations that antedated and outlasted the Homeric gods. Hence came the mysteries and the Orphic doctrine of immortality with future rewards and punishments. Plato was building on Orphism when in his myths he made philosophy the key to success in the next world as in this. The last chapter also includes an account of Aristotle's conception of God as pure form—thinking himself eternally and thereby being the cause of motion in the universe as the lover is moved by the loved.

The most remarkable fact about the Greek attitude toward the gods is their almost complete freedom from any fear of speculation or innovation. Their genius was æsthetic and philosophical, not religious. This is perhaps why we find among them such a tolerant variety of religious phenomena. Guthrie's book is true to the Greek spirit in that it seeks clarification, not mystification.

L. ARNOLD POST

Spokesmen for Ethical Religion, edited by Henry Neumann, Boston, Beacon, 1951, pp. xvii, 173, $2.

This book celebrates the seventy-fifth anniversary of the founding of the first Ethical Culture Society in America. The author has been a leader in the Ethical Society for many years, and largely from personal acquaintance gives sketches of Felix Adler, John Lovejoy Elliott, and other leaders of the movement both in America and in Europe. Three chapters sum up the teachings of the Society.

Four of the ten chapters are given over to the thoughts and deeds of Felix Adler, founder of the movement. An admiring picture is drawn of Dr. Adler as both a man of action and a man of thought. Unstintingly he devoted himself to the problems of child labor, poor working conditions, bad housing, and education. At the same time, he was "a thinker who sought to justify the impulses of his heart before the tribunal

of his intellect, and in turn to test the judgments of his reason by their application in conduct" (p. 49). He felt that every human being must be treated as deserving a fundamental, ethical respect. He reasoned that since every man is unique he cannot be replaced and because he cannot be replaced he is indispensable. Thus, the indispensability of every man is the source of his worth. There are times when it is difficult to distinguish the thoughts of Founder Adler from those of Disciple Neumann.

What is Dr. Neumann's conception of ethical religion? The ethically religious, he says, have always been those who were sure that a life vastly nobler than their own was calling upon them to do the will of such a life. ". . . such words as *responsibility, obligation, duty, loyalty* take on a living meaning only when we stick at a task which we know will succeed or go to pieces according as we measure up. Religion being devotion to the best and highest life which we can conceive, it too must have its roots in experiences real enough to give it genuine power" (p. 48). To the reader of this book it will probably be evident that to a very great degree the calls, the meanings, and the roots of the ethical religion of Adler, Elliott, *et al,* had Judæo-Christian sources. Nor were these leaders unaware of their indebtedness to the religion of their fathers. One test of the religion of the Ethical Culture Society will be its ability to produce men like its founders without an assist from Judæo-Christian religion.

That there were men of Jewish and Christian backgrounds who felt the need for starting an Ethical Culture Movement appears to be a telling commentary on the nature of orthodox religion in the century past. Why did these men feel the need for a new society? Was it primarily because they could not accept orthodox theology or was it because in their day they were moved by the ethical and social irrelevance of much religion? Let the reader decide.

For those (like this reviewer) to whom the Ethical Culture Society has been little more than a name, Dr. Neumann's account provides a pleasant means of filling in a gap of knowledge. I suspect that even the well-informed will be able to learn much. Prediction: There will be few converts.

LUKE EBERSOLE

Commentary on the Gospel of Luke, by Norval Geldenhuys, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1951, pp. 685, $6.

To readers who know the American publishing house, or the general editor, N. B. Stonehouse, it is needless to say that this first volume to be published in *The New International Commentary* on the New Testament is a conservative work. But its author, a member of the Dutch Reformed Church of South Africa, is a conservative who knows the critical or liberal work of other scholars. The scale of the commentary though generous still does not permit much more than the mention of an alternative view and the denial of it. The author's judgments are decisive. Typical are such passages as "Rawlinson is completely at fault when he declares . . ."; or, "There is no foundation for declaring, like Klostermann. . . ." A favorite expression about another's argument is "there is no conclusive proof" though for the author's own position "conclusive proof" is just as little forthcoming. The present reviewer is described as one "who is exceptionally critical and unwilling to assume Luke to have been the author of the Gospel and Acts," simply because he does not accept the validity of an argument of their alleged medical vocabulary to prove or even to corroborate the tradition. Yet Geldenhuys accepts as though it were reliable and independent information the anti-Marcionite prologue to the gospel. It is well to remember the historians' canon that excess of credulity can pervert truth quite as much as excess of incredulity. Geldenhuys rarely allows his readers to weigh fully the value of the contrary evidence.

This volume and series naturally suggest comparison with the first volume of

the new *Interpreter's Bible.* There the New Testament is to have six volumes; here, as in the Moffatt Commentary, there will be seventeen. Here the English text of a paragraph (British Revised Version) is given, then a few sentences suggesting its general relation, then a more detailed comment or commentary, then a somewhat homiletic summary, and finally the more historical and controversial "footnotes." Some sixteen notes are so long as to be made Special Notes, and there is a twenty-page excursus on the day and date of the crucifixion in which Geldenhuys neither accepts the Synoptics against John, nor vice versa, but accepts both, regarding the discrepancy between them as only apparent. The intention is to make the book available to readers who know no Greek. It is in the footnotes that information is supplied to the reader from other sources ancient and modern. The latter come fully up to date and include some Dutch works not familiar to most of us. Greydanus is quoted as often as Plummer, Creed, Easton, or Zahn. If the series title was chosen with any reference to the *International Critical Commentary* the word critical was correctly omitted.

The central core of the commentary is rather simple paraphrase of the text. But it is often paraphrase in terms of Christian theology alien to the text in hand, and derived from the Pauline and later thought of Christian tradition. The comments are often more edifying than relevant. They do little in this regard to help the modern reader recover the thoughts or motives of the actual evangelist or of the historical Figure that preceded him. He is interpreted in the light of theology rather than of history except in externals. Even on the literary side the problems of culture, style, sources, parallels, or editing are scarcely hinted.

HENRY J. CADBURY

White Collar, by C. Wright Mills, New York, Oxford, 1951, pp. xx, 378, $5.

This study of the new middle classes in the twentieth-century United States is written by an associate professor of sociology at Columbia University. The author is probably best known to readers of this review through one of his previous books, *The New Men of Power,* a study of modern labor leadership.

In the present book, Mills attempts a comprehensive study of white-collar workers, in the conviction that in the middle class is reflected to a marked degree the changes, characteristics, and problems of the twentieth century. He finds that the old middle class, chiefly composed of entrepreneurs who owned the property with which they worked, has tended to disappear in an increased polarization toward large scale business and wage workers. The new middle class, which has tended to replace the old, is characterized not by entrepreneurial property, but by occupation. It is composed of dependent employees in white-collar positions, including managers, salaried professionals, salespeople, and office workers.

The book provides a discussion of each of these occupational groups. Managers instead of owners are seen to be the central figures in the modern economy. Yet there has been no "managerial revolution"; property still exercises power. Professional people are increasingly becoming salaried specialists, creating their own bureaucracies. The multiplied types of salesmen which appear in an economy of abundance make our society "the great salesroom," characterized by "the bargaining manner" and "the theology of pep." Office workers man "the enormous file," offices which exercise centralized control through symbols.

There follows a discussion of styles of life and types of power which are associated with the middle class. An illuminating summary of various views of work is marred by some oversimplification, as of the distinction between Protestant and Renaissance views. "Status panic," says the author, characterizes the psychology of the middle class, since "success" in its modern form, through rise within a

bureaucracy, is less assured than was acquisition of property formerly. This is producing a new "literature of resignation," substituting *Peace of Mind* for ambition. While the economic problems of the middle class are at many points similar to those of workers, few have thus far turned to union organization. Likewise, the middle class remains politically apathetic. It is likely to move with that bloc or movement which appears to be winning. White-collar people are "rearguarders," "for sale" politically.

It is difficult to find in the book a clear, concise definition of the middle class, perhaps because of the dynamic nature and complex composition of the group. There is a great deal of generalization without adequate supporting evidence. Sometimes the more dramatic illustrations are regarded as typical; often conclusions appear to be the result of informal observation rather than scientific study. It must be admitted, of course, that comparatively few of the specific studies have yet been made which are necessary to provide the basis for a comprehensive book on the middle class.

Particularly annoying is the lack of footnotes identifying sources of information. Scarcely adequate as substitutes are the author's statement that such documentation is privately available to the interested scholar, or his section on "Acknowledgments and Sources," which is a general bibliographical essay. A movement which the present reviewer is ready to join with alacrity is one aimed at the restoration of the old-fashioned footnote to replace modern streamlined publishing methods evidently aimed at a public which would rather be comfortable than right.

Going beyond the confines of its more restricted subject, the book has a great deal of value to say concerning the general character of our economic culture. The specialist in religion will want to supplement many such observations with a more extended treatment of ethical or theological questions. The book includes stimulating discussions, for example, of the psychological patterns of the small entrepreneur, the meaning of bureaucracy, or the disappearance of business competition.

This wider range of the book is both its strength and its weakness. It contributes considerable wisdom concerning the current scene, placing its specific problem in its larger setting. One learns, however, less about the middle class than he might expect in a book of this length. As a study of the middle class this never quite comes up to reasonable expectations. As a commentary on important social trends its supplies much valuable sociological material for the religious interpreter.

HARVEY SEIFERT

Christian Knowledge of God, by James Harry Cotton, New York, Macmillan, 1951, pp. xi, 180, $2.75.

The author of this volume assumes, along with John Calvin, that to come to a knowledge of God and ourselves is "true and substantial wisdom." He devotes himself to the first of these ends, holding that Christians do claim to have come to a knowledge of God. He sets himself to the task of stating how this knowledge of God is attained and what it is.

One of the basic questions which arises in the course of the book is this: "Must faith and reason continue their warfare or are they necessary allies in a common quest?" The reconciliation between the two suggested by the author centres in the fact that man aspires after the universal, while at the same time he is a finite thinker subject to all the limitations of his particular perspective. It is through a realization of this dual nature of man that there is hope of a reconciliation between reason and faith. We must know that reason aspires after the universal, while faith is deeply conditioned by the finite and creaturely limitations of our human kind.

Reason is a factor in human experience which works within limits. Reason can play upon the natural world and draw certain conclusions therefrom concerning

continuities and regularities running through the whole, but it cannot lead men to the indubitable conclusion that God is. There are no mathematical proofs for the existence of God. This does not mean that the day of natural theology is over, but only that rationality cannot take us far enough to prove the existence of Divine Reality. What the religious man must and does do is to relate his faith in God to the world of experience, finding in the latter that which lends probability to his faith in the living God. Suffice it to note here that reason unaided is unable to establish any "significant certainties for faith." It is only as faith and reason work together, in full recognition of their mutual dependence, that the full fruitage of religious knowledge is possible.

The highest Christian knowledge of God comes in the personal encounter of God and man which meets us in the New Testament. Here faith is always a personal relationship. To deny that is to depersonalize faith and rob it of its central meaning. Our knowledge of other persons grows out of our intercourse with their minds. So our knowledge of God grows ultimately out of our encounter with him in the person of Jesus Christ. It is through our trust in and love for the God so encountered that we come to knowledge of him.

So much for the main argument of this stimulating volume. The book is also of value because of its pertinent insights and its statement of new points of view. Consider, as an example, the author's position on Scripture. He holds that the church needs to reach the point where she will look "askance at those who deny either the divine or the human element in the Bible." Both are there and both need to be recognized, rather than the espousal of either the view that the Bible is wholly a divine book or the view that it is completely a human book. GEORGE W. DAVIS

The Doctrine of the Atonement, by Leonard Hodgson, New York, Scribner, 1951, pp. 159, $2.50.

The author is Regius professor of divinity in the University of Oxford and was for six years a member of the faculty of General Theological Seminary in New York. The present volume, according to an English *Who's Who,* is the seventh from his pen. He has written on *The Place of Reason in Christian Apologetics, Essays in Christian Philosophy,* and *Towards a Christian Philosophy.* From these titles of his books it would naturally be inferred that he should be classed as a philosophical theologian. And this conclusion is confirmed by a reading of the present book and his immediately preceding book, *The Doctrine of the Trinity.* Indeed, these two books may be regarded as companion volumes.

This philosophical approach to the problems of theology distinguishes the author sharply from the irrationalism of current Barthianism. But he takes comparatively little account of the latter. He adheres for the most part to an interpretation of Christian doctrine within the framework of what might be loosely called traditional British Platonism. There is throughout a sweet reasonableness in his method. But this does not exclude independence of thought or at times an appeal to mystery. He does not, to be sure, erect mystery into a third dimension of theology, as Barth does. But he does at times try to salvage an ancient dogma by affirming its unintelligibility. He, for instance, says that "the doctrine of the Trinity requires a revision of the idea of Unity" and then declares that the divine unity is "a mystery beyond our understanding." Likewise he speaks of the doctrine of the atonement as a "mysterious truth."

He distinguishes his own view of this doctrine from the traditional "moral influence theory." The word "influence" in the name of this theory would in my opinion better be omitted and the theory called simply "the moral theory." For it is the nonmoral or even immoral elements in the traditional substitutionary theories that are

most objectionable in them. And if these elements are treated as purely metaphorical, as the author at times seems to suggest, what remains is a simple moral theory without any direct reference to or limitation by its "influence." The fact is that a rational theory of the atonement must in our day be a moral and spiritual theory, if it is to appeal to the modern mind. And for the most part this book aims to present such a theory. Its most valuable feature is probably the way in which it relates the doctrine of the atonement to the problem of evil as a whole and to a general Christian philosophy. It is a learned and for the most part carefully reasoned treatise, worthy of careful study. And at heart it is less traditional and conservative in its standpoint than it may seem to be on first reading.

ALBERT C. KNUDSON

The Episcopal Church in the United States: 1789-1931, by James Thayer Addison, New York, Scribner, 1951, pp. xii, 400, $4.50.

One of the smaller Christian bodies in America, the Protestant Episcopal Church is sometimes remarked to have had an influence out of all proportion to the number of its members. Some may wonder at this; but if it is true, part of the reason may be discerned through the pages of this fine volume by Dr. James Thayer Addison, one-time professor of church history at the Episcopal Theological Seminary, Cambridge, Mass., and until his retirement in 1946, vice-president in charge of missions for the National Council of the Episcopal Church.

The tone of the book can be gauged from a summary, in the opening pages, of the Reformation in England and its effect later in this country in putting the Episcopal Church squarely in Protestantism; and from an epilogue, at the end, where the comprehensiveness of the Episcopal Church is described, its resistance to uniformity, and its capacity to endure tension, even profiting by it.

Until this book by Dr. Addison appeared, there was a dearth of good histories of the Episcopal Church in this country. Earlier ones either bogged down in their description of the colonial period or were weighted with admiration for the Anglo-Catholic movement and its romantic nostalgia for mediævalism.

But the present book places its main emphasis upon the story of the development of the Episcopal Church in this country after the Civil War. It is frank in its admission that the Church of England in this country both before and after the American Revolution was a very sick institution and it needed a long period of convalescence, requiring in all about twenty years.

If Dr. Addison's treatment of his church's history suffers from any fault, it is in the sense of tediousness that arises in the reader, when about halfway through the book, over the sheer accumulation of data. Much of it could have been more interesting if there had been less historical "objectivity" in interpreting it.

But a refreshing virtue is the frank facing of the Episcopal Church's "limitations, failures, faults, and even the sins." He is correct in saying he has not overlooked, "where they appeared, the examples of its timidity and lethargy." He admits that its membership is too largely concentrated in the cities, that in its pursuit of Christian reunion "its words have spoken louder than its actions," that it has small influence among farmers and in the ranks of labor. And Dr. Addison takes no comfort from the social prestige the Episcopal Church has sometimes enjoyed.

But from its Catholic inheritance, on the other hand, the Episcopal Church, he says, has drawn much. And "in the midst of twentieth-century democracy the church maintains the principle of authority in the tradition of the episcopate and the principle of freedom in a constitution and system of government thoroughly democratic."

ROBERT O. KEVIN

The Life We Prize, by Elton Trueblood, New York, Harper, ©1951, pp. 218, $2.50.

Elton Trueblood's popularity rests upon his ability to sense the moral implication of our generation's successive crises. Before the atom bomb was perfected he saw that the termination of World War II would not end modern man's predicament. A series of his analyses followed, some short, some longer. This is one of the latter sort, although still quick and easy reading, but valuable nevertheless because of its felicity of expression and because it induces the reader to think for himself and to pursue a trail down paths which the author indicates but does not beat nor pave.

The Korean War is the instigator of at least the final draft of this book. Having prided ourselves upon our intelligence, our religious accomplishments, and our unselfish efforts to help the world, we suddenly find ourselves suspected and hated by those we would serve; we are enmeshed in a moral depression in which many of us live by a mere interim mentality, momentarily expecting the devastation of catastrophe. Confronted with communism which possesses a philosophy, program, and passion capable of winning millions to fanatical devotion, we need objectively, yet vigorously, to find and explain the life which our society prizes, that we may meet our responsibilities for survival, both actual and spiritual.

For the author, this task is a stimulating search rather than a cold finality. He draws upon both the Hebraic and classical roots of Christianity, finding that the answer lies not in the mental or inner peace which was the theme of many popular books of 1946 to 1950, and which now appears visionary or escapist. Rather must this generation turn to the moral and intuitional postulates of Socrates, Kant, and William James, to the loyalty of Royce, to Schweitzer's reverence for life, to Lovejoy's exposition of the uniqueness of man, to the mystic yet practical devotion of Rufus Jones, and to the intellectual decisiveness of Ray Lyman Wilbur. Trueblood studied or taught under these last three men; he assumes that biographical example can be a major incentive to those who would interpret and direct their own lives and the course of history.

It is not enough to discover or tell, as the scientist does, why things happen; it is more proper to ask whether they ought to happen, and if they should not, to find a better way, not as a dream but as an actuality. The world civil war will then assume a guise, in which men of faith will stress meaning, responsibility, freedom, integrity, and a bold initiative which shall present Christianity as both an intimate individual experience and as a comprehensive enduring fellowship finding peace in the glad acceptance of spiritual, sacrificial discipline. This will offer to the perplexed peoples of the earth "a dream far more exciting than that advertised by the Kremlin." Even those who might describe the dream in somewhat variant terms owe a debt to the writer who has charted a typical course through chaos and demonstrated that religion can again assert its potentiality to mould the future.

EARL CRANSTON

The Prophetic Faith of our Fathers, by LeRoy E. Froom, Volume I, Washington, Review and Herald, ©1950, pp. 1006, $5.

For the "prophetic" interpreters of the Bible, the four massive volumes of Froom upon *The Prophetic Faith of our Fathers* will prove an inexhaustible gold mine of data. It will become their classic. If all the preachers of all the varieties of "prophetic" interpretation presented a dozen times a day over the radio were to take a biennium off to digest these four volumes, the terrible confusion of their contemporary listeners would be considerably reduced. Sixteen years of continuous research, meticulous documentation, calm, clarity, poise, fairness, wide range of knowledge, the latest archæological information—these are a few characteristics of this huge work.

One wonders at the fine printing job, the quality of paper used, the up-to-dateness, the story of prophecy in pictorial form, the carefully constructed charts, the copious bibliography, the well-done index, the terrific production costs surely running into five figures, the audacity and the faith that completed it on such a grand scale. There is nothing shoddy here. Troeltsch on reading it would have underscored his conclusion that he was right as to *Who's Who* in Christianity—that minority groups still accomplish the marvelous. As a reference work, it is unexcelled for this area of Christian thought. We only wish that an index of biblical references had been added.

Anything approaching a just review would require ten times our space. We limit ourselves to calling attention to only a couple of matters. In the *Theologische Zeitschrift,* March-April, 1951, pp. 81 ff., Erik Peterson has an article which throws new light upon the attitude of Eusebius of Cæsarea toward millenarianism and suggests some revision of Froom's fine treatment of the latter's change of front after, let's say, Nicæa. The Old Testament used by the early Christians was the Septuagint. Now the verses in the Greek translation at Deut. 32:8, 9 have a different reading from that found in the Hebrew. It makes Israel a special nation:

> When the Most High allotted their inheritance to the nations,
> When he dispersed the sons of Adam,
> He set the boundaries of the nations
> According to the number of the angels of God.
> But the allotment of Yahweh himself was the people of Jacob—
> Israel became his very own inheritance.

Other peoples have only guardian angels; Israel has Yahweh himself as protector.

But by the equation that Israel equals the Christian church, this ancient bit of nationalism was transferred to the church in I Clem. 29:1 and 30:1. It profoundly influenced Eusebius, see his *Demonstratio Evangelica* IV, vii, 1 ff. And since this treatise was composed before Nicæa, the consequences must be entered in any attempt to construct his later views. From here it is easier to make the transition to the church as the kingdom of God and the appalling claims of the church to nationalism.

The second point is that it was not Protestantism that first identified the pope and papacy with certain apocalyptic characters. It was toward the close of the tenth century that Bishop Arnulf of Orleans, addressing a council of the church, said: "If he [the pope] hath not charity, and he is puffed up with his learning only, *he is Antichrist sitting in the temple of God, and demeaning himself as a god; he is like unto a statue in that temple, like a dumb idol, and to ask of him a reply,* is to appeal to a figure of stone" (p. 542). Thenceforth, titles applied to the papacy include Beast, Babylon, Man of Sin, and Little Horn. ". . . the Roman church pushed its way into the place of the Roman Empire, and the pope, the Pontifex Maximus, became Cæsar's successor" (p. 398). That title discarded by the emperor Gratian was assumed by the pope, while *vicar* and *diocese* were also carry-overs from ancient Rome. One wonders how often some of these facts will be called to the attention of President Truman by fervid pulpit orators during the hot campaign of 1952.

Needless to say that those who date Daniel in the second century B.C. and regard is as an apocalypse, not as prophecy, and are certain the Hebrew canon rightly locates it among the hagiographa, would reach very different conclusions regarding the original significance of this and that; but they bow in admiration before the scholarship represented throughout these pages.

CONRAD H. MOEHLMAN

BOOK NOTICES

The Superstitions of the Irreligious, by George Hedley, New York, Macmillan, 1951, pp. ix, 140, $2.50.

This is a challenging book for those who think religion out of date. The superstitions dealt with in a succession of vigorous chapters are such as these: That religion is static, does not change; that it is at odds with reason, a contradiction of competent scholarship; that it sits down on symbols instead of pushing through to reality; that it is an escape mechanism, impractical, and gloomy. Originally a chapel address, it is based on Paul's word to the men of Athens, Acts 17:2, "I perceive that in all things ye are too superstitious." "Superstitious," the author believes, is the right word for the great number of superior people he has in view, though they would resent it. "Superstition" is a matter of something standing over one. What these people stand under is a texture of misunderstandings. The discussions of these misunderstandings are marked by frankness, wealth of illustration, willingness to look on the other side, and informed scholarship. One of the strongest chapters is that on "Religion in our Culture." "We cannot know our historic heritage"—in philosophy, in literature, in art, in music—"without knowing historic religion, and we cannot live in our heritage fully without breathing its vitalizing spirit." The last chapter on the religiousness of the irreligious is only four pages in length and could well be expanded. It is based on the Revised Standard Version of the same text, "Men of Athens, I perceive that in every way you are very religious." So the author believes about his friends whose superstitions he discusses. They are "devout seekers of truth, so long as it is not called religion." "They work earnestly toward the making of a better world." The fault, he concludes modestly, is with us, the bearers of the tradition we accept and love. This little book of 140 pages might be used helpfully for a series of discussions on "religion in the modern world" by church groups adequately prepared for a new point of view. Dr. Hedley is chaplain and professor of sociology and economics at Mills College, Oakland, California. Born in China, he has the broad horizons and strong conviction of a missionary background. He "cannot forget the simple Chinese as well as the missionaries who died during the Boxer rising rather than recant." No escapism there! ALEXANDER MAC COLL

The Oxford Group, by Walter Houston Clark, New York, Bookman Associates, ©1951, pp. 268, $3.50.

It is stated in the preface that the book is based on a doctoral dissertation, and on the jacket that the degree was granted in 1944. Chapter eight, "The Present and the Future," contains only ten meagre pages, and few postdissertation facts about the movement. Coming as it does from a professional psychologist who has "followed the Group closely" since about 1924, and who undertakes to present to the reader a "psychological study of its effects on people" (p. 8), one may be surprised to find so little of psychological significance. The author is convinced that the Group supplies "emotional power" to some individuals, but he does not deal with an explanation of this phenomenon. As to Frank Buchman, the founder and strong man of the Group, it is conceded that the volume has "done little more than catalogue his salient characteristics" (p. 114). The writer concludes his work with the opinion that we cannot tell whether the Group "will ultimately prove to be a blessing or

a curse" (p. 256). The sterility of this book appears related to an unproductive questionnaire which the author sent to ninety-two individuals, and from whom he received fifty-five replies. This instrument is reproduced in the appendix. Instead of a few tabulations of the results obtained with the clumsy vehicle, he uses not a single table. Eight of the twenty chapters of the book are given over to verbal summaries of each of the fifty-five returns on the questionnaire. These he erroneously calls "case histories." They purport to show the extent of approval, or disapproval, by persons who had been associated with the Group, for only three were active in the early 1940's when the study was made. There is no claim to having procured a representative sample. Of the forty-eight men and seven women who sent in replies the "great majority felt their contact to have been beneficial rather than harmful" (p. 226). The fifty-five persons, each of whom is given a pseudonym, came mostly from upper income families and, with few exceptions, are affiliated with the Episcopal, Congregational, or Presbyterian churches. Thirty-four are ministers. It would be interesting to have something on their manner of ministering.

RAYMOND L. HIGHTOWER

Christian Faith & Practice, by Leonard Hodgson, New York, Scribner, 1951, pp. xii, 116, $2.25.

Dr. Leonard Hodgson is Regius professor of divinity at Oxford University. For seven years he was Regius professor of moral and pastoral theology at Oxford. For six years he was professor of Christian apologetics in the General Theological Seminary in New York City. He has published eighteen books. The present little volume makes available a series of lectures which were open to all the members of Oxford University and were included in its official list. Since Oxford was officially a Christian university, it seemed appropriate to have at least one course which would express the genius of the Christian religion in terms which students of the most varied groups could grasp and understand. These lectures are conceived within the Anglican tradition. They are characterized by much sweet reasonableness, and it is obvious that Dr. Hodgson wishes to establish some sort of genuine contact with the non-Anglican mind. It is more an attempt to express the character of the Christian religion than to defend it. The Christian religion is seen as beginning with a great series of divine acts, and the Christian moves out to see what they involve in the way of belief. The belief itself only becomes secure when it issues in action. And so the actions of God in creation, in entering the world in Jesus Christ, in the great deed of redemption, make inevitable a body of belief which becomes secure as Christian faith itself becomes Christian action. It is in this fashion for instance that Dr. Hodgson approaches the doctrine of the Trinity. There are many memorable sentences: "The world of personal relations is at the heart of reality." "The divine rescuing activity waits upon the free human response." "We cannot worship a god who sins." There is much that stimulates and there is much sound thinking in this friendly and earnest book.

LYNN HAROLD HOUGH

Consider the Children, by Elizabeth M. Manwell and Sophia L. Fahs, rev. ed., Boston, Beacon, 1951, pp. xiii, 201, $2.50.

For two years the original volume which this revised edition supplants has been regarded as one of the standard works on the religious development of the child of five and under. About one third of the former book has been rewritten. This results in a greatly enriched statement which includes the newer insights in the growth of the "whole child." The portions dealing with the specific or particular religious

problems, such as prayer, death, and religious ceremonies, have been enlarged, and a new chapter on the primary and fundamental nature of the religious experiences of the child has been added. The opening chapter, "Spiritual Beginning in Infant Emotions," has been contributed by Dr. Louis Fahs Timmins. Manwell and Fahs are exponents of the developmental theory of personality. The thesis of this volume is "the conviction that the beginnings of religious experience lie deeply imbedded in the child's everyday emotional and active living, and that the nature of these experiences should be discovered and analyzed. Some beginnings retard and even dwarf mental and emotional development. Other beginnings enrich growth. Whichever they do are of the deepest importance" (p. xi). The authors make their case quite successfully. The volume, unlike many similar ones, is filled with sound common sense and is written in English instead of "psychologese" or whatever the jargon of psychologists is called. The parent or the teacher who is interested in having a child develop a religious consciousness which should stay by him through life and by which he will have an intelligent appreciation of the values of real religion and be able to use them in his everyday living as well as in times of crisis will do well to listen to these authors. They understand children and the way they may or may not develop religiously. The basic point of view is as excellent as the manner in which it has been developed and set forth. The book is well documented, and the selected bibliography will prove helpful to those who desire further study.

CHARLES E. BATTEN

An Introduction to Metaphysics, by C. H. Whiteley, Boston, Beacon, 1951, pp. xii, 174, $2.50.

The author of this admirable little book, a lecturer in philosophy in the University of Birmingham, England, says in the preface: "This book is intended for those without much experience in philosophy. Such a book should, in my opinion, deal principally with problems which seem to the general reader worthy of serious study. . . . It should also, as far as possible, present connected arguments and definite points of view." The book begins with expositions of the different theories about the relationship between mind and matter most favored by philosophers and scientists in 1951; it is strictly up to date in this respect—and also for this reason will probably be out of date after about five years! Brief explanations are also given of some of the older modern classical views, such as were held by Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, and the Hegelians. These, nothwithstanding their brevity, are accurate, lucid, and interesting. It is astonishing how much the author is able to cover in so little space. He concludes with a brief account of classical and contemporary views regarding the existence of God, the problem of evil, and the validity of religious experiences. The references for further reading are well chosen. The different philosophical positions are presented impartially, leaving the reader to decide for himself which he will accept. Americans will miss discussion of Dewey and Whitehead; but probably their views are too involved for presentation in a book of this character.

WILLIAM K. WRIGHT

Journey Through Utopia, by Marie Louise Berneri, Boston, Beacon, ©1950, pp. xi, 339, $3.75.

This book, a compilation of passages from some twenty Utopian philosophers and writers ranging from Plato in *The Republic* to Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World,* combines an original intention to anthologize several thousand years of

Utopian thought with a penetrating, though brief, analysis of each passage in relation to the whole, and to present-day conditions under experimental government. Indeed, Miss Berneri presents the challenging thesis, that if most of these "ideal societies" were to become flesh and blood, there would be little choice between them and twentieth-century dictatorship. The Utopians almost invariably advocated mechanical ruthlessness and efficiency, state-supervised eugenics, and slave labor or conscription to carry out unpleasant details—the dirty work in other words. Hitler and Stalin have practiced these very things, and there are few people who still consider them benefactors. Hence idealists and Utopian aspirants in our day are in a curious position of self-doubt, or are forced to rely upon individual decision rather than on the fatherhood of an all-wise state for any course of constructive action which they may advocate, supposing that they still believe in a final solution of some sort. This is not Utopia's high time; we have come too close to its realization to feel any great enthusiasm for the Republic, or the year 2000 according to Edward Bellamy. Whether or not *Journey Through Utopia* produces the sentiment of profound approval in other readers that it did in me is not important; it is a rare book in that it makes further thought and reading a sort of moral obligation. This is stimulating writing in the extreme.

THEODORE ENSLIN

The Life of the Soul, by Samuel H. Miller, New York, Harper, ©1951, pp. 158, $2.

The pastor of the Old Cambridge Baptist Church has given us a brace of sermonic essays that speak most sagely and savingly to the man of 1951. Unbelievers should be exposed to this book, but I think it has more for Christians who have gone stale. To the jaded person of the middle years, worn down by these thirty-seven years of war, social confusion, and overwhelming tragedy, the author speaks as a fellow sufferer, but as a hopeful one who knows where to go for help. From the vile and grandiose corporalities of the old world's totalitarian states, and from the shallow and noisy socialities of American life he turns with loathing. He summons us from the blatant propaganda and the rattling squirrel cage of much current living back to the place of quietness where we can hear the Eternal whispering to us the saving truth. The paradox of loneliness in the midst of crowded society haunts him, and he helps the lost and lonely man to bring his loneliness to God and to become a true person. Miller is adept and relentless in tracking down all the rascally pretenders to the throne of the human soul. He exposes man's facility in running away from God and the eternal. He confronts us with the inevitability of lonely death and with life's demand for vital decision. This is an evangelistic book, and the power of God unto salvation is offered in fresh and really compelling tones. This is also a curative work, for the good evangelist is always a physician of souls. The book may not reach the great public that has devoured *Peace of Mind* and *Peace of Soul.* Surely it offers no easy cures. But it is deeply rooted in Christian verities and in costly and radiant experience of divine grace. Few but effective quotations from Kierkegaard, Rilke, Eliot Péguy, and others reveal the richly stored mind, but the message is always the author's own.

JOHN W. BRUSH

Worthy Is the Lamb, by Ray Summers, Nashville, Broadman, ©1951, pp. xv, 224, $2.75.

Those who are sure of their complete understanding of the book of Revelation are the very ones who quite obviously are far from the mark in their interpretation

of this cryptic writing. It is a pity that the average minister or layman leaves the book pretty much alone, while it is the happy hunting ground for many among the peripheral sects. Therefore, any treatment that makes the book more intelligible, and hence more appreciated, is a welcome addition to the lists of New Testament writings. Professor Summers has for a decade been dealing with the book of Revelation in his classroom at Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary. His work has accordingly had a practical testing as it has been subjected to student opinion. In his book he has a twofold purpose: to study the historical background of Revelation and then to apply the material of his background to its interpretation. He begins with a brief survey and notes the characteristics of apocalyptic literature. Various ways of interpreting Revelation are discussed with preference given to the historical background method. After giving Revelation its proper setting, his second major task is interpretation. The author believes the book should have meaning to a modern Christian similar to what it meant to its recipients. The title *Worthy Is the Lamb* represents the central idea. "This Lamb-Christ who was victorious over the chaotic world conditions of the first century will be victorious over similar conditions in every other century until 'the kingdom of the world is become the kingdom of our Lord, and of his Christ: and he shall reign for ever and ever'" (p. xv). It is from this point of view that the interpretation of the message proceeds. One looks with interest for the author's answer to the question of dating and authorship. He assigns the writing to the period of Domitian and accepts the traditional view that it was written by John, son of Zebedee (who he believes also wrote the Fourth Gospel). He wisely asserts, however, while accepting the above view that the message stands even if the identity of the author is not known. In addition to presenting the vital core of the message of Revelation Summers' book would seem to have a special service to render. Conservative in its approach, it should help some students of the Bible to shed their peculiar notions regarding Revelation—dispensationalism, for example—and to see it in its proper setting.

RUSSELL C. TUCK

Experiments of Spiritual Life and Health, by Roger Williams, edited by Winthrop S. Hudson, Philadelphia, Westminster, ©1951, pp. 103, $2.

"How are you feeling?" We ask the question of a friend who has been ill with a bodily illness. Far more important is the question, "How is your soul?" If we asked it, we should probably be dismissed as a fanatic, or given the blunt answer, "None of your business!" The wife of Roger Williams had been gravely ill. With recovery, came a wavering in her sense of Christian assurance. Mary Williams was ill in that profound sense. Her husband had felt compelled by urgent duties to be away from her during much of this trying period. Hence this discourse, written for her benefit, scribbled down mostly in foul Indian lodges in the wilderness. Later (1652) it was published in England. Professor Hudson of Colgate-Rochester has edited the work and given us a helpful introduction. It is hard to convey an idea of the wealth of this book in a brief review. Men like Douglas Steere of Haverford have told us we were in need of good treatments of "ascetic theology" in Protestantism. How shall we direct our spiritual progress from day to day? How "maintain the spiritual glow"? The seventeenth-century Puritans lived out their days with profound attention to their advances and retreats, failures and victories, in the Christian life. We are not of their day or temper. But I am very certain this book has riches for us. The Rhode Island rebel and pioneer was a dweller in the inner temple. He lived his life in the reflected glory of that One Face. A quiet joy hovers over these

pages. Let us hope that every Christian with an ounce of historical consciousness will give this little book a meditative perusal. It should be on every devotional shelf, and also in every library of pastoral psychology.

JOHN W. BRUSH

We Americans: North and South, by George P. Howard, New York, Friendship Press, ©1951, pp. x, 148, $2.

The Friendship Press has been doing a very genuine service to the churches of the denominations coöperating in mission study themes in these recent years. From them has issued a fine group of annual reading and study guides for various ages of children, young people, and adults. For the current mission study emphasis on South America we have this excellent small volume by one who is a leading authority on the evangelical movement in the continent to the south. Dr. Howard, who is a lecturer under the auspices of the Committee on Coöperation in Latin America, has written widely for the religious press, including the well-received book, *Religious Liberty in Latin America?* Designed to give the reader elementary facts and orientation for an appreciation of the backgrounds, scope, and problems of Protestant work in Latin America, this book is crammed in a short space with fascinatingly told materials. In addition to covering the historical situation, there are forthright and factual answers to such questions as "What is the work of the Bible societies?" "What is being done about illiteracy?" "What is being done in radio work?" and "How Roman Catholic is Latin America?" The book is well annotated, and is equipped with a carefully selected reading list and an attractive map pasted on the back inside cover. The book is available in paper covers for $1.75. It is highly to be recommended for church adult study groups, and can be read with value by clergymen and teachers who need information on a timely and increasingly important subject.

KENDIG BRUBAKER CULLY

Christian Certainties, by Ronald M. Ward, London, Independent Press, ©1951, pp. 118, 6/.

"Are ordinary people losing their capacity for God?" So begins a little book on *Christian Certainties* by Ronald Ward, minister of the Romford Congregational Church, England. This book seeks to point out the certainties of the Christian faith in such a way that any person may lay hold of them. His style is simple, readable, and interesting. The theology is of the conservative trend, but is not objectionable in the way it is proclaimed. There is really nothing new in the book, for Christian certainties are not new. Yet, some people have a fresh way of approaching old truth. Mr. Ward says what he says well, but without flare or great beauty. The approach is interesting as the chapter headings will indicate: "The Need of Certainty," "The Grounds for Certainty," "God, in the Light of Christ's Person," "God, in the Light of Christ's Work," "Man, in the Light of Christ's Work," "The Outer Darkness," and "The Eternal Light." These topics lend themselves to a series of sermons that would be most timely in our day. The book has possibilities for study groups and for personal enrichment reading.

ALLEN B. STANGER

The Craft of Sermon Construction, by W. E. Sangster, Philadelphia, Westminster, ©1951, pp. 208, $3.

Dr. William E. Sangster, recently president of the Methodist Conference of Great Britain, has many ardent admirers and some caustic critics. When they have read

his recent book, *The Craft of Sermon Construction,* the admirers will assert and the critics will be forced to admit that here is a solid and effective book, the work of much painstaking thought and of long and ripening experience. The man who knows most about sermon making will find here fresh and stimulating suggestions. The man who knows the least about sermon making will find a wealth of material just suited to his need. There are now and then flaws of taste and there are occasional bits of pseudo unction. But they almost help to give the book its intimate human quality and its bright and quick and vital movement. It would be possible to write a book about "The Craft of Writing Books on Sermon Construction" which might be useful to Dr. Sangster. But many of the readers of this book will feel that he does not need any such help. That the book will be widely read and widely useful goes without saying.

LYNN HAROLD HOUGH

The Great Revivalists, by George Godwin, Boston, Beacon, 1950, pp. vii, 220, $2.50.

This is a pocket-sized volume with keyhole views of several familiar events in church history treated as revivals. The first three of the thirteen brief chapters are psychologically slanted deprecations of conversions and revivals, which are characterized as abnormal and harmful. The next ten chapters consists of facts and opinions on selected religious leaders from Peter the Hermit to Mary Baker Eddy. Revivalism in this book includes the Crusades, the Reformation, and the rise of Methodism, also the Kentucky revival of 1800 and the Welsh revival of 1904—which suggests too great a fascination with the generic possibilities of the term. However, the writing is mostly about the leaders, all of whom are regarded as psychological deviates. (Incidently, it is historically deviant to refer to Increase Mather as Increase Matthews [p. 103], and to Cane Ridge as Camp Ridge [p. 155].) Probably the theme of the book is set forth in the last paragraph, which is simply that religious upheavals must be explained psychologically rather than supernaturally. This writer explained them superficially.

RAYMOND L. HIGHTOWER

A Theological Word Book of the Bible, edited by Alan Richardson, New York, Macmillan, 1951, pp. 290, $3.50.

Of composite authoriship, mostly British and Scotch, this dictionary will be found very useful for ministers interested in topical information relating to theology with biblical references and interpretations. While it would be rated as conservative in the sense of a work acceptable to churchmen (rather than a critical work), it is scholarly in the sense that the authors are mindful of the modern use of the Scriptures. Sample terms which are discussed at length are: *baptize, baptism; disciple; forgive, forgiveness; grace; mercy; minister, ministry; patience; peace; reveal, revelation; righteous, righteousness; shame; stumbling block; time, season; transfigure, transfiguration; wrath, anger, indignation;* etc. Expository preachers in particular will be helped by this type of work, especially if they go in also for doctrinal preaching.

VERGILIUS FERM

The Face of the Heavenly Mother, by Josef Cardinal Mindszenty, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1951, pp. vii, 150, $3.

Well-translated, beautifully printed emotional meditations of 1942 in defense of all phases of mariolatry with sly glances at Protestant and liberal Catholic criticisms

of some aspects. The Protestant Church (*sic*) is so cold and will remain cold until it brings Mary back. For no one "gets to Christ who will not approach Him from the hands of Mary." As usual the brothers and sisters of Jesus are turned into cousins and the problems thus made to disappear. Catholics are gayer than Protestants because they still have a mother goddess with them. "If we were to lose Mary the world would wholly decay"; thus spake Pius X. The last pages are most interesting because of the cardinal's admissions, but the excisions are so numerous that it is impossible at times to guess just what was originally written, for example, p. 145. Yet the curtain is raised enough to conclude that there are some doubts within the Roman Church about its activities in public life. The beautiful anecdotes within these pages will reappear in many a Protestant sermon. For the church historian the volume is of little value; for the tired minister, a treasury.

CONRAD H. MOEHLMAN

Primitive Gospel Sources, by P. B. W. Stather Hunt, New York, Philosophical Library, 1951, pp. xv, 344, $6.

The author of this book has been influenced by the theory of the "testimony book," as proposed by Rendel Harris, and by the interest of contemporary British scholars—as Hoskyns, Davey, Tasker, and others—in the influence of the Old Testament on the composition of the New Testament. Hunt's thesis is that the Risen Christ taught the Apostles the testimonial method which was taken down by Matthew in Aramaic. These teachings, according to Hunt, are reflected in Luke 24. They were passed on in the form of testimony books, which later became the basis of the gospels, indeed of all the New Testament writings. This book falls into three parts, the argument, the evidence, and the evidence from dialogues. Even in the dialogues (Hunt's peculiar contribution to this thesis), the *earliest* evidence offered is at best to be placed in the last quarter of the second century. Much can be said for the influence of the Old Testament on the New. But the phenomena offered in this book admit of other explanations than the one offered here. In other words, the hypothesis is possible, but not probable.

P. H. IGARASHI

So We Believe, So We Pray, by George A. Buttrick, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1951, pp. 256, $2.75.

This most recent of Dr. Buttrick's books is a succinct homiletical treatment of certain cardinal postulates of our common Christian tradition as to beliefs, together with a lucid and stimulating sermonic treatment of the Lord's Prayer. It is of great value to all who appreciate clarity of thought and pungency of expression on great matters of Christian faith and prayer.

SANKEY L. BLANTON

Springs of Living Water, by Carl J. Scherzer, Philadelphia, Westminster, ©1951, pp. 93, $1.50.

One of the *Pastoral Aid Books* edited by Russell L. Dicks, this fourth volume "is written to meet, in some measure, the various spiritual needs arising from the stresses in illness" (p. 11). This it does by chapters which speak briefly to the several stresses and which supplement the pastoral call by selective Bible passages, a portion of a hymn, and prayers. It will be of value to the pastor and patient alike.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

The Plain Man's Christ, by D. W. Langridge, London, Independent Press, ©1951, pp. 254, 7/6.

Many readers will come away from this book with mixed reactions. In thirty-three brief chapters, bearing such titles as "His Temptation," "His Toughness," "His Divine Sportsmanship," "His Sacrament of Failure," "His Divinity," and "His Resurrection," the author seeks to set forth the "wholly unique greatness of Jesus." In this effort there is a theological blend of liberalism and orthodoxy, expressed with an imagination that often speaks with freshness and vitality, but which sometimes seems tenuous. In spots verbose, the style on the whole is trenchant with frequent arresting phrases. Taken from their context these phrases would probably seem glib or flippant, but within the framework of the author's presentation they often speak with a refreshing disrespect for professional jargon. While the book contains little that is original in one sense of the word, it may be commended for the several provocative insight and suggestions it presents.

P. S. ELLIS, JR.

Worship Aids for 52 Services, edited by Friedrich Rest, Philadelphia, Westminster, ©1951, pp. 247, $3.50.

This book was not compiled hastily; therefore it will not soon be exhausted of meaning by the user. The wealth of it will be a perennial source for the one charged with the details of services of worship Sunday after Sunday. Rich in the aids it offers, gathered from all the ages of the Christian church ancient and modern, edited with taste and skill, this is a book for the library of every minister who takes seriously his task of putting rich materials into a significant pattern.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

The Land of Beulah, by a pilgrim, London, Independent Press, ©1951, pp. 58, 4/.

These eight brief chapters on old age as a Beulah land contain considerable assurance that there is a glory to the later years of our lives, if we prepare for them, meet them with expectancy rather than fear, and accept their limitations as challenges to the discovery of new horizons. A reader who has not yet entered the land is not competent to judge its scenery, but he may believe an inhabitant's description, and so await with confidence his share of its beauty. A religious emphasis is developed in the latter part of the book.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

John Wesley's Journal, abridged by Nehemiah Curnock, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1951, pp. viii, 433, $3.75.

This work is an abridgment of the several volumes of John Wesley's *Journal.* In this little volume one can read Wesley's own words without alteration or comment as he traces the revivalist's life from the time he set sail for America until just before his death. Here, too, the beginnings and development of Methodism are to be seen through the eyes of the man who looked upon the whole world as his parish. This book is similar to Percy Livingstone Parker's *The Heart of John Wesley's Journal* of some years ago. Curnock's work contains more entries but suffers from a poorer quality of paper and smaller print.

RAYMOND J. BEAN